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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D., F.S.A.

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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

2 JULY VOL. XXXVII

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

SECOND COLENSO

The recently published volume, *The Rise of Christianity* by hop Barnes, for which a second edition is already demanded, had a reception as cordial in some quarters as it has been tile in others. Dr. C. E. Raven, Regius Professor of Theology Cambridge, hailed its publication with gratitude. We give the owing extracts from his review published in the *Spectator* of rch 28, 1947:

'Far too many of our Christian leaders behave as if critical study of the Scriptures had been a distressing and indelicate disease with which a sceptical liberalism had infected theology and as if orthodoxy had now shaken off the affliction and could return to its medieval or prescientific dogmatism unaffected by the discoveries and untroubled by the problems of the past century and a half. No attacks by the open adversaries of Christendom are more damaging than this debasing of the standards of truth by its accredited champions.

'In such a situation the Bishop of Birmingham has given us a brave and timely presentation of a Christian faith which knows and is not afraid to state the findings of modern critical studies as to the origin, history and character of the Christian religion. With the detachment of a great mathematician, the objectivity of a great scholar and the sincerity and integrity of a great man, he has set out in a straightforward record the "things concerning Jesus" . . . Repeatedly he brings out points which most Christians would like to ignore, and issues on which Christian scholars have been timid and hesitant;" but "he can finish the story by 'claiming for Jesus the Christ a supremacy that time cannot end.'"

'This is the chief value of the book: it is convincing proof that a man of outstanding intellectual integrity can give full effect to the work of critical scholarship and without shirking or minimizing its results can find it consistent to remain not only as a confessing Christian but as an Anglican bishop. To those who know Dr. Barnes this is a fact of great apologetic importance: no man would more readily have resigned his position had his conscience allowed him to do so. . . .

'But if (as is the case) the present reviewer would take a very differen view on many particular points and especially as to the character an writings of St. Paul, this is not due to any difference of principle. Suc matters must be decided in accordance with the evidence.'

On the other hand, Dean Selwyn, in the *Guardian* of June 6 is extremely hostile to the book and its author. He writes:

'In my judgment, it is a very serious matter indeed that a bisho should produce a book which systematically disparages the trustworth ness of the Bible, denies or casts doubt on the central doctrines of th Catholic Faith, repudiates all reference in the Eucharist to our Lord' sacrifice, and treats with contemptuous detachment the whole liber and scientific tradition of biblical theology which has distinguishe English and Scottish Christianity for generations. Not only will th book, owing to its author's episcopal position, be widely quoted by ant Christian publicists both at home and in the mission-field; but its man fest inconsistency with Anglican standards of faith and teaching is calcu lated to make the Declaration of Assent required of clergymen, and eve the use of the Bible and Prayer-book in public worship, little better tha a farce.'

The Times Literary Supplement, which in its reviews of reli gious literature is no friend of Modernism, almost emulates Dea Selwyn in the severity of its criticism (April 26):

'The result is not far removed from the now somewhat old-fashione account of Jesus and Primitive Christianity offered by Harnack an Bousset. There is the same dogmatic rejection of miracle, the sam tendency to label everything as "magical" that is not acceptable t the scientific mind, the same urge to present the work of Christ a "teaching," and the essence of Christianity as obedience to certain rul believed to have been laid down by Jesus . . . In the early Church th essence of the Gospel is the "belief in God which Jesus had taught. Th belief was combined with reverence for Jesus, who had sealed his ow faith by his death and whose Spirit was with his followers. Belief an reverence were expressed in high standards of personal conduct" (p. 224 In the present day the urgent question as regards the ultimate fate European civilization is "whether, by reaffirming the teaching of Jesu in its undeviating severity, Christianity can resume its hold on the hear and minds of men" (p. 296). Essential elements in this teaching a pacifism, socialism, and internationalism (p. 335).

'These results are so meagre that readers of the New Testament a bound to ask how they are obtained from it. By "the methods of anal tical scholarship" is the Bishop's reply. Yet, in his ruthless applicatio of the analytical method, the hand of the amateur is constantly apparent

The contributions to the Church Press in defence of D Barnes have been unexpectedly numerous. We have only roo to cite one of these, addressed to the *Guardian* of May 30 in repl to the *Guardian's* criticism of the Bishop's volume:

'Sir,—The Bishop of Birmingham's new book, *The Rise of Chris ianity*, has received more than its rightful share of adverse comment the *Guardian* and elsewhere. I can only deal with one issue. Your

viewer describes the Christianity in this volume as something very different from that which has been held and preached for nearly two millenniums. Now the Christian life in its essentials has possibly been unchanging along the centuries. It is certainly otherwise with Christian belief. Whether we like it or not, traditions, some of which were held to be vital, have been abandoned, and new beliefs and interpretations have come in. A static conception of Christian belief does not square with historical fact. Of this Cardinal Newman was well aware. Examples could be multiplied, but three will suffice. For nine hundred years it was generally believed that the redeeming death of the Saviour was a ransom paid to the Devil, and since this had support in the Scriptures and Fathers, it was strongly defended by Bernard against Abelard. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury was one of the first to reject this theory, but not on the grounds that it was contrary to the Bible and the Fathers, but because he intuitively felt it involved a degraded idea of God. In the middle of the last century, few Christians doubted the reality of the eternal punishment of sinners. A few believe this to-day . . . A hundred years ago or less, it was universally believed that St. Matthew the disciple of Jesus wrote the Gospel that bears his name, and that the Pentateuch came from Moses. These opinions on authorship are still considered to be essential in the Roman Church. However, few scholars to-day, who have real independence would seriously defend the old views. Christian ideas have changed considerably.

'The old stick which has again been pulled out, this time to beat the bishop, will simply not do, Christian belief is living, dynamic, possessing a thread of continuity, and yet ever seeking a closer approximation to Truth. Dr. Garbett has rightly said, "There can be no fixed and closed body of Canons in a living Church." The same applies to theological belief. If the Bishop of Birmingham has opinions which are different from those commonly held, the right procedure is to try to demonstrate, if possible, where the error lies . . . The testimony of Church History is clear. Departure from prevalent orthodoxy has been regarded as unfaithfulness to Christianity. Briggs, Temple, Maurice, and Robertson Smith are names which come to mind. Of course Dr. Barnes is not right in every conclusion. Who is? . . . It may be prophesied that in time *The Rise of Christianity* will become generally accepted as an able, courageous and determined quest for truth, which it actually does reach in some measure.'

This letter from which the above extracts are taken is signed H. O. Jenkins, whom our readers will not be surprised to learn member of the Modern Churchmen's Union. No more fearless ok than *The Rise of Christianity* has been written by an English hop since Bishop Colenso (who like Bishop Barnes was a cond Wrangler and Smith's Prizeman) published his critical mmentary on the *Pentateuch* nearly three generations ago.

The Rise of Christianity is significant, first, because it has been tten by an English diocesan bishop and is intended for modern ucated people with the two-fold aim of emphasizing the inpensable contribution which the religion of Jesus Christ makes the moral and spiritual welfare of mankind and that loyalty to s religion does not demand the acceptance from its adherents of

anything which is contrary to scientific and historical truth.

The second significant thing about the book is that it demonstrates how very few are the fundamental dogmas of the Christian religion. All who know the life of Schweitzer would affirm how truly Christian he is, yet the traditional Christian dogmas affirmed by Schweitzer are very few indeed.

Sir George Cox wrote of Colenso's Natal sermons:

> 'They are full of interest as shewing the thorough compatability of the deepest spiritual faith and trust with the most advanced and searching historical criticism.' (D.N.B.).

A similar impression is made by the reading of the Bishop of Birmingham's theological publications. Many of the historical and literary conclusions at which Dr. Barnes arrives, Christian scholars of high standing may find themselves unable to accept. This need cause no perturbation in Christian circles. The disagreements of Christian scholars throughout the centuries have been as notable as their agreements, as was recognized by Abelard in his famous treatise *Sic et Non*. Moreover, we are certain that the Bishop of Birmingham is far from feeling that he has said the last word on many of the controversial issues with which he deals. What is of real importance is that he has claimed the liberty rightly conceded by the *Doctrinal Report* to undertake such researches and to state his conclusions with freedom and frankness. Archbishop Frederick Temple wrote of such religious researches: 'If the conclusions are prescribed research is precluded.' The Bishop of Birmingham has claimed the right to follow the argument withersoever it leads, even into regions where few of his fellow-bishops may feel disposed to follow him publicly.

The Bible and the Rebirth of Christianity

So many are the problems, metaphysical, anthropological, archaeological, historical, literary—as well as religious and moral—which beset the reader of the Bible to-day, that many modern educated people of goodwill seem forced to conclude that the cause of moral and spiritual religion can be best advanced without recourse to the Bible.

This is not the conclusion of Dr. Stanley Cook, Fellow of the British Academy and sometime Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge, whose knowledge of the Bible is as profound as his knowledge of Comparative Religion is comprehensive. Although a writer of great books he is also a writer of small ones—yet the distinction is misleading. His small books are

at ones. This is emphatically true of his two Pelicans, *The birth of Christianity* (1942) and its recent successor *An Introtion to the Bible*.

Dr. Cook is convinced of the need for the rebirth of Christian—we are in the midst of the travail pains of that new birth—he is also convinced that the right understanding and the right of the Bible are needful for the accomplishment of this rebirth. give the first of his conclusions in his own words, cited from *Introduction to the Bible*.

> 'The Bible is a book of unique spiritual and devotional value, but raises many intellectual or academic questions, some of them affecting its religious significance, whereas others concern ancient history, archaeology and anthropology. In a word, religion and scholarship cannot be severed. Nor can we sever the Bible from science.' (p. 210).

s second conclusion is also best expressed in his own words:

> 'The simple fact is that the world has not recognized the reality of the Divine Power in the universe. To understand what it has been in the past we must turn to the Bible as interpreted in the light of modern knowledge.' (p. 211).

Dr. Cook is not only a believer in the mechanistic development of the Universe and in the biological evolution of life on s planet, but he is also a real believer in the spiritual rebirth of n. We use the word rebirth advisedly, because although Man, product of the Divine Creative energy which brought the Universe into existence and is ever engaged in its creative development, yet makes use, it would seem, of a different method in His ation of the higher nature of man than He employs in the lower ges of creation.

Human personality, the most wonderful product of the creative cess with which we are acquainted, would seem to demand its creation a much more intimate relationship with the Creator n is necessitated in the mechanistic and biological stages of the ative process. This highest creative act by which human persony achieves the spiritual stage in which it both realizes the lity of its own nature and the quality of the Being from whom t nature is derived, is described in the New Testament as iritual rebirth,' 'the birth which is from above'—the begetting the sons of God, co-heirs of Jesus Christ. The Divine Agent he begetting of sons of God the Bible describes as the Spirit or rd of God.

The supreme value of the Bible is that it is unique in the clears and quality of its affirmation of this Divine Nature of man, l of the stages and means by which man has become conscious his Divine Nature, and of what the possession of this Divine

Nature promises and demands. Once again this is best expressed in Dr. Cook's own words:

> 'The Bible takes us to great epoch-making occasions that have changed the world. A Divine Spirit moves through it; and it has made our history what it has been. And the future of that history will rest upon that Spirit and our response to it: this is what we mean when we say that the Spirit of the Bible is the Spirit of History.'
>
> 'More than any other book, the Bible has led man to understand the Universe and himself; it has directed him along the road to a Truth and a Reality which no religion outside Christianity has ever conceived. In the Bible men have found that which answered their deepest needs; it has something for every crisis. In it there is a depth of feeling; the greatest figures were those whose consciousness of the reality of the Universe has not been surpassed.' (p. 208).

It is this Divine Spirit supremely present in Jesus Christ, who to-day is striving to tell mankind those 'many things' which the historic Jesus could not tell His disciples, that the right use and understanding of the Bible prepares us to recognize and to receive.

The last sermon preached by Hastings Rashdall was from the text 'Hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches.' But to-day the summons runs, 'Hear what the Spirit saith unto the nations,' and its dominant note is surely *Die Weltgeschichte is das Weltgericht*.

The Resuscitation of the Canons of James I

The publication of *The Canon Law of the Church of England*, being the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Canon Law together with Proposals for a Revised Body of Canons,* is significant.

When we say significant we mean significant for ecclesiastics not laymen. A Victorian royal duke, during the recitation of a canticle, was heard to exclaim, 'Shawms, shawms—what are shawms?' The significance of Canons is equally obscure to the vast majority of laymen to-day. *Canon* is the Greek word for rule regulation, and is used ecclesiastically for what the Church has authorized. The Canon of Scripture consists of books authorized by the Church for the use of the faithful. These are called 'canonical' Scriptures. A good Christian whose merits have been officially recognized by the Church is thereby 'canonized.' A clergyman holding a cathedral post and subject to capitular regulations is called a canon, and the same term is applied to all ecclesiastical regulations authorized by Church Councils and other high ecclesiastical authorities.

The oldest Canons of the Church of Rome are the *Canons of Hippolytus*, dating from the third century: the oldest Canons of

* Published by S.P.C.K. 15/-. 1947.

e Catholic (Universal) Church are those of the General Council Nicaea, 325 A.D. They could all be included on a sheet of note-per. The best of them is: 'Let the ancient customs prevail': e worst of them prohibits the translation of bishops. To-day the ass of Canons is so great that they constitute a large library.

The publication of the Report on Canon Law takes us back er 300 years in the history of the Church of England to the thorization of our Church of England Canons by Crown and onvocation (not by Parliament) in the year 1603. The authoriza-on of the Canons (1603-5) was inspired by a growing determina-on on the part of Crown and Church to suppress Puritanism — policy which cost Archbishop Laud and Charles their heads nd ended in rending the National Church by a schism which up ll the present time all efforts have failed to heal.

These Canons of 1603 A.D., 141 in number, have become rgely obsolete. To-day they are quite unknown by the laity and most as little known by the clergy as are the *Homilies* with which ey are usually bound up in a single volume. The only classes of ersons acquainted with them are our ecclesiastical lawyers and hurch historians. Whether it is worth while to revise these anons of 1603 by omission, emendation and addition, and to tempt to legalize them in a new form in face of the controversy nd opposition which such an undertaking must entail, and in ew of the urgency of other Church reforms whose importance laims priority, is an issue which must involve anxious thought by ading English Churchmen, clerical and lay.

Ever since the days of St. Paul and his conflicts with the udaizers, Christian freedom has been threatened, and in not a w cases vanquished, by ecclesiastical legalism. St. Augustine mplained that in his day (the early fifth century) the case of hristian men in respect of restrictions and regulations was worse an that of the Jews. In the spacious days of great Elizabeth a rge measure of liberation from ecclesiastical legalism was secured r English Church folk, but Church disorders, fanned by fanati-l intolerance, prompted the Church's rulers to resort to the medy of repressive legislation — with dire results.

To-day in the sphere of the religious life our administrators ave surely been led to recognize that the true remedy for religious isorders is education, not legislation. It is on the inculcation and evelopment of principles and ideals of conduct and character, ot on the enforcement of precepts in the form of regulations, that ur national Church must seek to secure ordered freedom, con-enial unity and expanding influence.

It is difficult to see what really worth having the Church of

England will secure by the authorization of the Canons of 1603, revised and augmented. Will such authorization secure a higher standard of matrimonial morality? Will it secure a better body of English Diocesan Bishops? Will it secure more modern forms of Public Worship? Will it secure better relations with the Free Churches? Will it secure larger-minded and more judicious decisions in ecclesiastical lawsuits? We venture to assert that in none of these spheres would the authorization of these revised and augmented Canons benefit the Church of England and expand its moral and spiritual influence with the nation.

Students of the History of the Church of England will be grateful to the authors of *Canon Law in the Church of England* for a learned, lucid and succinct presentation of their theme. Their volume will form a valuable addition to the history of the Church of England. From that point of view alone the work was well worth doing, but from the point of view of practical proposals to be implemented in the present state of the Church of England, and as a remedy for existing anomalies and irregularities, it threatens to produce results much worse than the diseases it seeks to cure. It is deplorable when Christian morality becomes Antinomian, but it is still more dangerous to the spiritual character of the Christian Religion when the freedom with which Christ has set us free is replaced by ecclesiastical legalism.

The New President of the Modern Churchmen's Union

After ten years of office, during a period of great national stress and strain, Sir Cyril Norwood has retired from the Presidency of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

What his leadership has been for our cause is aptly expressed in the valedictory published in the Summer Number of *Oxford*:

> 'He will be remembered in his College and in the University for his quiet and effective chairmanship, his shrewd and practical judgement, his fine presence with its impressiveness lightened by the frequent flash of humour, and his power of finding the right note for most varied audiences.' (p. 11.)

Sir Cyril Norwood's eminence in the world of English education, not only in England but throughout the British Commonwealth of Nations, provided our cause with what it most needed when great efforts were being made to reform the national system of education and make it definitely Christian. During that period modern Christian education was the watchword of modern churchmanship, and it must continue to be so — for all sound progress depends on it.

To-day, however, our most urgent task is Christian reunion nly based on modern Christian education. But intimately com- ned with this urgent task of Christian reunion are intricate prob- ns of reorganization within the National Church itself. This tracting and divisive Church situation must be remedied practi- ly and at an early date if the Christian religion in our land is t to yield place to a degrading secularism.

It is therefore with deep satisfaction that we welcome the ction of our new President, Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., .B.E., the possessor of great practical gifts and organizing lity.

Sir Henry is a most distinguished member of our Civil Service d has served in nearly every branch of it both at home and oad. He is a barrister-at-law of Lincoln's Inn and a graduate London University, not only in Arts and in Science but also in vinity. In 1932 he took his B.D. (general) and in 1934 his B.D. ilosophy). By his election Sir Henry Self becomes the eighth esident of our Union founded in 1898. His seven predecessors, . Morrison, Sir Thomas Dyke-Acland, Professor Percy rdner, F.B.A., Dean Rashdall, F.B.A., Dean Inge, C.V.O., F.B.A., Dean Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., and Sir ril Norwood, LL.D., have made no inconsiderable contribution the cause of enlightened Churchmanship and Christian Re- ion in this land.

The selection of a successor to Sir Cyril Norwood has been easy matter, for some of the leading members of the Council re convinced that the new President ought to be an influential rman of wide experience. Others were convinced that he ought be a theologian. Most happily the higher synthesis has been ieved by the election of Sir Henry Self. That one who is rmanent Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation should ve consented to become our President is one more proof that it always those who are most hard-worked who are the most ready add to their labours.

Sir Henry has been a member of the Union for nearly a quarter a century. He is a powerful and attractive speaker and will liver the Presidential address at our coming Modern Church- n's Conference in Westfield College, London, on September 22. s theme will be 'The Christian Religion to-day: its tasks and ospects.'

WHAT IS EXISTENTIALISM?

By the Rev. Geddes MacGregor, D.Phil. (Oxon.), B.D., LL.B. (Edin.).

SINCE the years in which Europe began to recuperate from the more obvious effects of the first World War we have heard much about 'existentialism' and 'existential philosophy.' The use of the term by Sören Aaby Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has caused it to be closely associated with his name, though the idea it expresses is as old as philosophy itself. It is not without significance, however, that the dominance of the idea in European thought should have come about with the aftermath of the agony of 1914-1918, nor that we should be turning now, with renewed interest, to existential philosophy after the yet greater struggle of the present decade.

What, precisely, is existentialism? In the first place, the definition may be very easy. It is that type of philosophy which takes existence as its starting-point or central theme. Just as phenomenalism concerns itself with phenomena, materialism with matter, and idealism with ideas, so existential philosophy is concerned with existence. But 'to exist' means 'to be,' and to say that a philosophy is a philosophy of being does not tell us enough about it even for a beginning, for a philosophy which was not in some sense a philosophy of being would not be a philosophy at all. It is true that the emphasis on 'being' as the central question to be discussed by a philosopher or philosophic school gives us an indication of the manner in which the proposed task is to be conceived. Nevertheless, such philosophies of being or existence may vary greatly. Jacques Maritain has rightly reminded us, for instance, that Thomism, the philosophic idiom of Roman theology, is an existential philosophy, for Thomism is nothing if not a philosophy of being. Throughout the whole course of the history of philosophy the problem of existence or being recurs, just as do, for example, the problems of reality, matter and truth.

As used in contemporary discussions, however, the term 'existential' means something more specific. In principle, it but underlines a particular aspect of the manner in which reality is philosophically apprehended. This approach to reality is to be found in some of the meditations of Augustine, and is highly characteristic of those of Pascal. It appears also, in a more intellectualist fashion, in the *Méditations* of Descartes. The analyses of the French philosopher Maine de Biran (1766-1824) exhibi

etaphysical thinking which attends closely to the aspect of reality e now call 'existential,' and the work of Bergson may be con-dered a more recent anticipation of contemporary descriptions the existential attitude. While every doctrine, even that of egel, may be regarded as existential, provided that it integrates e various aspects of reality and has been 'lived,' there is in the story of philosophy a trend of thought, easily traced, which ainly leads up to Kierkegaard and the modern existentialists. has produced outlooks as different as those of Nietzsche and ascal. Broadly speaking, it tends to relate all philosophic ought directly to experience, in the belief that out of the urgency nd poignancy of immediate experience we grasp reality more rmly than is otherwise possible.

However much philosophers have learned from their books, ey have always had to turn to their own experience of life in der to advance human thought. Experience itself is to some xtent transformed, however, in the very act of reflection on it. cientific experience, for example, is very different from everyday xperience. When the plain man is fortunate enough to find a late of bacon and eggs on his breakfast table and proceeds to njoy the situation, his experience is remarkably different from hat of a scientific observer of it. The latter would concern him-lf with, say, a chemical analysis of the plain man's saliva or of e bacon fat; or he might interest himself in calculating the itamin content of the dish; or again, should his interest lie in xperimental psychology, he might wish to investigate to what xtent the impact of the scene on the visual and olfactory nerves spectively had affected the flow of the man's gastric juices. ow, philosophic experience of the situation would also be differ-nt from the plain man's, but only by reason of deeper and more horough reflection on it as a whole. To the extent that the philo-opher was a competent philosopher he would try to neglect no spect of the total situation; but a scientist might be extremely ompetent without taking more than a fraction of it into account. t is his function to extract from experience, so that scientific ex-erience is by its nature selective in regard not only to its objects ut also to the mental conditions which serve to apprehend and xpress them. The philosopher, on the other hand, diminishes his ight to be so designated, to the extent that he restricts himself to ny part, however great, of the total situation, or sets up a barrier etween himself and experience. He must interest himself in the hole *being* before him, in such a way as may enable him to cover he entire situation. No matter how learned we may be, we are, as ocrates perceived, worthy of the name of 'philosopher' only to

the extent that we are conscious of our ignorance; but this consciousness of ignorance which is a necessary factor in philosophic reflection, far from being mental indigence, contributes to the completeness of experience as a whole. It is only in this sense that the philosopher's experience is different from that of the plain man; he sees differently because he sees more of the whole situation and sees it more clearly, while the scientist's experience is different because he deliberately elects to see only part of it in a particular way, which of course may make his findings very valuable for certain purposes, but inevitably alienates his experience from that of the plain man in a radical way.

Because the human mind is limited, the philosopher is nevertheless in constant danger, in the course of his intellectual exercise, of losing touch with the totality of the *being* which it is his function to think about. It is against this danger that all existential philosophies cry out. Existentialism is therefore always in some measure a protest; but it is a protest not against philosophy but against the neglect of philosophy to do what it has always been philosophy's business to do. It is only in this way that existentialism comes forth as an opponent of particular philosophical emphases, such as those of the various schools of idealism or materialism. An existentialist may write himself down as a realist or an idealist, as a theist or an atheist, almost in the way in which a political statistician may call himself a Liberal or a Communist, and yet agree with his political opponent in stressing the value of statistical fact. But as superficial political life tends to make thought about political issues superficial, so lack of genuine philosophic experience tends to superficiality in philosophic reflection. It is for this reason that the best philosophers have always valued stirring episodes in human life; these may help us to be jolted out of a rut of thought which has been moving away from the only proper subject for a philosopher's attention, *being*. An experience such as that of a world war, peculiarly shocking to the human mind, confronting it with situations which run counter to many of its cherished presuppositions, presents it with problems which did not seem to arise before, and yet are now seen to have been there all the time. The philosophic mind asks questions about *being*, and a startling, world-wide experience is likely to stimulate such questions among persons who would not otherwise be inclined to ask them. In other words, it tends to make a greater number of plain men in some measure philosophers.

On the other hand, there have always been some who needed no such world-shattering events. They have been stimulated by peculiarly rich or shocking individual experiences to ask philo-

ophical questions. It is plain that Kierkegaard, for instance, was timulated in such a way. It happened, moreover, that one of the actors in the situation which confronted him was that contemporary philosophy, especially that which he encountered in his comparatively restricted environment, had a strong tendency to e moving away from experience into abstractions. Our own age s, philosophically, an 'existential age,' though not wholly so, just s the heyday of the Kantians was a critical age; though not xclusively; but Kierkegaard's age and *milieu* were somewhat pecially in need of the existentialist protest, with the result that nat Danish thinker, faced with the philosophic problems arising ut of the poignancy of his own environment, and unable to solve nem by means of the kind of thought current in his day, discovered for himself one of the most profound philosophic truths bout philosophy itself: philosophy is emasculated to the extent nat it recedes from experience or allows itself to approach only mediated experience. An astronomer may put himself into a etter position for an *astronomical* study of the moon by standing quarter of a million miles away from it than he could achieve by aying a visit to its surface; but the philosopher, in order to perform his philosophic function, must stand within experience itself; or, strictly, he does not 'think about' or 'reflect upon' experience, nd can think philosophically only in the measure that he enters xperience.[1]

Kierkegaard, who was by upbringing and temperament a religious thinker' rather than a philosopher or a theologian, saw ll this very vividly. Though in his own day hardly appreciated t all, and for many generations known as 'the eccentric Dane,' nd that only within a comparatively limited circle, he has bequeathed to our generation an emphasis which our circumstances ave made it easy for us to value highly. This emphasis is as new s phenomenalism was in Kant's day, and yet is a rediscovery, a eturn to the urgency which characterizes the best philosophy of very age. Philosophic theory may easily degenerate into an peration by which concepts formed *about* existence take the lace of existence itself, so that we come to read the commentaries cribbled on the margin of life's book rather than the book itself. t is not the scholasticism of any particular system that is to be voided so much as the tendency to reduce any activity of mind o the mere application of a method; it is then that we get cholasticism of the worst possible kind, which always paralyses

[1] Nevertheless, in order to enter experience philosophically we must first tand outside it. Both theoretical abstraction and existential thinking are ecessary for the apprehension of reality.

genuine philosophic reflection. Existentialism ought always to mean avoiding scholasticism in this sense of the term. It should be concerned to show the vanity which is to be found in even the most rigorous theoretic abstractions, and to protest against the distance that often lies between them and concrete experience.

Modern existentialists have not always been content, however, with such a rôle, but have sought to develop systematic existential philosophies and impose them on thought in radical opposition to other contemporary schools. The German exponents have been particularly ready to do this. Such existential philosophy explains existence (*Existenz*) as an emergence, a process by which being emerges from being. So interpreted, existence is a transcendence of the original datum in such a way as to include time and eternity, finite and infinite, *I* and *Thou*. Existentialists who have elaborated such theories have, of course, invited the hostility of conservative idealists, especially neo-Hegelians.[2] There has been invented a philosophic jargon which it is hardly unfair to describe as the language of a new, existential scholasticism. This is, however, less true of an existential movement which, more freely conceived, has found itself at home in the intellectual climate of France. Existentialism so conceived has proved to be an invaluable aid to those who wish to show the fundamental unity of all philosophic experience.

Germany and France were the two countries whose thought was specially influenced by the revival of the idea of existential thinking. Though the results of the impact of existentialism on such disparate traditions might be expected to differ, they came out of a common, post-war mood, and have many points of contact. The German revival may be traced to Franz Brentano, who distinguished two modes of internal knowledge: (1) that which relates to data (objects), and (2) that which refers to their direction. The idea of such 'direction' reappears in Edmund Husserl, whose work has many affinities with existentialism. Husserl's' phenomenology passes easily into pure existentialism, and among those who bridged this pass was Max Scheler, who interested himself in a subject on which we shall have something to say presently, the connection between existentialism and religion. Scheler was interested in what he called 'material values,' that is, those which excite the existential content of the mind, as opposed to duty conceived in the formal, Kantian manner. In Martin Heidegger

[2] Guido de Ruggiero, in an essay recently translated into English by E. M. Cocks (*Existentialism,* Secker & Warburg, 1946), criticizes modern existentialism in very strong terms. He is representative of the neo-Idealist tradition in which Croce and Gentile stand.

nd Karl Jaspers we have pure existentialists who exhibit the fluence of Kierkegaard, though their interests lie in a very ifferent direction from his. They are both impressed by the agedy and anguish of experience. Heidegger gives us the idea the 'self thrown into the world,' while Jaspers finds in failure nd despair an intensity which is quasi-eternal. Both Heidegger nd Jaspers were born Catholics, but their interest in Kierkegaard nd their development of his existentialism[3] are philosophical, not eligious. Jaspers began as a disciple of Dilthey.

As recently as 1935, Jaspers was struck by the resemblance etween Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 'who in their lifetime were nored and for a long time after were made no account of in the story of philosophy.' Now, no two men could have differed in utlook more than the profoundly religious Kierkegaard and the heistic evolutionist Nietzsche. When Kierkegaard utters his haracteristic cry, 'Christianity is dead,' he means something very ifferent from what Nietzsche means when he announces, 'God is ead'; nevertheless it is true that they both have something in ommon, and this, Jaspers says, is their existentialism. He recog-zes that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were themselves very xceptional men, as was Pascal, and his concern is to find how one ho is not exceptional can philosophize with his eye upon the xceptional; hence arises modern existentialism of this type, hich, as Jaspers expounds it, has neither the godlessness of ietzsche nor the intensely religious faith of Kierkegaard.

Before considering the problem involved here, let us turn to rance where existentialism has influenced almost every aspect of ought. Though it had its stimulus from the same circumstances, ie anguish of war and the attempt to solve the problems to which is and post-war anxiety drew attention, its direction was different nd it was conceived in a much less gloomy spirit. I think it is ore constructive and suggestive, and that it is no mere coinci-ence that it fits easily into the traditional thought of France, hose intellectual temper has always been optimistic. Our own nglish perplexity about the existential movement is, I submit, ften due to the fact that it is the German type of existentialism hich we have chiefly imported. Naturally, France also experi-nced the impact of this German thought, and there is a wing of rench existentialism plainly German in origin and serving as a

[3] Walter Lowrie makes Kierkegaard not the linear ancestor of the modern xistentialists, but 'only a great-uncle.' The common ancestor, he suggests, rather Trendelenburg, whose *Logische Untersuchungen* Kierkegaard alued in his conflict with Hegelianism. (W. Lowrie, *Kierkegaard*, O.U.P., 938, p. 7.) But, as Dr. Lowrie himself admits, this genealogoy is disputable.

useful link beween the two otherwise distinct philosophic tendencies. But generally speaking, the French have turned the sense of 'nothingness' so characteristic of German existentialism into a divine mystery, pulsating with life. A writer like Gabriel Marcel, for instance, is in no danger of deifying the tension of the human 'moment,' as the Germans have tended to do. He connects existential thinking boldly with religion, insisting on an eternal peace which pervades human life to the extent that self does not get in the way and block it from view; God is always in the existential situation. Louis Lavelle likewise sees that, existentially, it is not enough to set forth the trials we have to undergo and the efforts we have to make in finding light amid the despair that comes of human misery; such efforts and trials but express our own miserable impotence. We could not even be aware of the true character of this very impotence, which the German existentialists claim to recognize, were we not somehow endued with a simplicity and candour, and did we not enjoy a sincere confidence in the divine Presence. In the apparently barren gloom of human misery, genuine existential thinking enables us to detect no mere 'nothingness,' but the expression of a great goodness which seems to be inviting us to understand it.

Contemporary French philosophers such as Louis Lavelle and René Le Senne are particularly interested in Value, which they see infused into us by the experience of values; they seek to avoid as not truly existential any kind of thought which fails to do justice to what we understand by existence *as a whole*. Existentialism is philosophy *par excellence* only if it seeks to understand in some measure *all* existence by *all* the existence we have experienced, not merely a sombre or terrifying part of it, to stop at which is to mutilate experience and negate existential thought. In face of a new and terrible experience such as the destruction of a city by atomic force, true existentialism, while enriching our philosophic patrimony in the light of the horrible event, cannot throw away all the philosophic insight we already, though imperfectly, possess. On a genuinely existential basis, our approach to Mind should become surer with every fresh experience, whether of joy or anguish, of hope or despair. If we cannot understand life completely in terms of hope, we certainly shall never do so in terms only of despair. It is such considerations that have in recent years so widely invigorated French literature.

How are we to relate existentialism to religion, and how, as Christians, are we to value existential philosophy? The connection between existentialism and religious faith comes readily to the minds of those familiar with the earlier theological works of

r. Karl Barth, which for some time made readers of the contin-
ital Protestant theology of the present day associate his and
ndred movements with the existential philosophy about which
l Europe was beginning to talk. Some of the students of con-
mporary theology, who might never otherwise have done so,
rned to Kierkegaard as the supposed ancestor of this theological
ndency. Both Barth and Brunner have, indeed, been much in-
enced by Kierkegaard. The former has, however, repudiated in
gorous terms — I think rightly, from his point of view — any
nnection his thought ever had or seemed to have with the
istentialist.[4] These continental theologians who have much in-
enced certain religious circles in our own country were steeped
the German form of existentialism, which, naturally, they came
fear.

The relationship with religion may be seen better in the French
itting, where the sharp opposition between an atheistic and a
eistic type of existential philosophy need not arise. The fact is
at genuine existentialism is neither theistic nor atheistic, nor can
even be said to have a tendency to be either. A system of
ilosophy, a methodology, may have such a tendency; but
istentialism ceases to be existential as soon as it becomes a
thodology. To ask whether existential thinking tends to reli-
on or irreligion, to godliness or godlessness, is much like asking
ether intellectual and moral freedom tend to the right or to the
t in politics. We must reply that it begs a question which, how-
er, existential thinking can help us to answer, just as intellectual
d moral freedom can help us to choose our politics wisely. If
od is in the situation and our thinking about the situation is
nuinely existential, we shall find God in it, if ever man can find
im at all. If we fail to find Him, then either He is not there or
e our thinking is not genuinely existential. To say, as some
ght, that God is there but withdraws Himself from me in the
rticular situation in which I find myself is simply to say that He
prives me of the capacity of thinking existentially, for if I could
d did so think I should find Him.

Much of the value of existentialism in the contemporary scene
is in the fact that it provides a link between otherwise disparate
odes of thought and outlook. Theists and atheists may agree
out existential thinking much as an agnostic rationalist and a
tholic may agree about the importance of reason, though their

[4] *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, English translation of the Prolegomena, by G. T.
omson (T. & T. Clark, 1936), p. ix. Cf. the interesting passage (p. 21 f.) in
ch Barth discusses his attitude to Kierkegaard and issues a warning
inst certain types of 'existential theology.'

mutual respect for it may lead them along different paths. Though the one may say that the other twists reason, or sees it awry, both recognize in it something sufficiently identical to make discussion possible. Existentialism provides a touchstone perhaps even more valuable, for the existentialist thinker is continually challenged to ask himself, 'Am I merely playing an erudite game, taking intellectual exercise as far removed from experience as chess is from battle, indulging in a pastime suitable for a subtle, philosophically gifted mind, or am I truly immersing myself in the totality of the situation I profess to analyse?' That all should ask this question does not ensure that all will come to the same conclusions about everything, but it does tend to bring all thinking back to a common meeting-place. The Christian thinker has the least reason to fear it, and will eagerly welcome it, rejoicing also that others who do not yet share his faith are exhibiting the sincerity the question implies. It is nothing if not a philosophy of choice; choice implies rejection, and consequently protest.

Existentialism is to be seen as a protest against the influences that destroy philosophy and should be a warning to all schools of philosophic thought rather than the establishment of a rival school. There is a danger that it should become this, as a legitimate warning against formalism in religious life may end up by becoming the worst formalism of all. Moreover, much as we enjoy protesting against other people's religious formalism while ignoring our own, the existentialist is always exposed to the danger of being less thoroughly existential than he professes to be; that is, he may select the fields in which he is to apply his existential thinking, and so tend to nullify its value even within these limits. We cannot and should not hope to reduce all philosophy to existentialism, for to do so would be to forget the limitations of the human mind, which must always need schools and scholasticisms. That which has invigorated and kept alive the best scholasticisms is in great measure their having heeded existential demands, by whatsoever name they may have been called. Philosophy, like language, must be systematized; but neither owe their life to systems; and the best and most enduring systematizations of both philosophy and language are those which most faithfully take into account the living undercurrent whence they are derived. It is to this undercurrent of philosophic thought that the existential movement properly directs our attention.

LIBERALISM*

By Sir Cyril Norwood

I HAVE not found it easy to throw my thoughts into shape for this address which you have been good enough to ask me to deliver, and partly the difficulty has arisen because the word liberalism is capable of carrying so many different meanings. It is perhaps not so elusive and uncertain as the term democracy, which means one thing in London, another in Chicago, and yet another in Moscow, but it is obscure enough for all that. And therefore I think it may be wise to attempt something like a definition by way of a beginning, even though there always sticks in my mind a remark of Lord Morley that 'if you want a platitude, there is nothing like a definition,' and he goes on to add rather unkindly that 'most definitions hang between platitude and paradox.' Let me quote one definition, which seems at any rate to avoid both these dangers, and which Morley himself deigned to quote, a definition framed by a Belgian political philosopher, Emile Banning:

> 'Liberalism is individualism: it means free examination in the intellectual order, independence in the political order, unlimited expansion of individual activity in the economic order. Its opposite is on one side Socialism, which sacrifices the individual to collectivity: on the other, Ultramontanism that absorbs him in the Church.'

I do not entirely agree with this definition. I do not like the phrase 'unlimited expansion of individual activity in the economic order,' for such unlimited expansion usually means undue restriction for many. But on the whole it does give what I want, and does bring out that Liberalism is an attitude, a state of mind, which has to do with religion, with politics, and with the whole business of the way in which as individuals and as nations we get our living. For my part I would be content to say that the Liberal to me is the man who is prepared to follow the argument wherever it may lead, who believes that he has been endowed with reason because God intended him to use it, in sympathy with his fellow-men, and with malice towards none. Such a man as this Liberal according to my definition of him is not very popular in any part of the world at the present day, and perhaps the most interesting line I can take this afternoon is to ask why this is so, and to attempt an answer.

* An address delivered by the retiring President at the Annual Meeting of the Modern Churchmen's Union on May 20th, 1947.

Distrust of Liberalism is due to various lines of thought, of which some are general, and apply at all times, so far as they are valid, and some are particularly relevant at the present moment, and derive their impressiveness from the critical circumstances in which the world finds itself. Let us take them separately. The most forcible line of attack, and the most difficult to parry, is that which was urged long ago by St. Ambrose, that 'it has not pleased the Lord to give his people salvation in dialectic.' There are Liberals who are apt to think that it does. A whole school of modern thought, reinforced by modern psychology, has become vocal in support of this criticism; it is pointed out with a great deal of truth that men in their actions, and in the thoughts which dictate their actions, are not guided by reason, by syllogism, and by argument, but by sentiment, inbred sympathies, usage, tradition, desire. The working men of Europe in the months preceding the war of 1914-18, using their reason, announced that they would stop war, and had very good grounds in reason for that intention, yet when the day came that war was declared, they all marched. It is but one instance out of a great many that I, or you, could quote, but I draw from it myself an inference which is not what those who quote it usually draw. It is that, if these things are so, if we are the creatures of tradition and prejudice, sympathies, and above all appetite, all the more is it wise to cultivate reason, and to give it as great a place in the shaping of our lives, whether it be as individuals or as nations, as we can possibly bring about and make effective. For surely none goes so far as to say that human reason is or ought to be without any influence at all.

Perhaps this afternoon, and in this company, it would be fitting that I should ask the question more particularly about Liberalism in the Church, and in the general field of religion. It has to be confessed that we who are Liberals in thought as to matters of the Faith are not conscious of any strongly running tide that is at the moment carrying us along. I do not think that this would ever prove to be the case in any generation, since it is the habit of religious bodies, and it is implicit in religion as they present it, always to hallow the *status quo*. Low motives and high motives alike combine to bring this result about. For one thing the Liberal who does not bow the knee to Authority, unless his reason approves the order which he receives, is unlikely to find promotion in the Church. It does not pay to think, save along certain lines, and this is true not in the Church only: men who have to combine and work together to do a job do not like, and frequently show that they have no use for, the man who does not march in step with the majority. For another thing there are some, and indeed a con-

iderable number, who think, without putting it into so many ords, that error is beneficial, where the uneducated and under- rivileged are concerned. There may not be so many to-day who ould advance this theory as there were for instance in the days f the Renaissance, or in the eighteenth century, but there are lways some who think in their studies what they would by no eans say on the platform or write in the Press. And then there ; that very human and not uncommon type, of the man who was ortrayed once for all by Rousseau in his picture of the Savoyard icar : here is the passage from *Emile* which I have in mind.

> ' The essential worship is the worship of the heart. God never rejects this homage under whatever form it be offered to Him. In old days I used to say Mass with the levity which in time infects even the gravest things when we do them too often. Since acquiring my new principles I celebrate it with more veneration. I am overcome by the majesty of the Supreme Being, by His presence, by the insufficiency of the human mind, which conceives so ill what pertains to its Author. When I approach the moment of consecration I collect myself for performing the act with all the feelings required by the Church and the majesty of the sacrament. I strive to annihilate my reason before the Supreme Intelligence, saying, " Who art thou that thou should'st measure infinite power ? " '

nd so we pass to that still more numerous class who quite defi- itely distrust that human reason, who accept without critical ques- on or demur what is revealed, whether it be the text of a book rbally inspired, or the voice of an infallible Pontiff, or the dic- tes of the Church, as they interpret the Church. There are some ven who exult in trampling upon human reason, who write on their anner the slogan '*Credo Quia Impossibile*,' and they may speak ith all the arrogance of the Pope who in 1864 promulgated :

> ' If anyone says that the Pope can and shall be reconciled to Liberalism let him be anathema.'

r they may speak with the milder and more persuasive accent of Wordsworth :

> ' Here then we rest : not fearing for our creed
> The worst that human reasoning can achieve
> To unsettle or perplex it.'

uch are some of the forces which are always making against the ee use of reason in shaping religious belief, and they are as con- nuous and pervasive as the tides of the sea. But they are not e only forces working against Liberalism in our time. The rongest force working against Liberalism to-day is the bitter sappointment which has come upon humanity as the result of e two world wars which it has been our misfortune to witness and dure. Remember for a moment the high hopes, the unshaken and nshakable confidence of the Liberals of the nineteenth century.

Let us listen for a moment to the authentic accents of the dawn, the splendid vision of what was to be, as phrased by the prophet Mazzini.

> 'This yearning of the human mind towards an indefinite progress, this force that urges the generations onwards towards the future: this impulse of universal association: the banner of young Europe waving on every side: this varied, multiform, endless warfare everywhere going on against tyranny: this cry of the nations arising from the dust to reclaim their rights, and call their rulers to account for the injustice and oppressions of ages: this crumbling of ancient dynasties at the breath of the people: this anathema upon old creeds, this restless search after new, this youthful Europe springing from the old, like the moth from the chrysalis: this glowing life arising in the middle of death: this world in resurrection — is not this poetry?'

Nearly a century has gone by since a visionary could write those romantic words, and move men to action for the realization of the vision which had kindled his heart to a flame. And now one cannot read them again without a smile and a sigh, since the course of events would seem to have given the lie to every assertion. There is no such thing as inevitable progress, and it is folly to rely upon it. There is no impulse towards universal association, but only the gathering of the nations into hostile camps, and the poisoning of the minds of young Europe. There is no endless warfare against tyranny, and the world has witnessed the rise and growth of the most brutal and the most efficient tyrannies which it has hitherto seen. I will not go on quoting in detail: the glowing figure of young Europe that Mazzini saw has proved to be the grimmest of all the scourgers of humanity, its face the face of a skull. In conflict with such a reality is it possible for Liberalism to survive?

Let us consider, and rapidly recapitulate the events of our own lifetime, of those of us who can at any rate look back to the beginning of this century. We remember Liberalism strong in the political field, and from 1906 onwards setting steadily about the creation of a new order. But it all crashed in the tragedy of 1914-1918, only to revive again amid the blood and the ruin of Western Europe. For it was claimed that the struggle was a war to end war, and out of it Christianity and enlightened humanism would combine to create a new international order, a League of Nations which for ever would outlaw war. Liberalism was strong enough to bring the League of Nations into existence, but not strong enough to rear the infant to health, strength and maturity. We had to witness the consummate wickedness, the crowning idiocy, of the second world war, which has left us with the flimsy hopes of

U.N.O., that ghost or patched up replica of the League of Nations to which peoples, who have apparently learned nothing, send representatives who have apparently learned nothing save the art of conducting international discussion and co-operation with the inscrutability of professional poker players. Behind this disastrous failure to make peace, or anything like peace, looms in the background, and not very far in the background, the Atomic Bomb. When one thinks of all that might have happened since the beginning of the century, of the standard of life that might have been created, of the physical betterment, of the intellectual advance of the new education, of the banishment of drudgery and ugliness, if mankind could have followed the guidance of reason, and when one compares that with what has actually occurred, at once so wicked and so mad, is it not natural to ask who can trust human reason? Is it not very hard to believe that there is a God, and if there be a supernatural Being, can He be thought of as Love? Is not a man self-deluded who can speak of absolute spiritual values, and regard truth or goodness as anything worth dying for, or, for that matter, living for?

There are a good many among those who have at once ability and a serious purpose in life who feel themselves driven to such gloomy lines of thought. But most shrug their shoulders, and abandon any attempt to interpret history, or to penetrate the future. Like the French thinker Diderot they would say:

> 'Everything even among the greatest of the sons of men is incomplete, mixed, relative: everything is possible in the way of contradictions and limits: every virtue harbours elements of uncongenial alloy, all heroism may hide points of littleness: all genius has its days of shortened vision.'

In other words, nothing comes up to standard, and you must not expect it. But such an attitude is not really Liberal, it is not based on any ardent belief in spiritual values and the possibility of their realization. It leads at best to a certain worldly tolerance of the imperfect and a certain indifference to crime and wrongdoing. Needs must these things be, and we must stand aside and let the storm blow itself out. So far as my own limited experience goes, I should say that this was a very common attitude among thinking men and women to-day.

But of course this is not the whole story. To-day in a degree hitherto unexampled the common man, the mass-produced, if you like, and mass-thinking man is in control, whether directly as in Britain and the United States, for instance, or indirectly as in Russia. As a result of the wars he has come suddenly into the

seat of power, before he has been educated, before he has become capable of thinking about the problems of human society, before he has benefited by moral and religious training. On all this we could enlarge at some length, for it constitutes a problem of great difficulty, the solution of which is by no means clear. For just as the invention of the atomic bomb and several of the recent advances in natural science have come upon humanity before it is morally fit to use its new powers for good, and not for evil, so too has political power come into the hands of the masses before they are educationally fit to use it. The bulk of our voters ask themselves, 'by following which side shall I get most out of it for myself?' the very natural appetite of the ordinary human being, but it is not the way by which we shall create a strong or lasting democracy. It is to me, for instance, a pity that the Butler Act could not have been passed twenty-five years ago in order that the voters of to-day might be more fit for their duties than they are. It is in no spirit of disgruntled Toryism that I say this; but do not be alarmed, I am not going to stray away into the tangled paths of educational policy.

Dark as present days are, and difficult as is the road which we have got to follow, I can myself but draw from it the necessity of following the light of reason so far as we can see the light. I would nail these colours to the masthead and go down fighting, if needs must. For it is not reason which has brought us to our present pass, but human unreason: let us rekindle our faith. It is sometimes said, and perhaps it is particularly said of us, who profess to be Liberal Churchmen, that it is just this application of the limited human reason to divine mysteries, and to problems too high and too deep for its capacity, that has destroyed religious faith in the hearts of many, and weakened the Churches. There is no need for me to go closely over the well-trodden ground of so many controversies, in a company such as this. I would merely ask one or two questions. When was the period when Christianity effectively checked the ambitions of kings and statesmen? Does Liberalism destroy religion, or does it purify it? Does it cut out the dead wood, and give room to the living shoots? Or take the Bible, upon which so much of our Christianity is built; it has been subjected to an unparalleled experience of relentless criticism that has now gone on for a century, and it has emerged all the better from the purifying fires with a keener and a more vital flame. We now see with much greater clearness the self-revelation of God through the history and the literature of the Jews: we now realize more vividly the life and teaching of Jesus: we recognize the wonder of the growth of the Christian Church. In place of a tale of tradition and magic Liberalism can offer a constructive Christianity which claims

once the allegiance of the heart and the consent of the human ason. It strengthens belief in God; it lays hold on eternal life. nd for this very cause it is of supreme value in this crisis of the man story, because it is just this failure, this ceasing to believe God among the uneducated many, this loss of hold on the doc- ine of eternal life among all classes, that makes humanity drift guided towards the future, as it is drifting to-day.

It is for us to go on quietly and steadily in the spirit of Christian lith. We are a small society in the Church of England, just as ır whole nation is comparatively small among the great masses of manity who are forming themselves into political unities of a nd. In each case, by setting the example of following reason, I said before, with sympathy towards all, and with malice to- ards none, we can show a more excellent way than has so far been llowed. Our country by refraining from empire in the old sense, d by ceasing to govern in the old sense, may begin to lead in the w sense: our modest society by accepting what is proven may ll show that Christianity has nothing to fear from truth, and can ll find room within it for variety of experience and interpretation that house of many mansions which is to be the religion of the ture. Like Tennyson's Ulysses, we must oppose to the storm ree hearts, free foreheads.'

> 'It may be that the gulfs will wash us down:
> It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles.'

may be, but only if humanity learns the lesson of Liberalism ich means that in religion, in politics, and in all its economic e, it will follow in good faith the road which enlightened and partial reason declares to be the true path; and that will be und to be the road that is well-pleasing to God.

THE SELF AND OTHER SELVES*

By the Right Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., M.C., O.B.E., Bishop of Truro.

THE gentle reminder of the things of the spirit presented to us by the Christian Church does not force itself upon us, but, speaking for myself, I am sure I need to participate in the life and fellowship it offers. I am sure others need it too. Indeed my conviction is that everybody needs it. In this paper I am going to try to exhibit my reasons for this conclusion.

Like most people who desire to get as near as they can to the truth about themselves and the world, I have read a good deal of psychology, and I have tried to wrestle with the more attractive systems of philosophy. Psychology seems to leave the conception of spirit to poetry and theology, and I hope to come to that in a second paper. What psychology itself deals with is the mind. 'Psychology is the science of the mind so far as it is a sequence of mental processes in the individual.'[1] So that psychology regards my mind as a stream of mental events. Very good: perhaps so. Certainly I am a living, moving, forward-looking creature, and somehow I carry the past with me into the present and forward into the future. As a conscious individual I am, in the same moment of experience, aware not only of the immediate present, but also of the immediate past and of the immediate future. 'We sit,' as Professor William James used to say, 'perched on the saddle-back of the specious present from which we look in two directions into time.' That saddle-back, says Dr. William Brown, is due to the power of the mind to rise above mere temporal sequence.[2] I agree: but whatever the essential nature of my mind may be, just taking my self as I see it, I am aware of certain fundamental urges and desires. First there are the desires most obviously associated with my body: the desire to be at ease and free from pain and discomfort. I want sleep and a good appetite. I want zest and energy and pleasurable sensations through tasting, touching, seeing, hearing and smelling. Then secondly I recognize truth as opposed to untruth, beauty as opposed to ugliness, goodness as opposed to badness, and I very strongly prefer truth and beauty and goodness

* This and the following paper were read as two of the Arthur Burrough Memorial Lectures, 1946, given in the University of Leeds under the auspices of the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement.

[1] William Brown, *Personality and Religion*, p. 28.

[2] William Brown, *Personality and Religion*, p. 38.

their opposites. I realize that my apprehension of truth and auty and goodness needs training, and my acquaintance with em is but slight. But I am eager for more, always eager for more. nd thirdly, I am conscious of an urge to achievement, a longing r security, and a hunger for love.

In actual experience most of our desires are complex senti- ents built up of several of the elements which I have mentioned. nd to attain a desire we are ready to make efforts. Indeed the ry desire includes within itself a conative element.

Now I realize that in the rough classification which I have just ven I am not strictly following the psychological analysis of the xt-books, but I think I am truthfully describing certain real ements in human experience which are of special concern to us our present study. I am acutely conscious of these elements in y own case. I find them unruly elements, and elements which ash with one another. They constantly produce in me a state tension. The desire for sleep or for some pleasure of sense, for stance, conflicts with my desire to discover and apprehend truth. hat requires much study, and much study is a weariness to the sh. Moreover, an immediate desire often competes with a long- rm desire even of the same sort. Thus, as I sit here I experience ore than one urge to achievement. I want to achieve tidiness in ne part of my garden, I want to finish an account I am preparing the great garden of Tresco Abbey in the Isles of Scilly, but I so want to put my best into this paper, which is a more exacting sk.

Bodily desires are numerous and strong, especially in youth, nd as age creeps on and the pressure of the desires themselves ecreases, the pressure remaining is all the more welcome and the hole organism is eager to put itself in the way of it. People try compensate for their loss of natural avidity by the use of stimu- nts of various sorts, and even in ordinary normal indulgences any find it very hard to draw the line. How many people drink nd smoke rather more than is good for them or than they can ally afford! And how easily appetites get perverted, how the aving for excitement, for instance, intensifies itself! 'Of all the ntastic pictures of life in post-war London,' says a recent issue the *People* (which no one will mistake for a religious periodical), none is so sinister as that drawn . . . by our special investigator fter spending nights at the greyhound tracks . . . Here 40,000 can change hands in just over thirty seconds' running me. £500,000 is often wagered in an evening.'

The desires included in the first group of my amateur classi-

fication may easily become so insistent as to lead to the butterfly-life which flits from one thrill to the next. In that case the desires of the other two groups are neglected, suppressed, or even repressed. And that is bad for the human being, for the desires of the other groups are equally natural and more important. Here I have of course made a judgment of value. I can't help it: I do judge that. Thirst for truth and beauty and goodness *is* a higher thirst than physical thirst for drink or bodily pleasure. And I say this without being able confidently to define exactly what I mean by truth or beauty or goodness.

Another judgment of value which I cannot help making, for indeed it seems perfectly obvious to me, is that the best life for a human being involves the integration of bodily appetite with higher and spiritual elements. Thus, civilized man no longer guzzles his food, but takes it in meals which form the occasion of social intercourse and mental and spiritual fellowship. And even in the act of enjoying his food and drink civilized man becomes discerning and appreciative. And this involves self-discipline. To become sensitive to the delicate qualities of good wine, a man must be abstemious and acquire a trained palate. A much more important example is the transfiguration of the crude sex-instinct. That it is capable of such transfiguration is one of the deeply reassuring facts of the universe. 'The generative powers of the world are healthsome' the book of *Wisdom* says (i, 14). The natural sex-instinct operates as if designed to be an instrument of expressing and enhancing the union of a pair who desire to give themselves fully to one another. It certainly serves the purpose admirably. And what a brilliant idea it was that out of such a union the next generation should spring! Could anything possibly be better? The full scheme is so splendid and satisfying that the mind recoils from any perversion or prostitution of it. Yet the whole of human history is thickly strewn with examples of garbled expressions and exercises of sex.

But further, the proper normal satisfaction of natural bodily appetite is out of the reach of a large number of human beings. The majority of mankind is under-fed or improperly fed. It always has been so, and it still is. A considerable number both of men and women miss the normal delight of marriage. In such matters our own desires are liable to clash with the similar desires of other people. There is competition, and one of the competitors is unsuccessful. There is not enough to go round and some fall short. Frustration in some respect or other is an almost universal experience. And often, if we are not careful, our whole outlook on life

warped by some unfortunate experience of our own. How in-equently we meet a person altogether free from some obvious istortion of vision in one direction or another! The normal life not easy: the good normal life is far from easy, quite apart from cidents and unavoidable hitches and difficulties. These fre-ently occur and must be taken into account in our view of life a whole. No voyage through this world is calm all the way, and ten the voyage is very stormy. Sometimes, and all too frequently, nditions are artificially depressing and unfavourable. Think of e back to back houses in Leeds, each with two rooms only, and e few lavatories provided for the whole row huddled at the end the street. Think of the acres and acres of grimy steel works the Sheffield area, and of the miles of drab and squalid indus-alism around Bolton.

Happily there is innate in human nature the will to live. chopenhauer held that this is the most fundamental factor of all. nd it enables men and women to grapple with the ordinary prob-ms of life, as on the whole they do with remarkable persistence d tenacity. Leeds is full of industrious activity, and some of its oducts (*e.g.* ball bearings) are unsurpassed. Sheffield produces autiful silver work and the finest steel in the world; the people Bolton are folk as sturdy and honest and cheerful as you will d anywhere.

It must be added that the actual universe as we know it, the iverse of our experience, appears to be a universe of approxi-ation. No absolutely perfect circle exists anywhere, though there e many circles approximately perfect, and perfect enough for r practical purposes. The human eye, delicate and wonderful it is, has its ragged edges, and is by no means a perfect optical strument. Those great flowering trees, the Magnolias, when in ll bloom are a breathtaking sight, but, examined closely, they e never found to be in complete beauty. And so it is with every-ng in the world. Indeed, we are so used to approximation that never expect anything else, and accept imperfection all too sily. At the same time in our heart of hearts we are capable of preciating the Platonic conception of the perfect idea of a thing perfectly realized on earth, and we have spiritual longings which ach out that way.

But now I come to a more insistent and practical problem, ich we all have to face. So far I have assumed that the self is a nsistent unity. But actually that is not so. I am a creature of ods and fancies. I am liable to forget, to be careless, to be sh. And the consequences may be out of all proportion to my

normal culpability. One of the most promising of the choir-boys of Truro Cathedral, a boy of ten, was killed a few weeks ago by a motor-car driven by a careful driver. The boy himself was careful too. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred he would pause and look both ways before crossing a road. Only the hundredth time he omitted the precaution, and that one most unusual omission cost him his life.

An infatuated pair, carried away by emotional excitement, 'start a baby,' and another human being of incalculable worth is brought into the world on an indisciplined impulse of irresponsible people.

Someone enjoying a picnic on the edge of a wood on a dry summer's day throws down the end of his cigarette without realizing that the spark is not out. It smoulders, starts a fire, and a whole forest is burned to the ground.

A beautiful country house in Cornwall was destroyed by fire a few months ago, and the fire was apparently started by a boy with a blow-lamp attending to the lead on the roof.

And how much harm has been done by a few provocative words rapped out in an unguarded moment!

I have, of late, been greatly impressed by the dire consequences of lapses—mere lapses, as in many instances we should be inclined to call them. And in that connexion I cannot help feeling that I have a great cause of insecurity in myself. The point of that difficult clause in the Lord's Prayer comes home to me therefore. What does 'Lead us not into temptation' mean? The word πειρασμός translated 'temptation' (*Lk.* xi, 4) means trial, a trial of our steadfastness. Later in St. Luke's gospel, in the account of the Agony in the Garden, the word occurs again twice (xxii, 40 and 46), 'Pray ye that ye enter not into temptation,' and here, as the context shows, the meaning is 'Pray that you may not get into a situation which will put you to too severe a test.' And so in the Lord's Prayer. Earlier in the prayer we have prayed 'Thy will be done,' that is that God will lead us on along the path He would have us tread. All through the rest of the prayer we are assuming that God is leading us. Hence the petition is put that way when we come to it, and we pray that God's leading may not be into a situation which will be too hard for us. And if we pray this sincerely then almost as part of our prayer we must do what we can to avoid running into a trial which will give us a fall. The petition in the Lord's Prayer is worded in such a way as to pull us up and make us think. And we all need it, for we are all liable upon occasion to be presumptuous or foolhardy.

There remains what seems to me to be the central problem of l. And I mean the central problem for normal people. I am r our present purpose leaving out of account altogether de-nerates like Heath, gangsters like some of the Nazis, sadists, asochists, dipsomaniacs, drug-addicts, mothers who leave their bies in filthy rooms while they indulge in drink and adultery, ster-parents who treat their charges with gross cruelty or neg-ct, and the like. I have in mind just the common run of ordinary spectable people, the great majority of British citizens.

The problem is put in a nutshell in a letter written by one of e best and most honest teachers of his generation in the Church England, Frederick Denison Maurice. The letter was written his distinguished friend Fenton John Anthony Hort on Novem-r 23rd, 1849, and in it Maurice says, 'When I began in earnest seek God for myself, the feeling that I needed a deliverer from overwhelming weight of selfishness was the predominant one my mind.' And may we not all admit that we feel very much e same?

Let us look into the matter a little more closely. If we ex-mine ourselves I think we shall all be conscious of the three ndamental desires which were mentioned towards the beginning this chapter: the desire for achievement, the desire for security, e desire for love. Observe how largely self bulks in connexion th each of these fundamental desires.

We have within us a creative impulse. We want to produce mething, to make or do something really worth while. The pro-cer, the maker, the doer must be *me*. *I*, *I* must be the agent—at is the heart of the matter. Indeed, I detect in myself a certain ndency (which I greatly regret) to resent the achievements of her men, even of my friends. Our emotions, psychologists tell , our pure emotions as such, are beyond our control. I am afraid find it so. When I hear that someone else has written a brilliant ook or made a fine speech or scored some other outstanding ccess, immediately the poisonous serpent of jealousy lifts its athsome head within me. Instinctively I hit out at it, and feel hamed that it is there at all.

But that kind of infection seems to be in our very blood. Never a man falls sick,' says Emerson, 'but some among the by-anders are animated by the faint hope that he may die.'

And why did the Press devote such space recently to the de-ription of Heath's detestable crimes, and why are the less reput-ble sections of it so avid for juicy bits of iniquity? Is it not ecause the editors know that their readers gloat over such

accounts, and draw from them subconsciously a sense of superiority: a kind of feeling, 'I don't claim to be a saint, but there is plenty of room for me to be a good deal worse than I am before I become as bad as that.' None of us like admitting that such disgraceful tendencies lurk within us, but actually I am afraid most of us are in the same bad boat. The mere self, domineering and tyrannical, looms far too large.

Similarly, in connexion with the question of security. We can't fully enjoy the present unless we have something to look forward to in the future. In our adventurous moments, and specially when we are young and strong, we rejoice to look into the bright eyes of danger. But underneath still there is the deeper desire to be sure at least of something, to have a firm foothold somewhere, some unshakable foundation rock. The essential self must somehow be preserved. I don't think we feel so blameworthy as regards this natural desire for security. But it may easily become too insistent, and I am certainly in danger of concentrating too much on my own individual self in this connexion.

In speaking of the universal hunger for love, I had in mind a whole range of desires connected with the relationship of the individual self to other selves. We desire the society of others, we enjoy sharing experiences; we like giving as well as receiving. It is abnormal to be aloof, isolated, solitary. We are 'bound up in the bundle of life' with our fellows to a degree we hardly realize. I shall return to this in my next article. The point to which I want to draw attention here is our desire for the respect, the approval, the admiration of those around us. We should like to have any amount of respect, approval, admiration; and more selectively and in a more limited circle we want personal affection and love. To love someone else does not in itself satisfy us. We want to be loved in return. Here again how large Self bulks in the whole affair! It is I who must be respected, approved, admired and loved.

It may not have escaped notice that hitherto I have made no mention of the word 'sin.' It is a word so hackneyed and misused that I have not gone out of my way to bring it in. But I think that we are at this point dealing with just what the word really stands for. The essence of sin is selfishness. And by selfishness I do not mean a proper regard for self. The creation of individual selves would apear to be at least one of the ends the whole universe has in view. Each individual self has a unique place and importance of its own within the whole. But that is true not only of my self but of your self and of all other selves. The trouble arises from the fact that in my view of the universe my self, my mere self,

ids to bulk larger than it does proportionately in the Creator's w of the universe. Sin is regard for self bulking too large. ie Christian doctrine of Original Sin seems to me to boil down just this : that all men have within them the tendency to let the f, the mere self, bulk too large. It is so : they have : that is e fact and we cannot get away from it.

What then can be done? What can I do to improve the situa- n and bring my life to progressive and harmonious development?

The Christian religion has a clear answer to give to this ques- n, and my experience so far as it goes — my very limited experi- ce — verifies the truth of the Christian answer. The Christian igion is through and through an ethical religion. It not only intains a high ethical standard, it offers moral stimulus and ritual power to enable the individual to rise towards that stan- rd. The New Testament is bursting with a sense of newness of e. Just where you are, it says, you can begin again, really begin ain. Any chains that have been forged upon you in the past can broken and cast off. To-day, now, you can enter the glorious erty of the children of God.

What I need is the transfiguration of my self-regarding instinct. actual practice I have found the greatest help towards this end three ways.

The first is through the influence of other people, anxious, as m, to live the good life. Not long ago I baptized a baby boy, d various relatives of the family were present. I realized what ood, wholesome, hard-working, kindly group they were. Among m was a young widow, whose husband had been killed in the A.F., left single-handed with four small children in a cottage on Cornish coast. It was a great moral stimulus to see how com- tely she was giving herself to her labour of love, and what a cess she was making of it.

A few days after that, in London, I ran into an old school and lege friend. I had not seen him for years. I knew well that was in the first class both for ability and character. Since the r he had been employed in the administration of Austria, and a few words he described the difficulty of it and the discernment d strength and patience it required. Again the brief contact had ery distinct and bracing moral effect upon me. The individual eds the stimulus of fellowship in a group. This need is recog- ed in the Christian sacrament of baptism.

Baptism is practised by the immense majority of Christians as e rite of entry into the Christian society. The theological word sociated with baptism from the very earliest times is *regenera-*

tion. For a long time I used to think that the metaphor implied by this word, the metaphor of new birth, was a little extravagant, but Frederick Denison Maurice taught me I was wrong. Birth is not the beginning of a child. The child has been in existence long before it is born. Birth brings the child into the new environment it needs for future growth and development. And that is exactly what admission into the membership of the Church is designed to do. It is right to admit the baby at once into that spiritual environment which should supply the atmosphere and influence conducive to the development of a truly Christian life. No doubt if the child is baptized as an infant, when he knows nothing about it, something more is needed when he comes to years of discretion and must take his own stand in life. I shall return to this point in my second article. What I want to emphasize here is the help the Church offers in the fellowship of like-minded people all sincerely aiming at living the good life in which the mere self does not bulk too large. The influence, subconscious as well as conscious, of their example undoubtedly tends to shame me out of gross selfishness and to keep me up to the mark.

The second way in which I find assistance in my desire to live the good life is by taking seriously belief in the existence of a great Creator. Consider: once upon a time there was nothing whatever to be seen anywhere except a mass of superheated whirling gas. Out of that has come, marvellous to relate, all the world we see, including ourselves. It is very hard to believe it, but believe it we must, for here we are. And if we believe it—as we must—are we not at the same time driven to a belief in some unseen, unimaginable Power which has been drawing all creation forward through this tremendous process of evolution. Such a power, though beyond our comprehension, cannot be less perfect than any of the creatures It has created. It must have attributes and characteristics not lower than the high attributes and characteristics which we associate with personality. We more rightly use the pronoun 'He' of that unseen Power than the pronoun 'It.' It seems to me just as reasonable to believe in the existence of such a Creator as to believe in my own existence. And it is much more important for me to believe in Him than to believe in myself. If I seriously believe in Him it alters my whole attitude to achievement and security and love.

Achievement is of such varying worth. I suppose it is an achievement to acquire a valuable collection of postage stamps. It is certainly an achievement to turn a piece of waste land into a garden. What we want is achievement that will be real worthwhile achievement, whether other people hail it as such or not. I

here is a great Creator drawing all creation forwards in accordance with His infinitely wise and far-seeing purpose, then included in that purpose is the midget me. And I am included not as a cog in a machine but as an active agent, and invited to contribute my mite of co-operation. It is indeed but a wee mite that I can possibly do, and if I do that there is plenty left for others to do. I have my part to play in furthering God's infinite purpose of good, and they have theirs. To realize this and to remember it checks in me any incipient jealousy at the achievement of another servant of God, and disposes me to give it a sincere welcome. 'Teach me to do thy will, O my God,' the Psalmist prays, and he adds 'I am content to do it.' Yes, content — content to do it.

> 'Teach me to do the thing that pleaseth thee, for thou art my God: let thy loving Spirit lead me forth into the land of righteousness.' (*Ps.* cxliii, 10.)

Next as to security. As we grow older, we are more and more conscious of a desire deepening within us for some ultimate security. Here the effect of sure and confident belief in God is obviously enormous. It just makes the whole difference. Examples are innumerable. Two come into my mind at once. My father was about eighty when he died. He had not been noticeably failing, and the final heart attack came rather suddenly. He was in great pain for a little while, but his end was quick and peaceful. 'I am ready to go' were his last words. He had been a devoted Christian since a boy, but it was not that he felt himself to be a saint. If he had had time to expand his single sentence he would have said (as he very often used to do) that his confidence was entirely based on the merits of his Saviour.

When I was Dean of a Cambridge College, a younger member of the college came to me one evening in distress about his landlady and her daughter. They were excellent people, hard-working, trustworthy, kind and efficient, and the daughter had just been told that she had to go into hospital for a severe operation. She dreaded operations very much. A day or two afterwards I saw my young friend again. He told me that the young woman had died under the operation, but she had gone into hospital with a cheerful courage, and then he added, 'I thought you might like to know what her last words to me were.' I said I would indeed, and he told me, 'Safe in the arms of Jesus.' Thousands of people, I suppose millions, could match these examples with others from all over the world; and they have been extremely numerous all down the Christian ages.

They bring me naturally to the third elemental requirement of human beings, for which I have employed the much abused word

'Love.' As I have already explained, I am not referring to mere sex-attraction. Sex-attraction is good raw material to build into love, though nowadays too much attention is focused upon sex-attraction as such. It is partly the effect of long protracted and exacting war that a wave of sex-frenzy appears to be sweeping over the civilized world. Over and above anything physical, we all want (as was said earlier in this article) something spiritual: approval, respect, admiration, affection. We have a deep need for someone who has a real interest in us, regard for us, attachment to us; whom we can count on to think the best of us and to do the best for us. The fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion is that God is love. God has personal love for every one of His children. No one comes into the world by chance. His providence prepares the way for us and watches over us all. 'The very hairs of your head are all numbered,' our Lord used to say to His disciples. If we are to some extent as least free, and some of our choices are wrong, and we blunder and err and make mistakes, the timeless wisdom of God has made allowance for all that, and at point after point His providence meets move by counter-move and turns the valley of Achor into a door of hope.

Now at the beginning of the new age of atomic power we are naturally anxious for the future, not merely of ourselves and of our children, but of the whole human race. If St. Paul were here he would quote again from his unknown Apocalypse:

> 'Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath laid up for them that love Him.' (*I Cor.* ii, 9.)

Once upon a time nothing visible anywhere but whirls of hot gas: then the drawing onwards of the long process of evolution, and at last here we are, you and I! We may well gasp and ask whatever is in store for the ages and ages yet to come. If God is all sovereign and God is love, the future must be unimaginably wonderful.

Hitherto we have been considering the effect of belief in God: firm belief, confident belief, belief arising from conviction, belief grounded in reason. The existence of God is an inference securely based upon observed fact. And if the inference is justified, we are in close relation to God whether we have any direct consciousness of Him or not. Is it possible to have conscious communion with Him? Or is He, as the people quoted by the prophet Isaiah called Him, 'a god that hideth himself'? Gerald Manley Hopkins has a moving poem on the subject:

> God, though to Thee our psalm we raise
> No answering voice comes from the skies;
> To Thee the trembling sinner prays

But no forgiving voice replies;
Our prayer seems lost in desert ways,
Our hymn in the vast silence dies.

We see the glories of the earth
But not the hand that wrought them all:
Night to a myriad world gives birth,
Yet like a lighted empty hall
Where stands no host at door or hearth
Vacant creation's lamps appal.

We guess; we clothe Thee, unseen King,
With attributes we deem are meet;
Each in his own imagining
Sets up a shadow in Thy seat;
Yet know not how our gifts to bring,
Where seek Thee with unsandalled feet.

And Thou art silent, whilst Thy world
Contends about its many creeds
And hosts confront with flags unfurled
And zeal is flushed and pity bleeds
And truth is heard with tears impearled,
A moaning voice among the reeds.

Professor Burkitt in the 1914-1918 war was working among e troops at Rouen and found himself one day in conversation ith a Frenchman upon Theology. A phrase of the Frenchman's ked itself in his memory. He was oppressed, he said, by *le silence u ciel*. Most of us at one time or another have been oppressed by e silence of heaven.[3] If the inference with regard to the exist- nce of God, all sovereign and loving, is correct, then one would ave thought that under appropriate conditions it would be pos- ible to have some kind of direct experience of communion with im. The mystics say that it is possible and that they themselves ave had it. They speak with no uncertain sound, but they say so any extravagant and far-fetched things that we hardly know hat to believe. Yet in most, if not all of us, there is a will to elieve, a readiness to experience, and indeed a capacity for a cer- in degree of mysticism. We feel the difficulty of distinguishing our own experience between what is mere fancy and imagina- on, and what is real and objective. Am I imagining the little ntacles of my soul touched by Some One Divine, or is it really so?

In certain forms of worship the sum total of the effect is ightened by physical means, a stately ritual, the use of incense, d so on. These induce a devotional feeling which may be easant and refreshing, though, on the other hand, it may be nervating and so sensuous as to be a distraction from the deeper

[3] And see further C. F. Andrews, *Christ in the Silence*.

experience which is what we really want. Indeed, we must be on our guard against meretricious aids to worship, which do much more harm than good.

In order to get further in our inquiry here, the best plan is for each one of us to examine his own experience. Personally I come nearest to a mystical experience by way of aspiration. Religious aspiration has a moral background. I ardently desire to be a better man. I picture the ideal of what a man just in my position should be. I actively and intensely desire to rise towards that ideal, and I look up for help. *Sursum corda*—'Lift up your hearts'; in a pattern of worship dating from about A.D. 200 the bishop is given these words to say, and the congregation replies, 'We lift them up unto the Lord.' The Lord responds, and to some extent I am conscious of His response in an inward cleansing, strengthening, renewal. The human spirit has received in-breathing—inspiration—from the Divine Spirit.

This is but one type of experience. There are many others, and we thank God for all of them, brief and fragmentary as they are. 'Now through a glass darkly,' St. Paul says (*I Cor.* xiii, 12). 'Not as though I had already attained . . . but I follow after if that I may apprehend that for which also I have been apprehended of Christ Jesus.' (*Phil.* iii, 12.)

MODERN CHURCHMEN: THEIR PRESENT PROSPECTS *

'Test all things: hold fast that which is good.'—*I Thess.* v, 21.

NEXT year our Union will be fifty years old, and this is the thirty-seventh year of publication of our magazine under its present title and, happily, by its first editor. Even in the first issue in April, 1911, an article dealt with the alleged 'Failure of Liberal Christianity.' Schweitzer was then hailed as its executioner. Nowadays we hear again and again that it has been slain. A type of theology deriving from Karl Barth and the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns has now put an end to it. Rather strangely, perhaps, it appears that even Hitler has had a hand in its demise, for we are told that it was merely the theological form of a philosophy of

* A sermon preached in St. Martin-in-the-Fields on Tuesday, May 20th, at the annual service of The Modern Churchmen's Union, by the Rev. Canon J. S. Bezzant, B.D., M.A., Chancellor of Liverpool Cathedral.

naturalistic humanism which the backwash of Nazi and Fascist aggression has swept away. This oft-destroyed entity, Liberal Christianity, it is said, had no message for an age desolated by two world wars with their distresses, dislocations and economic upheavals; in such a time the strange and bizarre apocalyptic eschatological strain in the Gospels and a theology sharply antagonistic to natural knowledge and reasonable belief assume a deeper meaning and are alone spiritually satisfying.

Yet in 1914, when doctrinal liberty was in danger, our Union was able to organize a memorial to Convocation which that cautious ecclesiastical diplomat Archbishop Davidson described as 'the weightiest of the memorials that were presented to us,' the claims of which he said were not incompatible with the pronouncement the Bishops then made. The result was a vindication of the worth and work of our society.

Seven years later our Conference at Girton College was an important factor leading to the appointment of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrine which, after a too long delay, issued the *Doctrinal Report* in the year before the war. It was another indication of reasonable intellectual and doctrinal liberty in the Church of England.

To-day there is before us a much more challenging statement than any which led to the controversies to which I have referred. Very recently, the Bishop of Birmingham has written a fair-sized book on *The Rise of Christianity*. Whatever may be thought of his conclusions about Christian origins and the nature, composition and dates of the earliest Christian documents, it is certain that no such honest, courageous, lucid and (from the point of view of traditional Christianity) meagre and negative statement has ever been made by an English diocesan bishop, if, indeed, by any English clergyman. This is not the occasion either for considering the value of the book or for criticism of it. But let anyone recall the ferment caused by *Essays and Reviews*, by J. M. Thompson's book on Miracles, by *Foundations*, by the nomination of Dr. Henson to the See of Hereford, or by our Girton Conference in 1921; recall the theological opinions which were the cause of these acute controversies, compare them with those of Dr. Barnes, and contrast the intense excitement which marked the former with the calm indifference which greets the latter, and, I think, there is ground for thought and astonishment.

The explanation may be that the Church of England is no longer interested in theological questions unless they have an obvious and immediate bearing upon some popular practical issue; or it may be that the oft-repeated assertion that Liberal

Christianity is dead has produced a complacent confidence that such statements as Dr. Barnes's book can be safely (and are better) ignored. In either case it would seem that the plea of our Union for 'the freedom of responsible students in their work of criticism and research' is no longer an urgent one.

Nevertheless in the Church and among the clergy the tide of articulate opinion is against us. There is, indeed, much that we find so hard to take seriously that we may incur unhappy consequences through not doing so. Tendencies of theological thought now most in favour, and naturally accompanied by corresponding ecclesiastical policies, are undoubtedly reactionary. There is a great deal which would lead an observer to conclude that Christian theology can now proceed as if the whole business of critical, historical, and scientific study of the Bible in both Testaments has achieved nothing, has no consequences and is supremely unimportant. What is called 'post-critical theology' largely consists of the old pre-critical positions, slightly disguised in 'theology of crisis' austerity clothing, and it often disdains the disguise. In this there is vast unreality. To take but one instance. It is said, with wearisome reiteration, that in the crises and menaces which have beset our civilization, people find a new and deeper meaning in the 'strange supernaturalism' and apocalyptic eschatology of the Gospels and early Christianity, which Liberalism had set aside or allegorized. This may be true of some theologians who do not relish the consequences of critical and historical studies; but it is not true of one quarter of one per cent. of the people who have endured the trials of modern times, even of those who profess themselves Christians. They are not sustained by post-critical theology; they do not know of it and could make little of it if they did. It is, of course, not at all surprising that in ecclesiastical circles forms of faith and hope should re-emerge in catastrophic circumstances like those in which they first arose; but neither this nor the further fact that some find them spiritually satisfying tells us anything of their truth or permanent value. And why should doctrines alleged to give consolation, hope and strength in a world in which evil and its consequences so widely and strongly prevail be more true than doctrines which arise and satisfy and inspire in periods of peace, human advance and reasonable happiness, such as we must believe to be more in accordance with the will of God for human life on earth? In the grievous upheavals of modern war and its devastating results some, indeed, do become aware of the deeper issues of life and death; but the much more widespread and manifest consequence is that the mind, including the religious mind, easily becomes unbalanced. In a world in which so much that once

emed secure is uprooted and thrown into confusion, anything ay happen and anything be true. A credulous atmosphere is eated, much more favourable to the revival of superstitions than the deepening of sane and spiritual religion. When evil iumphs it is natural to suppose that the true values of the world which it triumphed were false: it is not considered whether the iumph was due to their rejection.

It is thus that we have a modern return to Reformation theoy of which Barth is the inspiration. In this there can be no gitimate criticism of Christian theology from the standpoint of y natural knowledge. Barth is 'an avowed opponent of all tural theology.' It does not exist, he says, as an entity capable becoming a separate subject within what he considers to be real eology — not even for the sake of being rejected. There is no ie knowledge of God possible to man except through the Divine evelation of the Holy Scriptures, and man has no capacity even responding to or being addressed by God except as such capay is, by grace alone, given in the Scriptural Revelation itself. hough post-critical in date, the whole significance of Biblical iticism is thus set aside, and theology again consists in the exosition of the text of Scripture as finally authoritative in a way ard to distinguish from Fundamentalism. Of course men so eeped in Scripture cannot avoid saying many things that are true id profitable to all Christians; but the contemptuous setting ide of the whole fabric of modern knowledge and experience, id what the human mind can infer therefrom, as irrelevant and rrupting, as not only useless to true religion but as something om which the church of anti-Christ can profit while the true hurch can only sicken and die of it, is too preposterous to be ken seriously except by people permeated with pessimism and espair of the world.

The fundamental assertions of this type of theology—and they e in the last resort mere assertions—may not have been widely ccepted by religious thought in this country. But their indirect fluence has been and is considerable. They supply the real if nrecognized foundation of much that is nowadays said about 'the Word of God'; they afford added impetus to the widespread etreat from Christian humanism which is very marked in our resent Church life. Modern psychologists are frequently emphazing the fact that, once we get out of the sphere of sciences in hich results can be tested by experiment, conscious thought is lways affected by desire and may easily become merely the instruent of desire. When that happens, as often as not 'reasons' are ttle more than ingenious excuses for what a nation, a class or an

individual wants to do or to happen. A soundly based, broad, humanist yet critical reason, applied especially to what makes an immediately strong appeal, is our one defence against superstition, ignorance and folly. There is, naturally and rightly, something from which the religious mind recoils in any doctrine which seems to make man first the measure and then the master of all things. Yet in fact, truth, when recognized, from whatever source it may come, is the master of man, to which he instinctively bows in reverence, not something of which he is master. Were it not so and where it is not so there could and can be no human progress. To one who believes in God and that the earth is the Lord's, truth in any sphere is not something wrested from God, but truly revealed by Him, whatever be the extent of human effort required in its uncovering or discovery. And reason is the gift of God to be used humbly in His service in causes of truth and righteousness. An unworthy and unmoralized anthropology is as fatal to sound theology as is an unworthy conception of God, and will always lead to an unworthy conception of God. That there are limitations and dangers in the Liberal Christian humanist standpoint does not render it false or wholly misleading. And in fact, though reason is not the only source, it is one source and the only test of truth, at least in the sense that nothing in contradiction with it can be accepted as true. Humanly formulated propositions are not the proper subjects or objects of *faith*. *Reason* is necessarily involved in asserting the knowable trueness of any proposition, whatever its source, and there is no worthy reverence in disguising the fact in pietistic language.

There is, as we know, the age-old pretence that there is an ecclesiastical authority which in itself is the sufficient and only ground of truth in religion. Leaving this aside, there are other attempts, in the sphere of theology itself, which would fain exalt it above the necessity of achieving harmony with knowledge and reasonable belief. Of such attempts the lucid and able book *Christ, The Christian and The Church* affords an example. Even such conservative efforts to restate ancient Christological theory as those of Drs. Gore and Relton are regarded as unnecessary concessions to the *Zeitgeist*. The author again and again protests against the transference of the Christological problem from what he calls the ontological to the psychological plane; it is a doctrine which must move 'within the orbit of those conceptions which are proper to it and resist the temptation to transfer itself into the modes of thought of other sciences.' He seems to realize that finality cannot be claimed for any doctrinal statement without claiming a commensurate finality for the sphere of thought in

ich it is expressed, and would thus have us believe that we are the realm of truth if we resist all concession to the modern *itgeist* and return completely to that of the Church of the early ristian centuries. Unfortunately, however, for this point of view, alleged ontological terminology in which ancient Christian ctrine was formulated does not represent categories derived by luction from fact-controlled knowledge or probable belief, but nsists of abstractions, fancies, fictions and surmises; whereas in dern genetic psychology we are in touch with facts of experi-ce and with real if imperfect knowledge of what knowledge lf is, as distinct from imaginative speculation such as assumes t every distinction the mind can draw has an actuality of being responding to it. The weakness of modern Christologies, this iter says, is that they start with human nature as known to us; ey hardly ever start by considering the mode of existence of e divine Word and then ask what must happen to human nature it is to be united to him.' Precisely; and the reason is that dern men disclaim prior knowledge of 'the mode of existence the divine Word' and renounce attempts to elucidate the known the unknown. This author's starting-point allows mystery to piled on mystery and to claim an authority above reason and owledge for asserting the truth of the result, as his book shows. ere, indeed, is the same aim as that of Barth's neo-Calvinism — remove Christian doctrine beyond contact with and therefore yond the relevant criticism of modern knowledge; and although r neo-Scholastics would probably deny that they repudiate erary and historical criticism of the Bible, it is hard to find any int at which it is allowed to have any significance for the exposi-n of doctrine.

Allow me to conclude with three points which I regard as portant in prevailing conditions and to be in the interest of ligious truth and of the purpose for which our society exists.

1. Though we claim no finality or even adequacy for any re-atements of Christian doctrines by representative Liberal hristians, we must continue to insist that the line of approach to odern religious questions which they exemplify, and in particular eir emphasis upon the significance of the literary, historical and ientific criticism of the Bible, is the true one, which eventually ll prove to be abiding and the most fruitful. An example to nd, in contrast to tendencies I have mentioned, is the recent ork entitled *The Christian Answer* by a group of American inkers. There is little hope in the matter of winning thoughtful en for Christ in forms of apologetic which seem to imply that ience, in its relevant branches, and the philosophy and reason-

able belief based thereon, is a quite separate sphere of thought or of truth from that of religious thought, and that the latter can rightly take much more for granted and pursue other methods. That can only lead to a disastrous dualism which will issue in the future, as it did in the past, in the absurdity that a statement can be religiously true yet scientifically or philosophically false.

2. We *must* increase our membership if we are to have real influence in the Church. We have large numbers of sympathizers. Everyone in contact with ordinary men and women knows that the theological questions they ask are not about the neo-orthodoxies, by which they are untouched, but the old questions with which Liberal Christianity grappled — about the relation of Christian faith to such knowledge as they have and to modern knowledge about the Bible. But these are days in which, in the Church as elsewhere, weight of numbers counts for more than reasonable opinions; and what will influence our Church authorities in their decisions upon any issue is not what ought to happen but what will in fact happen in the Church. If we desire to count for more than we do we must have more, and many more, active supporters.

3. We must not be discouraged if the realization of our cause seems at present to be remote. The value of ideals and of the people who hold them is often best seen when they are out of fashion. In particular, we must not be deflected from our principles by charges that we deal in negations, even if the charges are sometimes true. So long as the ultimate sacredness of truth and of Divine revelation is claimed for what is in fact human opinion, and often precarious opinion, the denial of that status for it is the necessary service of truth. 'Test all things: hold fast that which is good'; but in religion that which is not true, assuredly also is not good.

HY THE PRIMATE LIVES AT LAMBETH

y the Rev. John Todd, M.A., F.S.A., Rector of Waterstock, Oxford.

EXT year the Lambeth Conference will be held, and from all parts of the world bishops of the Anglican Church will her in the home of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the old lace of Lambeth, which looks across the Thames to the Houses Parliament. It is to Lambeth they will come and not to Canter-y, for it is Lambeth and not Canterbury which is the home of archbishop. Few, if any, will pause to reflect that, had it not en for a long, weary quarrel some seven and a half centuries o, the home of the archbishop might still have been in Canter-ry. This quarrel, which dragged its weary course for some enty years, involved five Popes, two Kings of England and two chbishops of Canterbury; it divided the Sacred College of rdinals, it ranged the Cistercians on one side and the Bene-tines on the other, and at last Pope Innocent III declared that e very mention of it brought a blush to his cheek.[1]

The pre-Reformation cathedrals of England were divided into o classes, secular and monastic. The secular cathedrals, like ose of St. Paul's, Salisbury, York, were governed by a dean and ffed by canons, whereas the monastic cathedrals, like those of urham, Worcester, Winchester, were staffed by monks and the shop was the abbot, although the actual government was in the nds of the prior. The cathedral of Christ Church, Canterbury, s staffed by Benedictine monks, and the head of the community, e abbot, was the archbishop himself. It was perfectly reasonable at a monastic community should elect its own head, but when at head happened to be the Archbishop of Canterbury, it was viously intolerable that the appointment of an official of such portance in Church and State should be in the hands of a small mmunity of monks. In 1185, after some controversy, the monks ected Baldwin, Bishop of Worcester, to be Archbishop of Canter-ury, a man of high ideals and force of character, although, like laud in later days, considerably lacking in tact. Baldwin was a istercian monk and, as a Cistercian, must have had no very high pinion of the unreformed Benedictines over whom he had been lled to rule. Moreover, the luxury and extravagance of the anterbury monks must have been abhorrent to his ascetic mode life. Their expenditure on hospitality was enormous, and the yle of living may be judged from the fact that no less than

[1] '. . . ut vix questionis hujusmodi non tam inveteratae quam veteris diamus absque rubore fieri mentionem.'

seventeen dishes were served up at the prior's table! It was the custom of the monastic tenants to bring to the monks *xenia*, gifts comprising game and fish, on the Feasts of Christmas and Easter to swell the good things on the refectory table, and Baldwin gave orders that this practice must cease, and proceeded to confiscate the income of the rectories of Monkton, Eastby, Mepham and Eynsford, which the monks alleged was appropriated to their almonry. At once the monks appealed to Rome, and the archbishop replied by confiscating their estates, and, although these estates were soon afterwards restored, the quarrel which was to drag on with increasing bitterness had begun.

Baldwin now determined on another step, one which would curb not only the luxury of the monks, but their arrogance also. He resolved to found a church at Hackington, about a mile from Canterbury Cathedral, and staff it with secular canons who would give their time to study and which would be absolutely independent of the Christ Church monks. This college was to consist of between 60 and 70 canons, one of which was to be the King of England[2] and the rest were to be made up of the bishops of the province, their deputies and the priests who held livings in the gift of the archbishop and convent.

The monks were filled with alarm. They suspected, probably not without reason, that Baldwin's real intention was to found an electoral college, and so take away from them their coveted privilege of electing the archbishop, and this they would resist to the death. One excited young monk declared that Becket himself had appeared to him in a dream and had revealed the evil intentions of the archbishop, and that the holy martyr had held out to him a sword on which was inscribed '*Gladius beati Petri apostoli.*' The monks concluded that the sword of St. Peter implied nothing less than an appeal to Rome, and to Rome the prior went. Pope Urban III was no friend of Baldwin, and issued a mandate forbidding him to build his collegiate church at Hackington. Baldwin obeyed the mandate, but as the order only mentioned Hackington, he proceeded straightway to build another church on another site, this time opposite St. Dunstan's, Canterbury, and he built it of wood. Again the monks carried an appeal to Rome, and again came a papal mandate commanding the destruction of this wooden church. 'What the pope has ordered,' was the laconic reply of the

[2] There was nothing unusual in a mediaeval king being a canon. The Emperor was a Canon of St. Peter's, Rome, the King of France was a Canon of Rheims, and James IV of Scotland was a Canon of Glasgow. Our own King is called a Canon of St. David's, but this is a different matter, and may be due to a mistake, for there is no trace of it before the Reformation.

rchbishop, 'that we will do.' He destroyed the wooden church, ut as the order referred only to a *wooden* church, he immediately et to work to build another in *stone*. What the next move would ave been it is difficult to say, but the situation was saved by the eath of Urban III and the accession of Gregory VIII, a friend f Baldwin. Immediately the papal policy was reversed, and the onks found themselves in a desperate situation. Partisans of the rchbishop, emboldened by the change of fortune, laid siege to the onastery and occupied some of the outer buildings, and divine ervice was suspended. A rumour arose that the archbishop in- nded to disperse the monks, that he would carry them off half a ozen at a time, and drop them in various places. A supporter of ie archbishop, one Roger Norreys, who unfortunately for him- elf was inside the monastery at this time, had a most unpleasant xperience. Having been thrust by Baldwin upon the monastery s cellarer, Roger was in a difficult situation, but at length suc- eeded in making his escape from the monastery by way of the *loaca*, or monastery sewer, which discharged into the town ditch, a mode of exit which the monastic chronicler somewhat maliciously ints was quite in keeping with his character.[3] The siege was ressed more closely, and the monks would certainly have been mpelled to surrender or would have perished from hunger had ot the pilgrims managed to smuggle in provisions. In this, strange o say, they were helped by the Jewish community of Canterbury, ho prayed for the besieged monks every Sabbath in their syna- ogue.[4]

Meanwhile there had been another turn in the wheel of for- ne. The pope died and the new pope, Clement III (1187-1191), mpletely reversed the policy of his predecessor and sent letters o the Prior of Faversham and to Master Farreman, Warden of t. James' Hospital, Canterbury, bidding them excommunicate ose who had so violently assaulted the monastery. But the papal andate, although it put an end to the siege, raised a storm. The rchbishop determined to resist, and gave orders that his church

[3] After his adventure in the sewer poor Roger apparently continued in bad dour in more than one sense, for his enemies nicknamed him *Rogerus loacarius*.

[4] Perhaps it was not strange that the Jews took such an active interest in ecclesiastical affairs considering the extent to which the Church in the twelfth ntury was financially indebted to them. Abbeys borrowed money from the ews, and the cathedrals of Lincoln and Peterborough owed money to the reat Jewish financier, Aaron of Lincoln. Aaron used to boast with more uth than tact that it was he who provided the money for the great window the church of St. Alban's Abbey. Sacred vessels were deposited as pledges, nd Nigel, Bishop of Ely (1133-1169), actually pawned sacred relics with the ews of Cambridge.

of Hackington was to be fortified and to be prepared to stand a siege, and the parish clergy of Canterbury took the part of the canons of Hackington and publicly declared that the papal excommunication was invalid. Riots took place and the mob even attacked the Hospital of St. James because the Warden of that hospital had assisted in publishing the excommunication.

The struggle went on with increasing bitterness, and although on the accession of Richard I there were a few weeks of peace, the quarrel was soon resumed and the opposition of the monks to what they regarded as a rival church became more fanatical. At length Richard determined to intervene, and on November 27th, 1189, the King and his whole court came to Canterbury. Never had the city seen such splendid pageantry. With the King was William the Lion, King of Scotland, David his brother, Earl of Huntingdon, and a great host of lords, spiritual and lay. Richard appointed the Archbishop of Rouen to act as mediator, but reconciliation was difficult. On the question of the Hackington church the monks were adamant. Its mere existence was a threat to their coveted privilege of electing the archbishop, and as no compromise was possible, Baldwin yielded, and the monks on their part promised obedience to their titular head.

But this surrender by the archbishop did not terminate the strife, it merely changed its venue, for Baldwin had other plans for achieving his objective. On the south bank of the Thames, looking across the river to the king's palace at Westminster, was the estate of Lambeth,[5] which belonged to the bishop and monks of Rochester. Some of Baldwin's predecessors had already enjoyed the hospitality of the Rochester monks at Lambeth, and had even used their chapel occasionally for the consecration of bishops. Baldwin determined that, if he could not build his church at Hackington he would build it at Lambeth. By an exchange of land with the monks of Rochester he acquired twenty-four acres at Lambeth, and to the consternation of the Canterbury monks proceeded to cart the stones from his demolished church at Hackington to his new site at Lambeth and to build there. But he did not finish his church at Lambeth, for, deeming the warlike life of a Crusader more peaceful than life with his rebellious monks, he joined the Third Crusade and reached the Holy Land in time to take part in the siege of Acre. Here he fought manfully, but within five weeks died of the plague and was buried before the walls of Acre.

[5] The letter b is probably intrusive. The name would appear to be derived from the Anglo-Saxon *lám* = mud or loam, and *hyth* = a landing place, *i.e.* the muddy landing place.

After a short interval another bishop of the Church militant, Hubert Walter, was elected Archbishop of Canterbury. He had been an intimate friend of Baldwin, his comrade-in-arms at the siege of Acre, and had also been one of the original canons of the Hackington church. In spite of the opposition of the Canterbury monks Hubert proceeded to carry out Baldwin's plan for building at Lambeth. By a further exchange with the monks of Rochester he acquired the whole of the manor of Lambeth, and, as lord of the manor, had by common law the right to build a religious house of any order he chose upon his own estate. Again the monks appealed to Rome, and Innocent III, without waiting to hear the archbishop's case, ordered the church to be demolished within thirty days. But the pope had gone too far. Such high-handed proceedings roused King Richard to fury. He forbade the archbishop to pay any regard to the papal mandate, and wrote to the pope protesting vigorously against such an invasion of English liberties in Church and State, and took the church at Lambeth under his royal protection. The usual appeals to Rome followed, Innocent reiterated his demand for the destruction of the church, and at length the archbishop levelled it to the ground. When the king heard this he ordered the estates of the Canterbury monks to be confiscated, but before the next step could be taken he had received his fatal wound from the bolt of a crossbow. The unhappy quarrel dragged on into King John's reign, until at length a body of arbitrators was appointed who decided that the archbishop might build at Lambeth, but not on the old site, that he might staff his church with canons, but they were to be Premonstratensian Canons, and not secular canons as originally intended. The building was to be of moderate size, but neither ordinations, consecrations nor councils were to be held in it. And so the quarrel ended with the victory of the monks.

But did the victory really lie with the monks? True, they gained the point for which they had striven so obstinately, and retained in their own hands the election of the archbishop, but henceforth the part which they played in the election became more and more purely nominal, and in spite of their efforts to elect men of their own order, never again after the death of Baldwin did a monk (with the single exception of Simon Langham, 1366-1368) govern the Church of England. In spite of the destruction of the Lambeth buildings the association of the archbishops with that manor became closer, and the only abiding result of the monks' fanatical opposition to Baldwin's scheme is the residence of the Primate at Lambeth instead of at Canterbury.

JEREMIAH:

THE PROPHET OF UNIVERSAL, SPIRITUAL AND PERSONAL RELIGION

POLITICAL upheavals not infrequently produce thei prophets, but seldom are these of the stature of Jeremiah The last decades of the seventh century B.C. saw great change pass over the face of Western Asia. Assyria was in decline, an the weakness of the northern defences permitted the incursion o non-Semitic hordes whose advance was only halted at the strongl fortified frontier of Egypt. Evidence of permanent Scythia settlements in Palestine itself is, however, lacking; archaeolog can only point to the survival of a memory of the invaders in th Greek place-name Scythopolis (Beth-shan). The fall of Nineve in 612 B.C. before the combined assault of Medes, Chaldeans an Scythians was soon followed by Babylonian efforts to inherit th old Assyrian Empire, which had included Palestine. Unti Nebuchadnezzar's destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. the king of Judah alternately submitted to the yoke of Babylon or lent thei support to fruitless Egyptian-inspired revolts. Of these king Josiah was, after David himself, regarded by later Jewish his torians as the ideal monarch, a judgment founded largely o priestly views of a series of religious reforms carried through i 621 B.C. in obedience to the requirements of a law-book foun under mysterious circumstances in the Temple, and now identifie by many, though on grounds far from adequate, with parts of th canonical book of Deuteronomy.

Against such a background must be set Jeremiah, born in th little town of Anathoth, a short distance to the north of Jerusalem and destined to end his days in Egypt among a few miserabl refugees from the collapse of the kingdom of Judah. His nam containing the divine title, significantly has the possible meanin 'Yah(weh) will rise,' and he was apparently descended from th ancient Shilomite house of Eli, whose representative Abiath Solomon had banished from the Jerusalem priesthood in favou of Zadok. Jeremiah's call was thus to prophecy.

The inner quality of prophetism would appear to be indefi able. Prophetic manifestations and technique of utterance may b studied, though early Semitic evidence is too scanty to enable pr cise conclusions to be drawn concerning the distinguishing fact which set the prophet apart from other men. It is perhaps onl

ossible to see in prophetism a phenomenon whereby certain indi-
iduals or groups claimed an abnormally close acquaintance with
ıe divine nature and will, such knowledge being imparted to them
ı various ways—in dreams, by the use of mechanical means of
ivination, by direct revelation in spontaneous or induced ecstasy,
)r example. Such observations ignore the heart of the problem,
ıe solution of which would require the mastery of one of the
ındamental difficulties in the scientific study of the psychology of
eligion, and indeed of psychology in general. A descriptive
:ience demands experimental data of the highest order, such as
re hardly to be obtained from the subjective reports of the object
f study himself. The biblical accounts of the profound psychical
xperiences of Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, even of Paul, are
ar from valueless, but they do no more than record in terms of
ontemporary psychology what is probably incapable of accurate
bjective description. Moreover the objective study of subjective
rocesses can only imperfectly be pursued by minds themselves
ınctioning according to processes similar in kind. Ultimately
rophecy must simply be regarded as potentially the highest ex-
ression of human personality, demonstrating the Divine presence
Man more convincingly than any other form of human activity.

This conclusion raises in a particularly acute form the problem
false prophecy, peculiarly prominent in the ministry of Jere-
iah. If the inherent quality of prophecy is indeed indefinable,
e validity of prophetic utterances cannot at once be determined;
)r very little, if anything, can be deduced from the accompanying
xternal manifestations. Jeremiah does not seem to have called in
uestion the sincerity of Hananiah, though he was convinced that
s opponent had not been sent by Yahweh. His own tests of true
rophecy are hardly adequate. Chapter xxiii, 29 states that the
nuine word of Yahweh is 'like as fire' and 'like a hammer that
eaketh the rock in pieces'; no less could fairly be said of the
pposedly inspired utterances of Zedekiah in *I Kings* xxii, and
deed of Hananiah himself. It is further suggested that the
ophet who really stands in Yahweh's council would turn the
ople from their evil ways; this is to beg the whole question, and
nply brands as false that prophecy which is in disagreement
th Jeremiah's own teaching. It is interesting in view of our
)spel records that no appeal is made to the working of signs and
)nders; an argument from silence might be adduced to the effect
at even the false prophets were possessed of a loftier conception
the prophetic office than those who even in our day fail to dis-
ciate it from dislocations of natural law on the purely physical
ane. In xxviii, 9 Jeremiah points to the fulfilment of prediction

as proof of the validity of prophetic utterance, and with this judg ment agree *Deut.* xviii, 21, 22 and *Deutero-Isaiah* (*passim*). State thus bluntly the criterion implies a limitation of the scope of pro phecy, but regarded more broadly its application is not unsatis factory; the prophets were concerned with human experience, an ultimately practice and proof are inseparable.

This leads to the more profitable consideration of the conten of prophecy, as distinct from the nature of prophetism. It is a once noteworthy that the earliest prophetic activity of whic records survive appears to have been predominantly political i character. The idea of God is accurately reflected by the matte of prophecy, and a God of history in its widest sense is a pre requisite of a significant theology. A God who has no contact wit human environment is in effect no God at all; thus it follows tha theology is largely fashioned by Man's external situation. A societ of small warring communities naturally produces a theology o small warring gods. The notion of a National God is still no infrequently present in our minds, especially in time of wa Political activity, the attempt to organize human life on the larges possible scale (which in primitive times is in fact a very sma scale), is closely associated with religions. It is when tribal o national communities become merged in world movements tha henotheism becomes an absurdity; as the events of history wide man's vision, so the limitation of divine power to a multiplicity o localized deities, served by the activities of such as Elisha, be comes intellectually untenable. A defeat in battle by a neighbou ing petty state need imply no more than the temporary displeasur of the appropriate divinity, but domination of the entire known worl by one power demanded a God of comparable dimensions, whos purpose was correspondingly more complex and whose relation with subject communities needed to be explained.

Superficial observers have not infrequently labelled the O Testament prophets as prophets of woe. It would be more just t point out that they arose in periods of catastrophic change. It arguable, moreover, that security is the greatest hindrance to re gious advancement. The catastrophic note in apocalypticism, di cernible also in such passages as *Jer.* iv, 23-26, where the pictu of a return to chaos is quite irreconcilable with the conditions of mere military invasion, expresses a truth of religious histor Religious exaltation is fostered by adversity, and those prophet movements which have been responsible for the greatest religio advances, too frequently lost by a prosperous institutionalism, ha arisen under conditions of extreme unrest, often brought about large-scale political movements destructive of currently accept

ılues. The recorded experience of the Church of the present ntury is no less valid than that of the Early Church, but infinitely ss valuable because less intense. The academic search for the igins of Christian institutions is symptomatic of a pedantry which ifles the self-sufficient prophetic spirit exemplified in Jeremiah. erhaps we shall only learn to stand on our own feet in the cata-mbs of an atomic war.

Such general reflections as these are essential to an under-anding of the work of Jeremiah. Attempts to relate individual ophecies to specific historical events reveal a distorted perspec-ve. The vagueness of references to a foe from the North indicates early enough that for Jeremiah the important fact was the forth-ming manifestation of Yahweh in judgment, and not the people, cythian or Babylonian, destined to execute the Divine purpose. he terms of the prophet's call show that his mission was conceived world-wide in scope. Such a notion would hardly have been ssible under different political conditions. The end of the teenth century B.C. was, as the Tel-el-Amarna correspondence plainly shows, a period when an international outlook was called r and important theological progress might have been expected. he solar monotheism which became prominent, in Egypt especi-ly, under Ikhnaton (Amenhotp IV) did indeed arise as an ttempt to meet the needs of the time, and it is not unreasonable to ppose that features of the higher religion of the age survived rough succeeding centuries in such centres of cosmopolitan cul-re as Jerusalem, there to be developed by Hebrew religious nius in times of crisis. Amos had pronounced judgment, in the me of a God of righteousness, on the peoples with whom his n nation came in contact. Jeremiah in xxviii, 8 expresses the lief that his predecessors recognized the truths they uttered to valid for all mankind. He himself had been called even before s birth to his mission, so that for him humanity counted before tionality. In his conception of humanity, subject as a whole to e absolute standards of Yahweh, Jeremiah drew the full conclu-ons from his appreciation of the political unity of the world. As s already been suggested, he was conscious of a common burden prophecy, the main characteristic of which was the expectation judgment. The oracles of the almond tree and of the seething uldron contained an assurance that this judgment would indeed fulfilled, in spite of apparent failure producing a state of mind st illustrated in the opening chapters of *Ecclesiastes*, where the sence of the changes announced by successive prophets is iterated.

At one level of Jeremiah's thought the coming catastrophe is

ill-defined. In i, 13-17 the 'kingdoms of the North' set up their thrones before Jerusalem; their function is obscure, for judgment against the city is actually uttered by Yahweh Himself. Elsewhere it is stated that doom is to come from the North, or by way of Dan and Mount Ephraim, or from the desert. There are references to 'horsemen and bowmen,' or to the enemy as a 'lion' and 'destroyer of nations,' to a 'full wind,' even to a return to chaos. In iv, 5-8 judgment is apparently confined to Judah; in iv, 27-31 it includes the world. Full allowance must of course be made for poetic imagery in references to historical invasions of Palestine, but it seems probable that the prophet is also visualizing an indefinite catastrophic 'day of Yahweh.' Amos too had included other nations within the scope of the Divine action, for righteousness could not be the norm of judgment for Israel alone, although she, as more privileged than other peoples, must remain the primary theatre of Yahweh's self-manifestation. Jeremiah entered into the direct prophetic succession in uttering his prediction of judgment, a judgment to fall on the whole world. If Yahweh was indeed righteousness, His will must include all nations, and a revelation of righteousness in the world meant first a judgment on it. Here was the word of Yahweh which Jeremiah was to proclaim to the nations.

The attempt to limit the prophet's work to a declaration of Yahweh's employment of Babylonians or Scythians to punish Israel for her transgressions is unjustly to underestimate the depth of the thought expressed in the oracles. The scope of the Divine judgment corresponds with the scope of Jeremiah's commission the prophet was to take from the hand of Yahweh the cup of His fury against the nations. The emergence of an all-powerful empire might only have indicated the existence of a Divine emperor supreme over other gods. The defeat of Israel in battle proved no more than the nation's military incapacity. But the attribution of universal judgment to Yahweh Himself at once demands an absolute standard on the moral plane; the nations were to be judged for failure to live by the revealed will of Yahweh. Just as such a conception could not easily have arisen except in the appropriate political conditions, so such conditions could not have given rise to so exalted a conclusion without the exercise of prophetic genius. Religious advances, no less than progress in other spheres of human activity, are the work of outstanding personalities.

On an entirely different level was Jeremiah's application of the fundamental prophetic idea. Although led to an understanding of the Divine character by reflection on the broad historical situation as it presented itself to him, his starting-point henceforth could

nly be the known will of Yahweh, and not casual events in history. 'It is in the soul that things happen.' The presence in alestine of powerful invaders was not the root from which prang ideas of the coming judgment of Yahweh, but the sign hat the 'day of Yahweh' was at hand. The prophet's attention is oncentrated upon Israel, whose doom will confirm the burden of is prophecy. Hence the remarkable complaint that Jeremiah was orced against his will to prophesy a catastrophe that still seemed emote: 'The word of Yahweh is made a reproach unto me, and a erision, all the day.' Hence too his uncompromising conviction hat resistance to Babylon was not so much useless as rebellion gainst the fulfilment of the Divine purpose, an attitude which not nnaturally brought him into conflict with the Jerusalem authoriies, priestly, prophetic and secular. A prophet whose thoughts bout the future had had their origin in the hopelessness of resistng Babylon or the Scythian hordes might have acquiesced in the rospect, but Jeremiah's convictions concerning the character of ahweh carried with them the belief that judgment was a prelude o a future which held hope, a belief in accordance with the facts f religious history, as has been suggested in the discussion of the elation between political catastrophe and religious renascence. he restoration of the Davidic monarchy is looked forward to in passage (xxiii, 5-8) whose Jeremianic origin has been questioned n grounds hardly cogent, and a degree of material prosperity in ne future was demonstrably not absent from the prophet's thought. is purchase of a field near his native village in occupied territory a piece of prophetic symbolism indicating that even for Judah nere was a future. And his letter to the exiles in Babylon recomnended them to accept cheerfully the conditions of the new land: Build ye houses . . . plant gardens . . . take ye wives . . . seek ne peace of the city whither I have caused you to be carried away aptive, and pray unto the Lord for it.' It is probable that Jereniah's denunciation of Zedekiah and Ahab and their mysterious ate at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar were due to their prophecy of speedy return from Babylon. Such teaching implied a poor nought of Yahweh, whose action in bringing His people into exile ould not be purposeless; clearly it was His will that Jewish life nould continue in an alien country. Such a decision on Jeremiah's art carried with it conclusions of the utmost significance in the ormulation of his attitude towards the Jerusalem cultus.

It is not without significance that a series of oracles defining ith precision Jeremiah's conception of the essence of true religion addressed to North Israel, whose moral and spiritual superiority her sister-state in the south is supported by a variety of evi-

dence. Hosea's figure of the relation between husband and wife is employed once more to illustrate that between Yahweh and Israel. But the people have not recognized the uniqueness of Yahweh, which demands an allegiance likewise unique. Yahweh's treatment of his people is contrasted with their treatment of Him. But the prophet insists, like Hosea, on the possibility and adequacy of true repentance, through which the people shall return to a right relation with Yahweh : 'If thou wilt return, O Israel . . . unto Me shalt thou return.'

Attempts at reform along very different lines were being made. Both Hezekiah and Josiah sought to restore the unity of Israel, partly by the expedient of the centralization of the cult at Jerusalem. Chapter iii, 10 characterizes such activity as a feigned return to Yahweh. Its result was to make the Temple with its sacrifices and its ritual an essential to the true worship of Yahweh. Demands were imposed in excess of the prophetic requirements of a repentant soul and a redeeming God. It seems impossible to reach agreement as to the prophetic attitude towards sacrifice. Scholars who expend great ingenuity in the denial of the plain meaning of such passages as *Micah* vi, 6-8 are forced to admit that sacrifice was regarded as subordinate to behaviour on the ethical level. The denunciation of sacrifice that was not the organ of obedience to Yahweh is quite evident; it cannot reasonably be urged that the prophets looked with more than tolerance on sacrifice that was the organ of obedience to Yahweh. An unbiased review of the evidence suggests that the balance of probability is in favour of an unequivocal prophetic condemnation of the entire sacrificial system. In any case Jeremiah was faced with an attempt to make participation in the Jerusalem cultus obligatory. His judgment is quite unambiguous : Yahweh had never commanded sacrifice, even human sacrifice, the most costly of all. Chapter viii, 8, 9 point to a deep-seated controversy as to what constituted the authoritative *torah* (covenant) of Yahweh; the prophet accuses certain scribes of falsification, not by oral interpretation, but in writing. The inhabitants of Jerusalem were controlled by false notions; the exiles they regarded as cut off from Yahweh, and themselves as the elect of the nation, as was proved by their continued and seemingly miraculous preservation. Such an attitude was so contrary to Jeremiah's view that the prophet, in his vision of the baskets of figs, declared that of the two communities that in Babylon was the more pleasing to Yahweh. His solution of the religious problem facing these exiles was a logical deduction from such facts as have been discussed. The Josianic reform had limited Yahweh to the status of a local divinity, a conception quite irreconcilable with the

universality of Jeremiah's theology. The cultus of Jerusalem had not been instituted in obedience to Yahweh's will. Moreover it was the purpose of Yahweh that the city with its Temple should be overthrown, and so could not be essential to the true life of the nation. Yahweh Himself had brought the exiles into Babylon. Hence it must be possible to worship Yahweh apart from home-land, temple, and cultus, attachment to which obscured the true nature of the Divine will. It is perhaps not too fanciful to suppose that the prophet's convictions were strengthened by his own experience of exclusion from the Temple, which xxxvi, 5 seems to indicate.

It is not impossible that Jeremiah himself was not aware of the full implications of his pronouncement. He was in fact assuming a fundamental change in the means of mediation between God and Man. Not only was the worship of Yahweh quite independent of considerations of place: 'Trust ye not in lying words, saying, the Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord are these,' but indeed worship had no need of physical accompaniments. This was to demand a degree of pure spirituality such as has ever been but rarely attainable. It goes far beyond the mere declaration that it was still possible for the Jews of the *Diaspora* to worship Yahweh. It represents in all its uncompromising starkness the essential prophetic religion. The relation between God and Man was moral and spiritual, and all sacramentalism was no less than an unnecessary declension from that standard. Circumcision was to be of the heart; Yahweh's new covenant with all Israel would be written in their inward parts. As a final corollary of Jeremiah's view of such a relation, xxxi, 34 points unmistakably to a doctrine of individual responsibility: 'They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them.' Nevertheless the hasty judgment that Jeremiah was the first prophet to appreciate the personal element in religion must be qualified; the significance of the individual worshipper is implicit in the teaching of Amos, Hosea and Isaiah, though these tended to regard their message as primarily national in import, and the concept of corporate personality bulked large in their minds.

It is not easy fully to realize the greatness of Jeremiah, for the tendency is strong to fill the gaps in our knowledge of Old Testament religious history by reference to the loftier conceptions whose records have been deemed worthy of preservation. But clearly the man was an outstanding religious genius who could contemplate calmly the destruction of his country with its great

city-sanctuary as part of the purpose of a God of righteousness whose relation with His people was dependent on neither of these things. Amos's vision of a Yahweh whose power extended over nations other than Israel really demanded a universalist theology. Hosea had shown repentance to be the only requirement for reconciliation with a Yahweh whose attitude towards Israel was that of a loving husband to his unfaithful wife. But Jeremiah drew the full conclusions from the contemporary situation. The scale of international politics rendered obsolete purely national gods, and demanded one God, whose dealings with humanity as a whole could only be according to an absolute supra-national standard. Such a standard Jeremiah conceived to be moral, and sin was a neglect of this Divine will. Although social injustice is not specified to the same extent as in the prophecies of Amos or Micah, it is plainly condemned in, for example, xxxiv, 17: 'Ye have not hearkened unto Me, to proclaim liberty, every man to his brother, and every man to his neighbour; behold, I proclaim unto you a liberty, saith the Lord, to the sword, to the pestilence, and to the famine.' A God of righteousness necessarily requires a judgment on unrighteousness, the announcement of which constituted the common prophetic burden. Unlike his predecessors, Jeremiah believed that he was witnessing that judgment in history, a judgment which swept away existing notions of the relation between God and Man. And his vision was broad enough to comprehend that a God such as he had proclaimed could not be enclosed within narrow ideas of a Holy City and a Temple cultus, but required of men repentance and worship on a spiritual level unhampered by the grossness of material accompaniments. Such a view, it may be objected, was something of a counsel of perfection; the maintenance of a God to Man relationship on such an exalted plane is too often beyond our powers. But ideals have a value, and indeed a compulsion, of their own, quite apart from their realization without modifications. And Jeremiah's final conclusion of the individual's direct responsibility to God provides the basis for developed views of the sanctity of human personality on which a Christian civilization must ultimately depend: 'Every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge.'

G. B. F. Cook.

MODERN TRITHEISM IN OXFORD*

DR. Hodgson's Croall Lectures on the Trinity, first published in 1943, have now been reprinted for the second time. This is an encouraging fact, for it suggests that even in an age which is so largely preoccupied with material considerations there are still those for whom speculative theology and metaphysic continue to make an appeal. Or so at first sight it would appear; but a perusal of the Lectures will make it seem more doubtful how far this encouragement is really justified. Dr. Hodgson, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford, would probably deny the speculative character of his theme, and his prevailing attitude towards metaphysics is one of deep distrust. His outlook, in fact, is typical both of the philosophy and the theology of the present day. Philosophically he is at one with the empiricists in their rejection of idealism; theologically he is at one with the modern dogmatic school. It is significant that the theologians to whom he refers most often and with whom he is most anxious to show his agreement are Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin.

Altogether the Lectures amount to little more than a restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity along familiar and traditional lines. The three divine Persons are held to be three distinct personalities and the Unity rather than the Trinity is made the central mystery of the Godhead. This Dr. Hodgson maintains to be a necessary deduction from the evidence which the New Testament affords. Like the late Dr. Temple, he believes that revelation is given not in propositions but in certain historic acts; the doctrine of the Trinity is a revealed doctrine because it is the interpretation which those events demand.

Of this general view of revelation, it may readily be granted that it is an improvement upon its predecessor, but at the same time it is not wholly satisfactory. The more limited in number the historic events through which the revelation is alleged to be mediated, the less satisfactory it becomes, since we are thereby increasingly committed to an 'irruptionist' view of the divine activity. Moreover, it tends to a sharp and arbitrary distinction being made between the self-disclosure of God thus given and that which we receive through the experience of the moral and spiritual consciousness.

All Christians, of course, would agree that certain events may justly be termed revelation *par excellence*; but Dr. Hodgson does

* *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, by Leonard Hodgson, D.D. (3rd Impression, 1946; Nisbet, 15/-.)

not allow that greater and lesser degrees can enter into our conception of it. 'Revelation,' he says, 'is given in unique, particular historical events.' (p. 36.) In these events we see 'the action of God at work in history rescuing His world from evil and restoring its possibility of perfection. . . . [This is] the key with which to unlock the mysteries of all being.' (p. 22.) In other words, religion is to be based upon history and not upon metaphysics. Against this 'historical positivism' may be set the famous saying of Lessing that 'the contingent truths of history can never be made proofs of the necessary truths of reason.'

In spite of his rejection of idealism Dr. Hodgson is willing to allow that the human mind has direct access to these necessary truths to a certain limited extent. 'I believe,' he says, 'that any genuinely rational principles of thought are as objectively *presented to* our minds as any of the objects of our sense experience.' (p. 23, note.) A theist obviously must believe that man is somehow able to apprehend what is ultimately real at least in some degree. Nevertheless Dr. Hodgson steadily refuses to allow any genuine kinship between God and man. To do so, he realizes, would involve the acceptance of idealism which he is determined to avoid. Accordingly, as the argument of the book proceeds, it becomes clear that to share the divine nature is not 'an inherent natural element in man by virtue of his creation,' but 'a gift of God in Christ through redemption and adoption.' (p. 57.) To the question which this may reasonably suggest, How then is the knowledge of God given to us? Dr. Hodgson replies:

> 'If we are genuine empiricists we shall be chary of basing our thought on *a priori obiter dicta* such as "Like can only be known by like." When we free ourselves from these, we see that the recognition of this divine activity does not require us to infer a metaphysic in which each man has in him by nature, in virtue of his creation, a spark of the divine reason or a share in the universal Logos. We can equally well . . . think of the Spirit going forth to illuminate the minds of men and render them *capaces revelationis*.' (p. 139.)

But it is doubtful whether 'genuine empiricism' would leave room for the knowledge of God at all. An *a priori* element is involved not only in the belief that such knowledge is possible but also in determining the means by which it is achieved. Surely, however, when once it is granted that the human mind can become possessed of objective truth about God, it is more reasonable to suppose the existence of an essential relationship between that mind and the mind of Deity, through which the truth may be apprehended, than to suppose that God imparts it to man *ab extra* and in a wholly inconceivable way. The fatal objection to such a supposition is that it is absolutely arbitrary and therefore pre-

cludes a rational justification. In fact, with all due respect, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Professor has made the worst of both worlds. In spite of himself he has abandoned his empiricism and yet at the same time he has rendered the possibility of our knowledge of God incapable of reasoned explanation. When at length he warns us that we 'are led astray by *a priori* considerations if we conclude that God is in no sense the Father of all men' (p. 182) it would seem that confusion is only made worse confounded.

Hence the question naturally arises, Why does Dr. Hodgson refuse to posit an essential community of nature between God and man; why is he resolved at all costs to avoid being committed to this basic assumption of the idealist position? His reply is definitely unconvincing:

> 'It [*i.e.* Idealism] implies that the ultimate reality is not the consciously intelligent Creator from whose will the space-time universe takes its origin, but an impersonal necessity expressing itself through persons.' (p. 133.)

Necessities there may indeed be, or what Bishop Butler called 'impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with.' (*Analogy*, Pt. I, chap. ii.) But it is far more intelligible to suppose that they exist *within* the Being of God than that they are somehow antecedent to Him. To suppose on the other hand that God's nature is wholly indeterminate seems very nearly the same thing as to suppose that He has no nature at all.

In fact Dr. Hodgson's whole treatment of idealism is unsatisfactory and misleading, partly because his treatment is more general than the nature of the subject permits. Dean Rashdall is taken as the type of the idealist theologian and his name is joined to those of McTaggart and F. H. Bradley, though with the latter he had very little in common. Dr. Hodgson objects that together with these the Dean held an impersonal conception of the Absolute. In a sense this is true, but it is only true because he did not identify the Absolute with God. In Rashdall's words:

> 'The Absolute cannot be identified with God, so long as God is thought of as self-conscious Being. The Absolute must include God and all other consciousnesses, not as isolated and unrelated beings, but as intimately related (in whatever way) to Him and to one another and as forming with Him a system or Unity.' (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Pt. II, p. 239.)

Against this objection, however, Dr. Hodgson welcomes as 'an element of permanent gain' the dubious theory held by some idealists, though strongly opposed by Rashdall and others, 'that a single personality can include and unify other personalities.' (*Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 129.)

Reverting to the necessities which he alleges idealism to in-

volve, Dr. Hodgson considers that it implies a necessity of creation on the part of God (p. 130 f., etc.), but certainly not all idealists have actually asserted this, and if Dr. Hodgson would assert the contrary — that it was *not* necessary — as he appears to do, then it is not he who is the true empiricist but the idealist who is content to leave the matter open and hold with Rashdall that

> 'The question whether our material Universe . . . has a beginning and will have an end, is one which we have no data for deciding. . . . The antinomy involved either in supposing an endless succession or a beginning and end of the time series is one which our intellectual faculties are, or at least have so far proved, incapable of solving.' (*Philosophy and Religion*, p. 119 f.)

This brings us both to Dr. Hodgson's fundamental point of departure from the idealist theologian and to his doctrine of the Trinity, which after all is the real subject of the work under review: the two do not agree together, and therefore idealism is set aside. This, of course, may be quite consistent with an empirical approach; its consistency depends upon whether his doctrine of the Trinity is, as he affirms, that which an empirical study of the New Testament demands, and if it be so, whether it is thereby sufficiently justified.

The Trinity, it has already been indicated, Dr. Hodgson regards as a Trinity of personalities, as three minds in personal relationship one with another. The Spirit is a personality no less than the Father or the Son; the Son is in no sense subordinate to the Father; and it is not the Father but the Trinity as a whole that is the source and origin of Deity.

It is evident that this conception of God is at variance with any that the idealist is likely to form. A close and intimate relation between God and man must always be part of the latter's system. But in Dr. Hodgson's view the life of the Godhead is self sufficient and self contained. The Three Persons of the Trinity enjoy what he calls a 'family life' (p. 67) amongst themselves. In this life men may also share, when as members of Christ's Church they are admitted into it by adoption; but since the historic Christ is so absolutely identified with the Second Person of the Trinity there is no real affinity between Him and ourselves. His earthly life, says Dr. Hodgson,

> 'was the earthly life of One who was essentially different from every one of us. . . . Jesus of Nazareth, though living to the full the human life of this planet, is a sojourner whose true home is another sphere. . . . In Heaven . . . the knowledge wherewith the Son knoweth the Father and what the Father doeth is not mediated through the consciousness of the body born at Bethlehem.' (pp. 67, 68, 69.)

So great indeed is the gulf that separates Him from men that Dr.

Hodgson thinks it necessary to observe that 'there is a noticeable difference in the Gospels between the attitude of Christ to inanimate objects and to men.' (p. 69.) All the limitations which conditioned His incarnate life have to be 'thought away' from His divine being.

But can it be maintained that this is the idea of Jesus which an empirical study of the Gospels does in fact suggest? Dr. Hodgson practically assumes that it does, but to others not only will the truth seem otherwise, they will also feel that if this were true, the most precious significance of the Incarnation would be destroyed.

Dr. Hodgson then proceeds to a brief examination of the New Testament doctrine of the Spirit. From this he concludes that all the relevant passages either demand that the Spirit shall be understood to be a separate personality, or at least are patient of such a meaning. But the examination is decidedly inadequate. Dr. Hodgson dismisses as 'effectively killed' the theory that the Holy Spirit is often identified by the New Testament writers with the risen and ascended Christ, though good arguments can be adduced in its favour; and to say that *all* the references to the Spirit can be understood personally is only true if the obvious meaning of many of them be distorted. When, as so often in *Acts*, the phrase occurs 'full of the Holy Spirit' how can this be taken to mean being filled with a personal being?

It is indeed hard not to feel that Dr. Hodgson's treatment of the whole subject of the Trinity is far less empirical than he himself would claim. It owes far less to the evidence of the New Testament than it does to traditional orthodoxy; and one might have expected any impartial modern scholar to admit that the New Testament itself does not afford sufficient material of itself for any such dogmatic formulations — hence the conflicting doctrines that have been held and the controversies that have arisen out of them.

This failure of empiricism is no more than might have been expected. Theology cannot be based solely upon particular events, however transcendent those events may have been. The chequered development of Christian doctrine illustrates this, and the need that reason should go beyond the interpretation of purely empirical data, though at the same time it illustrates no less the danger of giving too little consideration to history and too much finality to accepted conclusions.

Our acceptance therefore of the doctrine of the Trinity which Dr. Hodgson offers us must not only depend upon whether it can be made to accord with the evidence of the New Testament. It must depend upon whether it is philosophically tenable as well. Dr. Hodgson would no doubt himself admit that it should be so,

and he argues in favour of the concept of divine unity which he believes his doctrine of the Trinity to involve. He urges that the unity of God must be thought of not as a simple absence of all multiplicity but as an organic unity of which the human self, in its threefold activities of thought, feeling and will, is the closest analogy which we possess. It has to be granted that any trinitarian doctrine of God must imply so much at least, but the problem raised by these Lectures is whether there is room left by them for any real unity within the Godhead at all. There is a unity in the human personality, whatever the activities and relations within it, which it is surely impossible to postulate of three self existent minds however close the harmony between them. If we are to understand that there are within the Godhead three distinct personalities, a frank confession of tritheism seems to be unavoidable. Sometimes Dr. Hodgson appears to be not unduly anxious if it does. He says, for example,

> 'It is better that we should enrich our spiritual life by exploring to the full the possibilities of our threefold relationship to Him than that for fear of tritheism we should impoverish it.' (p. 180.)

But in spite of the risk of impoverishing the Christian revelation, is not the risk of tritheism greater still? Would not its admission stultify that revelation altogether? The Church has on the whole regarded this as the greater danger and has clung jealously, in theory at least, to the monotheism which it inherited alike from the religion of Palestine and the philosophy of Greece. How far indeed Dr. Hodgson's doctrine of the Trinity accords with the traditional teaching of the Church may be open to question. It has already been noticed that he denies that there is any subordinationism within the Godhead at all. For this he finds support in the Athanasian Creed. It is, he says, 'the only Creed which explicitly and unequivocally states the full Christian doctrine of God.' From it alone 'every trace of subordinationism' is eliminated. Whereas the Nicene Creed

> 'might be taken to assert that the Son and the Spirit only share in the Divine substance by derivation from the Father . . . the *Quicunque Vult* leaves no room for such misunderstanding. "In this Trinity none is afore, or after other . . . the whole three Persons are co-eternal together; and co-equal."' (p. 102.)

But the verses immediately preceding these contradict Dr. Hodgson's interpretation—

> 'The Father is made of none: neither created, nor begotten.
> The Son is of the Father alone: not made, nor created, but begotten.
> The Holy Ghost is of the Father and the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding'—

and the contradiction can hardly be removed by the admission which he makes elsewhere:

> 'I have not the least idea what is meant either by filiation or procession in respect of the divine Being.' (p. 144.)

The whole emphasis of the Athanasian Creed is surely opposed to Dr. Hodgson's view, for it is the *unity* of God upon which it insists primarily throughout. 'There are not three eternals: but one Eternal . . . There are not three Lords: but one Lord,' and so on.

Dr. Hodgson gives a lengthy consideration to the trinitarian doctrines of Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, from which he concludes that he is in substantial agreement with them. He maintains that none of these theologians allowed that the Deity could be regarded as *una mens*. In the case of Augustine and Aquinas, Dean Rashdall, as is well known, held the opposite view, and he is severely criticized by Dr. Hodgson for doing so.

Whether the Dean or the Professor is right only one with specialized knowledge may presume to judge, but the opinion of so erudite a mediaevalist as Rashdall cannot be lightly set aside.* Moreover, Dr. Rashdall claims the support of several other schoolmen besides Aquinas—Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Richard of St. Victor—whom Dr. Hodgson does not mention. But in any case it should be noted that the Dean is nowhere concerned to show such a close agreement with the views of these ancient doctors as the Professor himself desires and apparently understands him to claim also. Thus in a footnote to a passage quoted by Dr. Hodgson, Rashdall says:

> 'I am far from saying that the details of St. Thomas's doctrine are not open to much criticism: a rough correspondence between his teaching and any view of God's Nature which can commend itself to a modern philosopher is all that I endeavoured to point out.' (*Philosophy and Religion*, p. 184.)

And elsewhere he says of Augustine:

> 'It must be admitted that his great treatise, *De Trinitate*, is full of obscurities, inconsistencies, and unintelligibilities.' ('The Scholastic Theology,' in *Ideas and Ideals*, p. 176.)

At most, then, Dr. Rashdall is seeking to indicate an agreement between his own interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity and theirs in broad and somewhat indefinite outline. But whether or not the claims which he makes for the scholastic theology in this respect are justified, he is surely right in affirming that

> 'If the Church is to retain any hold over the intellect of the present day, nothing is more essential than that its monotheism should be beyond dispute.' (*Ideas and Ideals*, p. 178.)

It is to be feared that Dr. Hodgson's conclusions will do little to further that result.

D. L. Scott.

* The Head of the Dominicans in Oxford asserted that Rashdall was right, as against Gore, in his interpretation of the Doctrine of the Trinity as expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas.—Ed., *M.C.*

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN'S BRAINS TRUST

WE are grateful to correspondents who send us questions o general interest. They should be written on a postcard addressed to the M.C. Brains Trust, The Vicarage, Stithians Truro, Cornwall.

QUESTION I

Is a realization of the continuity of the human life in its spiritual form through the agency of heredity, whereby, to our certain knowledge, th mental and physical qualities of our ancestors are reproduced in us and i turn handed on to our descendants, a reasonable equivalent to the traditiona belief in a future life of the individual?

The answer is that it is not an equivalent at all, reasonable or otherwise 'The continuity of human life in its spiritual form through the agency o heredity,' so far from being a certainty, is a precarious speculation. Th mental resemblances between offspring and parents, sometimes pronounce but often hardly recognizable, are sufficiently accounted for by physical con tinuity; and two persons, not an individual, are concerned in that. An further theory of the direct transmission of 'mental qualities' entirely fails t explain the much more striking *differences* between parents and offspring Each human life, as an unity, is new, and is certainly not the continued o 'future' life of any individual. At one stage, the Jew seems to have bee content with the hope that his children would inhabit a more glorious Jeru salem when he himself had become a lifeless ghost in Sheol. That hope wa found unsatisfactory. 'Spiritual' life is a quality of personal life which seem to be acquired rather than transmitted, and though it may be partly condi tioned by our physical inheritance, is assuredly not wholly determined o narrowly limited by it. Future life, in any intelligible meaning of the words must involve the conscious continuance of the personal subject of experience in this life, and at least that degree of memory. J. S. Bezzant.

There is such a thing as 'the continuity of human life through the agency of heredity.' But Canon Bezzant is right in holding that continuity of the rac is no substitute for personal survival. It is indeed a real satisfaction to leav offspring behind who display the characteristics both good and bad of thei two parents and four grandparents (to go no further back). But such off spring is far from being a reincarnation or replica of any of its forebear whether immediate or distant. It may indeed contain elements derived fro all of them, but the possible permutations and combinations of the heritabl characteristics concerned are almost infinite. Nature appears to have invente the curious device of sexual reproduction for precisely this reason, that i ensures a richly diverse crop of unpredictable variations, which are the ra material of evolution. The only type of organism which can guarantee tha its offspring will be the exact replica of itself are those unicellular creature which reproduce themselves by the simple process of splitting in half. In thi respect they have the advantage of ourselves who stand rather higher up th evolutionary ladder. J. C. Hardwick.

I agree with Chancellor Bezzant's answer, and also with Mr. Hardwick's, except his assertion about the satisfaction of leaving offspring behind who display the bad characteristics of their parents. There is another form of survival which the questioner ought to have included — a survival in human society independent of physical heredity. The poet wrote, 'To live in hearts we leave behind is not to die.' This kind of immortality secured for Socrates by the discipleship of Plato and Xenophon, or for Jesus Christ by apostles and evangelists, saints and martyrs, may perhaps be of more worth than any personal individual survival after physical death, and is certainly superior to the survival in decendants who, although 'born after the flesh,' are not 'born after the Spirit.' H. D. A. Major.

Of course I agree with Mr. Hardwick that 'the continuity of human life through the agency of heredity' indicates a fact; but the question speaks of the continuity of life *in its spiritual form* through the agency of heredity, and this I understand to imply much more than continuity of the physical basis of life with, probably, certain capacities, dispositions, attractions and repulsions. I also entirely agree with the nobility and unselfishness of the view stated in Dr. Major's answer, though I cannot regard it as 'a reasonable equivalent' to the belief in a future life. For it is a form of immortality to which only the great can aspire; and were it otherwise it would not be satisfactory because those in whose memories we might continue to live are not immortal either— even if future generations think much about us, which they are extremely unlikely to do. J. S. Bezzant.

QUESTION II

My Encyclopedia says that of the three religions of China, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, some would describe the first as only a philosophy. What is the difference between Philosophy and Religion?

Philosophy is directed to the acquiring of knowledge. Natural Philosophy is concerned with scientific knowledge, Moral Philosophy with ethical knowledge, Metaphysical Philosophy with speculation about the nature of reality behind phenomena, theories of knowledge, etc. Religion is concerned with man securing and maintaining right relations with the Divine — what Otto has called the *mysterium tremendum fascinans,* 'the numinous.' The main concern of religion is *cultus*. For the Christian *cultus* will not only be concerned with right worship of the Divine, right ethical action, but also right thought about the Divine Nature. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself.

Aristotle, one of Greece's greatest philosophers, was called 'the master of them that *know,*' but Jesus, the supreme religious figure in human history, is the Lord and Leader of those who *love* God and man. H. D. A. Major.

I would add that the business of philosophy is the attempt to harmonize in a consistent theory the branches of knowledge which Dr. Major distinguishes. There may be, indeed at first sight there are, aspects of moral philosophy and what it seems to imply which other feaures of the universe may not confirm or may disallow. Religion is concerned with action as well as with thought; and if Jesus is Lord of those who love God and man, and if that activity is a true and real one and not merely a sentimental illusion, then a philosophy which would be adequate must take it into account without explaining it away. Religion is a complex activity which supplies certain data for philosophy, and if its insights are true or valid, a philosophy which takes no or too little account of them cannot be as adequate as it might be. We

may say that religion is primarily concerned with action and *cultus*, and philosophy with thought; but if this distinction is pressed too far both religion and philosophy are impoverished. J. S. Bezzant.

I find myself in complete agreement with Chancellor Bezzant's statement. H. D. A. Major.

It has been said that every religious man, in his irreligious moments, is a theologian; and I would add that in such moments he is often a philosopher. Philosophy, said F. H. Bradley, is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, though the finding of those reasons is itself an instinct. Religious beliefs, or the more fundamental ones, are instinctive; and the theologian and philosopher attempt to rationalize them. The religious man believes in God instinctively; God is as real to him as his own existence, and possibly more real than the existence of the world around him. The language of religion is the language of poetry and metaphor, and to take it literally, as the rationalist delights to do, is to divest it of meaning. The simple religious consciousness knows that God is revealed not to the intellect but to the heart, and that 'when philosophers call their ultimate reality by the name of God they are taking that name in vain and pretending to be what they are not.' Perhaps it is true that 'God is the imaginative or intuitive form in which the Absolute reveals itself to the religious consciousness.' The above remarks do not depreciate philosophy, which is a useful mental discipline and an antidote to some superstitions — especially to modern superstitions like materialism. And it may remove some anti-religious inhibitions. But religion and philosophy are distinct activities, and to confuse them only leads to misunderstanding, dogmatism and conceit. J. C. Hardwick.

I am unable to agree with Mr. Hardwick's citation from F. H. Bradley. Bradley seems to me by his depreciation of Philosophy 'to vilify Reason,' which, as Bishop Butler maintained, possesses authority to criticize Religion. Surely in this sphere the right function of Philosophy is to discover and state the right reason for true Religion. I cannot but think that this is Mr. Hardwick's conviction also. H. D. A. Major.

QUESTION III

Is anything known about the method by which the will of the Holy Spirit was so precisely ascertained or manifested in such cases as recorded, for instance in Acts xv, 28; xvi, 6, 7; xx, 23; xxi, 11. *Was it felt as an impulse after prayer, or ascertained by lot, or revealed in dream or vision, or was it manifested in some other way?*

The author of *Acts* does not inform us as to the methods whereby the will of the Spirit was ascertained. Possibly he assumed that his readers would know. He does tell us that on one occasion (i, 26) the Divine Will was ascertained by the casting of lots after prayer. In *Acts* xxi. 11 we are told that Agabus foretold what lay in store for Paul by handling his girdle — a method still practised by those who profess powers of precognition. *Acts* xvi, 6 and 7 clearly indicate that Paul and his companions were conscious that the Spirit dictated their route. Whether this was through premonitions, omens, inner voices or by some other means there is no telling. The statement in *Acts* xv, 28, 'It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us,' was certainly no conventional formula, but expressed a sincere conviction of the Spirit's guidance. In *Acts* xx, 23 Paul has no doubts at all as to his imprisonment having been foretold by the Spirit more than once.

What are we to make of all this? We are driven to the conclusion that the mental processes of the primitive Christians were different from our own. We may be sure that none of these happenings, to us so strange, seemed to them at all surprising. Their absence would have created a disturbing vacuum. From Paul's writings it becomes clear that these first Christians were conscious of possessing new powers, which appeared supernatural, through the presence of the Spirit among them. It would be an unwarrantable assumption on our part to suggest that they were mistaken. J. C. HARDWICK.

St. Paul (*Rom.* viii, 16) writes, 'The Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirit.' It is the united affirmation of our spiritual, moral and rational consciousness in support of what is believed to be a Divine Revelation which constitutes Divine guidance for us in the sphere of the great spiritual truths, and if this be preceded by prayer for Divine guidance, then this adds to the sense of assurance. In lesser matters of faith and action, it must be right to adopt this procedure. To strive to learn the Divine Will by recourse to dreams, omens, casting of lots, even though apostolic Christians used them in their seeking to discover the Divine Will, is sub-Christian. See Bishop Lightfoot in *Philippians* on Christian and Pagan conceptions of the method of Divine Inspiration. H. D. A. MAJOR.

Dr. Major correctly describes the methods which would be followed to-day by any reasonable person seeking Divine guidance. I do not think, however, that much is to be gained by obscuring the differences which subsist between our way of looking at things and the way in which the primitive Christians regarded them. But to describe their methods as 'sub-Christian' is only to say that they do not appeal to *us*. *They* might with equal justice describe *our* methods and beliefs as 'post-Christian'—which they undoubtedly would do, save that they might express themselves more forcibly. J. C. HARDWICK.

It seems to me that Mr. Hardwick has correctly answered the question and that Dr. Major has indicated what is beyond doubt, *for us*, the better way. I would add that though it would be presumptuous to lay down that early Christians were mistaken in believing that the Holy Spirit was active through the methods which, in good faith, they used in discovering the Divine Will, it would be both presumptuous and worse for modern people to return to the use of such methods. Anyone who, faced with a responsible decision or one about right and wrong, first prayed and then 'tossed up for it,' and claimed Divine guidance for the result because of the method used, would rightly be held guilty of levity and irreverence. None can justifiably assert that the honest exercise of faculties (God-given for the purpose of judgment), in the spirit of prayer, cannot also be God-guided; but equally the claim to such guidance in any given instance cannot be more than a matter of the claimant's private certitude. It cannot be proved to anyone disposed to doubt it; but neither can it be disproved except to those convinced that any action or statement which is neither noble nor in accordance with knowledge or reason cannot have been Divinely guided. Nowadays in ecclesiastical circles, and those the highest, appeals to the Holy Ghost seem sometimes to be *substituted* for appeals to knowledge and sound learning. They have, indeed, the double advantage of being both easier and less open to verification, but that is all that can be said for them. J. S. BEZZANT.

Canon Bezzant, in mentioning ecclesiastical 'appeals to the Holy Ghost,' raises a very important point. The period of 'inspiration' described in *Acts* obviously could not last, belonging to a quite early stage in the development

of a religious movement. Unless confusion, chaos and eventual collapse were to result, organization was inevitable, and with organization inspiration ceases, or rather 'the Spirit' is 'put into commission' and the institution becomes 'the organ of the Spirit' with the institutional official as its accredited mouthpiece. Spiritual power seems to resemble physical, in that unless canalized it runs to waste. For this reason the church is a necessary evil. J. C. HARDWICK.

BOOK REVIEWS

LEFT WING CRITICISM

'Thoughtful observers are aware that during the last thirty years there has been throughout Europe and America a disquieting and progressive decay in Christian belief.' So says the dust-cover of the Bishop of Birmingham's new book *The Rise of Christianity*,* and the fact is exemplified in its pages. The tone of the book is predominantly sceptical, and very little of traditional Christian theology remains. Can what is left provide modern Europe with a faith? 'Dr. Barnes's answer,' say the publishers, 'is a persuasive affirmative.' But others may be less confident. Historic Christianity is represented as a socialist and pacifist movement which, among a welter of superstitions, won the allegiance of the disinherited proletariat of the ancient world; and if such were its essential nature its appeal to the modern world could hardly be great.

Dr. Barnes, whose great distinction is primarily in the field of mathematics, is acutely conscious of the opposition of religion and science, or at least of the scientific spirit and much popular Christianity, and his purpose is to present Christianity in such a form that the opposition will disappear. His method is that of unilateral disarmament, and he attempts to appease the rationalists by abandoning all that might offend scientific presuppositions. He accepts alike 'the methods of analytical scholarship and the postulate of the large-scale, or finite-scale, uniformity of nature which is fundamental in modern science.' In other words, he rules out miracles altogether, and he is therefore constrained to give an account of the rise of Christianity on a purely naturalistic basis. It may be true that 'there emerges a lovely and satisfying faith which contains the essentials of the great Christian tradition,' but it is a faith which will not satisfy everybody. More conservative Christians will have some justification in accusing the Bishop of a *petitio principii* on the question of miracles. Like Hume, he conceives of a miracle as something which does not happen, and his contention that science has made belief in miracles impossible is only an extension of Hume's assertion that no testimony can ever suffice to make a miracle credible. But he does not face the question whether this is indeed a necessary conclusion of science or only a working hypothesis. The problem is philosophical, not scientific. It has often been pointed out that we have no knowledge of a 'law of nature' in any forensic and compelling sense, and 'laws which never shall be broken' are no more than relics of the anthropomorphic deism of the eighteenth century. Natural 'laws' are generalizations of experience, and who is to say that our experience is exhaustive or that even 'nature' has no undiscovered secrets? Modern churchmen are rightly suspicious of miraculous stories, but that is a different thing from ruling them out *a priori*, and we may well hesitate to declare dogmatically what may or may not have happened in the presence of

* *The Rise of Christianity*, by Ernest William Barnes, Sc.D., Hon. D.D., Hon. LL.D. F.R.S., Bishop of Birmingham. (Longmans, Green & Co. 1947. 15/-.)

the incarnate Son of God. This does not make credible every tale of miracles in which the vulgar of all ages have delighted, but it does suggest that to begin an enquiry into the rise of Christianity with the assumption that no 'miracle' can ever have occurred is an unscientific method. As Dr. Barnes's sometime colleague, Professor James Ward, once said to the present reviewer, 'There is nothing impossible about miracles; I do not believe in them myself, but it is simply a question of evidence.'

The Rise of Christianity is a long book which must have cost its busy author much labour to compile, but it may be doubted whether some of the earlier chapters are strictly relevant. Palaeolithic and neolithic man present an interesting field of study, and books by experts in that field are widely read; but it is difficult to see what it has to do with Christian beginnings, and even the early history of Egypt and Babylon is remote from the first century A.D., although it is doubtless intended to lead up to a brief study of Old Testament religion. A chapter on The Mediterranean World provides a sketch of civilization from the early culture of Crete to the age of Augustus, and this introduces a short and more obviously relevant chapter on the mystery-religions which Dr. Barnes believes to have exercised a profound influence on the development of Christianity. We are on uncertain ground here. No doubt there are elements in Christian faith and practice which were foreshadowed in the mysteries; and that is natural enough, since both grew up within the same civilization; but it does not follow that there was direct influence of the one upon the other, still less that there was conscious borrowing; and we must not forget that the early Christians regarded the gods of the heathen as devils. Such a conviction must surely have limited any tendency to borrow their rites; and, in particular, the theory that St. Paul, a Hebrew of Hebrews and later an ardent Christian, allowed his mind to be deeply influenced by the theology of the mysteries is one which should be received with caution.

His determination to rule out miracles sets the tone of Dr. Barnes's work. It leads him to exaggerate the lowly status of the early Christians who believed in miracles and to give the latest possible date to those Christian writings in which miracles are enshrined. He does indeed admit that Christianity 'did not affect the scum of great cities like Rome, Corinth, or Ephesus' (p. 62), and that 'it was primarily a movement among the lower middle and upper artisan classes'; yet on the next page we read, 'Speaking generally, Christianity spread through an unhappy proletariat which found life hard.' 'Proletariat' is a word that needs careful definition, but if it be taken in its commonly accepted sense the statement that Christianity spread through a proletariat, happy or unhappy, is seriously open to question. The family of Jesus were certainly not proletarians, nor were the disciples, nor were the writers of the New Testament, nor were the majority of the local congregations who read and appreciated the epistles of St. Paul. The Church's net enclosed some fish of every class, but there is no evidence that Christianity was specially a movement of the lowest classes who found in it the hope of social emancipation. No doubt the intelligentsia held aloof, as they always do, and Celsus and Lucian scoffed; but to describe the Church which included Flavius Clemens, Clement of Rome, and a host of educated men from the *Auctor ad Hebraeos* to Clement and Origen, as 'proletarian' is a misrepresentation.

Scarcely less open to question is Dr. Barnes's characterization of the Church as socialist and pacifist. Again, some accurate definition of terms is desirable, since without it such words are apt to bear their modern meaning. The early Christians were acutely conscious of their mutual obligations, and the best of them showed little concern for personal possessions and worldly goods. From the first, the social conscience of the Christians was an out-

standing feature of their common life; widows were supported, children rescued, prisoners relieved, and a weekly collection was made for the poor. But this is not 'socialism' in any accepted sense, and there is no evidence of any attempt to interfere with the rights of private property. The early church of Jerusalem may have made an experiment in Christian communism, but if so it ended disastrously, and the Jerusalem Christians remained a charge on the charity of others throughout the apostolic age. In any case, Dr. Barnes would be the first to admit that the early chapters of *Acts* present an idealized picture. The fact is that the earliest believers were far too little interested in this world to concern themselves with questions of social organization.

There is more to be said for the view that the tone of the early Church was 'pacifist,' although here again we must beware of transferring modern ideas to the ancient world. Probably the earliest Christians were not of the class from which Rome recruited her legions, and there was little in the rough life of a legionary to appeal to a Christian. When the emperors became the declared enemies of the Church the Christians had no incentive to serve under their standards, and a Christian in the army was in constant difficulty owing to the idolatrous ceremonies in which he was required to take part. But the early literature reveals little repugnance to the military life as such, from New Testament times military metaphors were freely applied to the Christian 'warfare,' and as soon as the persecutions ceased Christians served willingly enough. Even in the second century many of them were to be found in the army, and whatever may be said of the story of the Thundering Legion, it certainly proves that there were not a few in the army of Marcus Aurelius.*

One has a feeling in reading this book that the distinguished author is lacking in the true instinct of the critic or the historian. He has made up his mind what he will find in his sources, and he finds it; but the selection of evidence is apparent, and many of his judgments are sweeping and arbitrary. With all respect it must be said that Dr. Barnes lacks the ability to transfer himself into another age and to enter into the minds of men whose background was so different from his own.

An example is to be found in his lukewarm regard for St. Paul. It is true that on the Bishop's premises we know very little about the great apostle, for he regards *Acts* as late and legendary and the chief Pauline epistles as composite works written in the second century round fragments of St. Paul's genuine letters. This theory, which few New Testament scholars would treat seriously, is very convenient in allowing Dr. Barnes to get rid of anything in the epistles which he does not like. Even *I Corinthians* xiii and xv are rejected, the former because it is too good for St. Paul, and the latter because it provides almost first-hand evidence for the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus. If Marcion 'criticized with a penknife,' Dr. Barnes criticizes with a hatchet. The fact is that the mentality of the Apostle is uncongenial to the Bishop. St. Paul was a man of the first century, not a twentieth-century scientist, and Dr. Barnes fails completely to understand him. For instance in *Galatians* St. Paul sets faith in Christ in opposition to reliance upon Law and in so doing he develops his glorious conception of Christian freedom, a conception which, despite the rabbinic arguments by which it is supported might be expected to appeal to a modern churchman. But Dr. Barnes makes no attempt to enter into the spirit of the Pauline gospel, and remarks that 'to the humanist the opposition between faith and law is largely unreal. 'There are probably no passages in all the writings ascribed to Paul from

* Lightfoot showed that the evidence for this story is exceptionally strong (*Apostolic Fathers*, part ii, vol. ii, 469-476). Tertullian believed it twenty-five years later (*Apol* v).

which the Christian humanist finds himself so alienated.' This sounds more like the verdict of a Jewish controversialist than of a Christian theologian, and it seems to imply a lack of appreciation of the very essence of Christian (and especially Protestant) ethics. Between a legalistic system and reliance upon the free operation of the Spirit of Christ there is a great gulf fixed, and it was the religious genius of St. Paul which first revealed it. If Dr. Barnes's scepticism were not so selective he might well doubt the authenticity of the saying quoted from *Matthew*, 'I came not to destroy but to fulfil,' and he might consider the implications of the unquestionably genuine saying concerning the new patch on an old garment. It may be true that 'the pious rabbi or strict pharisee was . . . because of the Law clean-living and honourable, kindly and charitable. The Law taught him to be a lover of things pure and true and beautiful'; but it is not true that 'Paul in his polemic seems to have forgotten such fundamental facts.' Paul (and, we may add, Jesus) knew contemporary Judaism better than does the Bishop of Birmingham; his own moral teaching is of incomparable richness; and yet he could write with his own experience in remembrance, 'If righteousness is through law, then Christ died for nought.' To Dr. Barnes this is merely 'strange teaching.'

He is repelled by the 'Christ-mysticism' of St. Paul and by his belief in sacramental grace. The former is no more than a reflection of pagan mystery faiths, the latter mechanical magic. It is astonishing to find no greater appreciation of the wholehearted devotion of the heroic apostle and no understanding of the sacramental principle which, however often degraded in the popular mind, has no essential connection with magic and is deeply embedded in the history of Christianity and in the formularies of the Church of England.

Since Dr. Barnes is so unsympathetic towards St. Paul, who was, after all, the chief intellectual force in the Church of the first century, it is not to be expected that he will have much to say in praise of the simpler mentality of the synoptic gospel writers. The gospels abound in miracles, and therefore it is necessary from Dr. Barnes's point of view to lay stress upon their late and unreliable character. *Mark* may perhaps have been written about A.D. 75, but *Matthew* and *Luke* date from the end of the century, and the fourth gospel belongs to the second century. This may be true, for we have no certain knowledge; but the assumption that belief in miracles is a proof of a late date is hazardous, and it must not be forgotten that *Mark*, the earliest gospel, is no whit less miraculous in tone than the others. For Dr. Barnes's suggestion that the gospels underwent a process of harmonization before they were accepted as authoritative Christian writings (p. 72) there is no evidence whatsoever; and if 'skilful removal of contradictions may often be suspected' it is strange that the work was not more thoroughly done. In any case the period 140-175 is too late for any such process.

Dr. Barnes's treatment of the gospels contains many challenging statements, and to some of his readers his method will seem arbitrary and dogmatic.

> 'We have seen reason to believe that the story of the virgin birth, which only occurs in the picturesque introductions to *Matthew* and *Luke*, arose from a mis-translation in the Greek version of the book of the prophet *Isaiah*. The story can hardly have had its beginning on Jewish soil. The whole background, and the analogues cited in defence of it by Christian apologists of the second century of our era are pagan. To an orthodox Jew the story would have seemed blasphemous' (p. 87).

Perhaps; but how is it that of all the gospels the opening chapters of *Matthew* and *Luke* are the most Jewish in tone? The serious defence of the historicity of these chapters is seldom undertaken by a modern critic, and their mutual

contradictions are undeniable, but the origin of their underlying belief remains a mystery. The suggestion that they are the product of purely pagan influences is too simple to be accepted, and although *Isaiah* vii, 14 soon came to be quoted in support of the Christian belief, it is highly improbable that the belief arose simply from a study of that passage in the Greek. *Matthew* at least shows few traces of the influence of Hellenistic paganism.

A few references to other passages must suffice to illustrate Dr. Barnes's treatment of the gospel narratives and the presuppositions on which it rests.

'It must always be remembered that Christianity was formulated in a non-Jewish environment' (p. 88).

'We reach the conclusion that *Luke* and *Acts* were both written after A.D. 93' (p. 113).*

'The egoism of the statement that, though heaven and earth shall pass away, his words shall endure, is not like Jesus' (p. 136. Cp. *Mark* i, 22).

'We can see that the second gospel is a disordered narrative, a collection of fragments of teaching in no proper sequence' (p. 145. Cp. Burkitt, *Gospel History*, ch. iii).

In the cleansing of the Temple 'there can have been no use of physical force' (p. 155. It must not be forgotten that at this time Jesus was accompanied by a large band of devoted followers).

'The execution of Jesus showed that Pilate was prepared brutally to crush the new movement' (p. 174. That is certainly not the account of the Gospels).

'*Matthew* has two allusions to Peter that have no parallels in the other gospels. We are told that (viii, 14-15) Jesus healed Peter's wife's mother, who was sick of a fever' (p. 182. But see *Mark* i, 30, *Luke* iv, 38. The other allusion is not quoted).

'We seem forced to conclude from his Roman citizenship that his father, and in youth himself, had apostatized, had given due homage to the pagan gods, and to the genius of the Emperor' (p. 199. Poor St. Paul!).

'In the teaching ascribed to Paul profound pessimism is coupled with strange arguments and irrational beliefs. Yet curiously enough it has left an indelible mark on Christian theology' (p. 235).

'Possibly, when Christianity was originally proclaimed, its message with regard to the future was simply the speedy coming of the kingdom of God, as the social expression of new moral standards' (p. 249. So much for Schweitzer).

'Opinion during the present century has hardened against the belief that the Ignatian correspondence is genuine' (p. 262).

'It is hardly necessary to say that there is no evidence for infant baptism in the early Church' (p. 277. Cp. Polycarp, Irenaeus and Tertullian).

'Because Christianity declined to recognize national boundaries, because it was not nationalist but internationalist, it was regarded as unpatriotic' (p. 300. A good example of the twentieth century transferred to the first. There was no nationalism in the Roman Empire. Racialism is another matter; but are we to think of the restless barbarians as 'patriotic'?).

'In the second century human scepticism was losing its cleansing strength' (p. 328. Then we may take courage for the present).

'It must be allowed that Celsus, whom we only know through the eyes of an opponent, impresses us favourably' (p. 331).

* For a discussion of this difficult problem see Foakes Jackson and Lake, *Christian Beginnings*, II, 355-358. 'The argument that Luke used Josephus is not quite conclusive.'

These are small points, but they serve to illustrate the general tendency of the author. Dr. Barnes approves of socialism, pacificism, and internationalism, and therefore he thinks that they were the dominating characteristics of early Christianity. He has small sympathy with mysticism and sacramentalism which offend his austere rationalism, and therefore he represents them as incursions into Christianity from the heathen world. He dislikes speculative theology, and to him the Logos doctrine, by which, it has been said, the Greek world was led to accept Christianity, seems fanciful and useless theorizing (p. 331). Throughout the book the subjective element predominates, and many will feel that the facts are made to fit the theory rather than the theory based upon the facts.

In his treatment of the Resurrection Dr. Barnes is rigidly consistent and declines to allow even here any element which could be regarded as 'miraculous.' He is ruled by theory, not by evidence. 'We cannot, out of deference to religious sentiment, reject the principle of the uniformity of nature which is fundamental in the outlook created by modern science.' That disposes of the story of the empty tomb. But Dr. Barnes pays hardly more respect to the evidence for the appearances of Jesus, and here he is in conflict with many modern critics who could hardly be described at conservative. *I Corinthians* xv is rejected as post-Pauline, although there is little attempt to justify this astonishing theory. As to the argument that the survival of Christianity furnishes the best proof of the Resurrection, Dr. Barnes feels that it is sufficiently met by reference to the faith of the early Christians that Jesus was still with them in spirit. 'The followers of the Saviour-Lord thought of themselves as . . . "raised together with Christ" and therefore seeking "the things that are above, where Christ is seated on the right hand of God." Metaphor changes easily into myth, and myth into what is supposed to be history.' So the resurrection faith was an offshoot of the irrational mysticism of St. Paul. It is an unconvincing theory. Perhaps Dr. Barnes might find the actual narratives of the gospels, confused and confusing though they be, still worthy of further study. It might occur to him that *John* xxi, which he dismisses as a late addition, possibly of the middle of the second century, an awkard narrative, just another myth of the presence of the risen Jesus at a eucharistic feast, is in fact a survival, combined with other material, of the very early tradition underlying *Mark* xvi, 7.

The Rise of Christianity cannot be accepted as a serious contribution to critical study. It is too arbitrary, too dogmatic, and too much indebted to a few extreme critics. Frequent references to the opinions of 'modern scholars,' 'analytical critics,' and such people, who are always anonymous, may be forgiven in a popular work so long as the opinions are such as are indeed generally accepted; but when authority for highly questionable statements is sought in reference to the work of scholars, the reader has a right to know who these scholars are. It is not enough to say that 'those familiar with the subject will readily recognize the groups of scholars to whose work I attach special importance.' This is a book which is intended to be read by many who are not familiar with the subject, and it may be thought to embody the last word of critical scholarship.

All modern churchmen will pay tribute to the honesty and courage which have gone to make this book, and no less to the industry which has enabled a diocesan bishop to produce so considerable a work. Yet many will regret its publication. A bishop necessarily speaks *ex cathedra*, and the eminence of Dr. Barnes in one field may easily give to his pronouncements in another field an authority which they do not possess. The purely naturalistic interpretation of the rise of Christianity may be possible and even legitimate, but it is not the only view compatible with a full acceptance of modern know-

ledge, critical, historical, and scientific. The average churchman who reads this book need not conclude that all his old beliefs are repudiated in enlightened circles, and the outsider will be rash to infer that the whole dogmatic system of Christianity lies in ruins. Many will feel that Dr. Barnes has not provided a probable explanation of the rise of Christianity. Mountains may produce mice, but mice do not give birth to mountains.

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

RADHAKRISHNAN'S MESSAGE TO INDIA AND MANKIND*

Religion and Society, by Dr. Radhakrishnan, is based on Notes of Lectures delivered in the Universities of Calcutta and Benares in the winter of 1942. The time was one of crisis, and the crisis can hardly be said as yet to have passed. At bottom it is a religious crisis, for what has brought the world to its present pass is 'the dominance of a false philosophy with its misleading assumptions, beliefs and values.'

> 'Every civilization is the expression of a religion, for religion signifies faith in absolute values and a way of life to realize them. If we do not have a conviction that the values a civilization embodies are absolute, its rules will become dead letters and its institutions will decay.'

The character of a civilization is derived from its conception of man and his destiny. Is man just the most cunning of animals? Is he primarily an economic being, his history controlled by economic laws? Or has he a spiritual element in him, which lifts him above the temporal and the expedient? Has he far horizons, invincible hopes, creative energies?

Many, and especially, perhaps, the young, are of the opinion that the days of religion are over. Yet the historic controversy between science and religion is out of date, 'for the science which challenged religion is as dead as the religion it challenged.'

> 'The problem to-day relates not to the incredible dogmas of religion, but to the place of the spiritual in a universe which cannot be explained altogether by science.'

A new world order is not to be achieved solely by organization, efficiency, propaganda and 'drive.' What is needed is some deep spiritual impulse, some conviction on the part of the majority of human beings that they belong to an order of reality higher than that of brute nature.

> 'Religion in the past has been mixed up with magic and witchcraft, quackery and superstition. The dogmas which were once paths to divine life, but are now hindrances, should not be allowed to interpose a barrier between man and God and spoil the essential simplicity of spiritual life. Religion, as its very name connotes, should be the binding force which deepens the solidarity of human society. In its essence religion is a summons to spiritual adventure.'

A church, remarked Kirsopp Lake, should be not a museum of antiquities but a laboratory for research. Discoveries in the spiritual sphere are still possible, and it may be that the present 'time of troubles' will prove fruitful. Perhaps the advance will be towards greater simplicity, for to simplify is not to dilute.

> 'The religion of the truly religious is a simple one, without any shackles of creeds, dogmatic sentiments or supernatural elements.'

Yet the attitude of the very religious always strikes the conventionally religious as blasphemous. 'This man blasphemeth,' is the verdict always.

* *Religion and Society*. By S. Radhakrishnan. (Allen & Unwin. 1946. 10/6.)

Professor Radhakrishnan is an unashamed believer in the individual. He ealizes that the progress of applied science and technology has resulted in the ubjection of man to the machine; his consciousness has become mechanized, e becomes an interchangeable unit instead of a unique person. Yet 'life is ıanifested in the individual,' the world has its focus in him, and truth is evealed to him. It is 'the low level of the mass mind' that is responsible for yrannies.

> 'Human progress has been achieved in the past by the refusal of the individual to sink his common sense and conscience in the neurotic herd. Life is resistance, digging one's heels into the ground in order to stand against the current. One of the deepest causes of the disorder of the present is the absence of men and women who refuse to be carried away. All progress is due to the initiation of new ideas by exceptionally endowed individuals. Without intellectual freedom there would have been no Shakespeare or Goethe, no Newton or Faraday, no Pasteur or Lister.'

Nor is there any denying that there are some crucial and inexorable human xperiences, like love, birth, and death, which are essentially personal. Some ital experiences are social, and both aspects of life are essential, but the ndividual must resist that total annexation by society which is a manifest hreat to-day. The strength of a society lies in its forceful individuals, and they are lost all is lost.

> 'Modern man, without losing his social consciousness or conscience, must rediscover within himself a source of individual initiative sufficiently strong to cope with social despotisms.'

There can be no doubt that Leviathan is the menace to-day, and that the efeat of Hitler has not removed the menace to the extent that was hoped is ıe most sinister feature of the present situation. There are always aspirants o mount the Devil's throne. It would appear that the author of the present ork is one of those who look to religion to provide a stiffening element, nd to produce again, as it has often done in the past, the stuff of which ıartyrs are made. Like Professor Arnold Toynbee, he speaks of a process f 'withdrawal and return' whereby a man goes apart to be, as it were, recharged,' after which he returns to the fray with renewed strength and ourage. 'He went in the strength of that meat forty days and forty nights.'

There is an interesting section in this book on *ahimsa*, or non-violence. he Hindu scriptures look upon it as the highest virtue, and commend it as ıe supreme duty, though they indicate occasions when departure from the rinciple is permissible.

> 'In an imperfect world, where all men are not saints, force has to be used to keep the world going . . . In the present conditions, the use of force is necessary to check the turbulent, protect the helpless, and keep order between man and man and group and group. But such a use of force is not by intention destructive. It works for the ultimate good of those to whom it is applied. This legitimate police action is necessary if we are to be saved from anarchy.'

A perusal of this book is very encouraging. If the spirit pervading it spires any not-negligible proportion of those in whose hands the destiny of idia now rests, there is hope, not only for India but for the world. The writer a believer in religion. Not in the sense that he holds this or that doctrine, it in the sense that he believes man to be a spiritual being whose centre s not in himself, nor indeed in this sphere of reality, but (to use the language religion) 'in God.' Moreover, for him, religion is not only a refuge, but giver of life and courage, and of power of mind and spirit to fight evil herever it is enthroned. J.C.H.

THE ENGLISH TOWNSMAN PAST AND PRESENT

Much has been said and sung of the English countryside but not too much, for until fifty years ago the English countryside was largely unspoilt. Yet most of the wealth which did so much to beautify the countryside and build the stately homes of England was produced by the citizens of our English towns, the centres of our industries and our commerce.

How many of our noble families, the possession of whose titles required that they should be landowners, are descended from our great city merchants? On the other hand, how many of the more vigorous and enterprising inhabitants of rural England have sought to escape from the dullness and drudgery of rural life by emigrating to the towns? Every serf who could escape from his lord's glebe and live for a year and a day in a town became thereby a free man.

Notwithstanding this give and take between town and country, town life and country life had their distinctive features and traditions, and the inhabitants of each were widely differentiated, save in the case of that very limited class whose wealth and leisure permitted them to enjoy the best of both worlds.

Thomas Burke, who has given to the English-speaking world so many delightful books on English life, its homes and streets, its inns and recreations, its beauties and its peculiarities, completed just before his recent death a charming book, *The English Townsman*,* with one hundred illustrations drawn from rare sources. It should stir the pride of English townsmen, for it is to the towns and their independent and resolute inhabitants that we owe the great institutions which characterize our national life. As J. R. Green, the popular historian of the development of our social institutions, has pointed out:—

> 'In the silent growth and elevation of the English people the boroughs led the way . . . . The rights of self-government, of free speech in free meeting, of equal justice by one's equals, were brought safely across the ages of tyranny by the burghers and shop-keepers of the towns. In the quiet, quaintly-named streets, in town-mead and market-place, in the bell that swung out its summons to the crowded borough-mote, in merchant-gild and church-gild and craft-gild, lay the life of Englishmen who were doing more than knight or baron to make England what she is. . . . '

But the freedom of the mediaeval towns was of a very disciplined kind. It possessed no ideal of equality. The city guilds aimed at efficiency and provided for each of their members *une carrière ouverte aux talents*, and the penalties and punishments inflicted upon the idle, incompetent, and dishonest, encouraged virtue. The city guilds and companies made varied provision both for the needs and the welfare of their members. They had their chaplains, their churches, their patronal festivals. They provided for the infirm and the aged, the orphans and widows. They even provided, in some cases, dowries. They were the centres of the social life of the urban community. The townsman who belonged neither to guild nor company was something of a social pariah. The modern trades union is a very poor substitute for them, for they united worker and master and contributed to the welfare of both as well as to the welfare of the larger community in which their own guild or company was a co-operative factor.

Although Mr. Burke finds the modern town in its plan and in its appearance and in its amenities very different from the mediaeval town, he thinks

* *The English Townsman*, by Thomas Burke. (Batsford. 1946. 12/6.)

that the responsible citizens of the modern town — its mayors and town clerks — have much in common in character and temperament with their mediaeval predecessors.

In the modern town its dwellings, its shops, its inns, its places of entertainment, its municipal buildings, are all very much larger than in the mediaeval towns. The citizens, however, are much the same in stature save in one respect, they have grown thinner. Of course, the sanitation, lighting and transport in modern towns are immeasurably better than in mediaeval towns; but the amusements, interests, occupations and solid comforts of the mediaeval town are not really surpassed by its modern successor. The modern citizen is indeed more grave and serious than the mediaeval citizen. It is difficult to account for this, but Mr. Burke regards it, in part, as due to a sense of responsibility arising from the greater freedom of our modern town life. Men have to think more for themselves and for others — our outlook is wider. Possibly the pressure of competition may be another cause.

Mr. Burke, as becomes the author of such a book, is an enthusiast for the life of the town. The country is the place for children and the retired. His feeling is that of Dr. Johnson. 'Sir, when a man is tired of London, he is tired of life.'

The English Townsman closes, and rightly, on an heroic note:—

> 'Mayors and aldermen will never again be fit subjects for laughter. They served their towns and their fellows as men served at Crecy and Blenheim and Waterloo and the Somme and Dunkirk. But they served at a time when heroism was no longer a quality peculiar to special figures. It was no longer remarkable because it was common to all men. I know of the happenings in provincial and coast towns only from what I have heard and read, but so far as my own town is concerned, I was not from it for one night since 1939, and I know from personal observation that it would be invidious to pick upon this or that individual act as heroic. Similar acts were being performed night after night in a hundred streets. Deeds of angelic indifference to self were so many that nobody on any particular night could have counted them. The town gave us something that was more valuable and more impenetrable than armour: it gave us a renunciation of self, a quiet acceptance of whatever might come. To this we added our secret weapon; a secret weapon that puzzles the enemy more than any of our mechanical inventions, and one that he cannot produce and to which he can find no counter — our spirit of laughter under catastrophe' (p. 143).

H.D.A.M.

THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS*

Klausner has declared that,

> 'throughout the Gospels there is not one item of ethical teaching which cannot be paralleled either in the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, or in the Talmudic and Midrashic literature of the period near to the time of Jesus.'

Mr. Marshall, in reply to this, remarks that from the religious point of view it would be disconcerting if there were no parallels anywhere to the ethical insight of Jesus, for in that case we should have to conclude that, apart from him, God had left himself without witness.

> 'But where is the ethical teacher,' he asks, 'in Greece or Palestine or India, who can supply parallels to that ethical insight *at every point*?

* *The Challenge of New Testament Ethics.* By L. H. Marshall. (Macmillan. 15/-.)

> The newness is to be found in the unique combination of ethical precepts which Jesus presents, a combination which has no parallel anywhere; it is seen not in particular exhortations but in the absolute intensity of His ethics . . . Jesus supplied, not so much new ethical precepts, as a new *direction* to the ethical life of man, and invested it with a new *power*.'

Mr. Marshall does not accept the view that the ethics of Jesus can be dissociated from his religion and so made to stand alone.

> 'All the ethical teaching of Jesus is rooted in His religion, in God. It is true that some of His utterances *seem* to be purely ethical and almost anti-religious, and they were undoubtedly so regarded by the Scribes and Pharisees . . . Yet in all these cases, He is not exalting ethics above religion, and still less separating ethics from religion, but denouncing as false any religion which yields unethical fruit, and insisting that true religion leads inevitably to a high ethic. For Him, ethics is part and parcel of religion, and morality springs out of a new relation to God . . . The "right" and the "good" are, for Him, aspects of the Will of God . . . He calls on men to act like God and thus to show themselves God's children.'

In point of fact the idea that ethics can be separated from religion never occurred to the Hebrew mind. This is one of the discoveries of modern times, for we claim to be in our generation wiser than the children of light.

Mr. Marshall stresses the point that the idea of the Kingdom of God was central to the ethics of Jesus. As to the manner in which the Kingdom was conceived by Jesus, Mr. Marshall takes as the *locus classicus Luke* xvii, 20-21, and gives reasons for regarding the correct translation of *entos* as 'within.'

> 'In this conception of the Kingdom of God in the heart, religion and ethics meet. God takes the initiative and comes to the soul of man with a transcendent moral claim. When a man recognizes that claim, and voluntarily surrenders himself to it, he has come under the rule of God, and thus the Kingdom of God is established within him . . . It is in this way that the living God enters into the living experience of man, for man thus experiences God as the light of the mind, and finds in obedient fellowship with God the strength and inspiration of life.'

Thus the ethical teaching of Jesus is simply an exposition of the ethics of the Kingdom of God, of the way in which men inevitably behave when they actually come under the rule of God. All he has to say about the good life 'is simply a description of the way men behave when the Kingdom of God is really established within them.'

It is clear from the above that Mr. Marshall does not accept what is usually known as the 'apocalyptic' view of the Kingdom, and consequently cannot regard the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount as intended primarily for the moral guidance of people who expected the imminent end of the age. It is true that some of the precepts display a certain suitability or relevance to such a situation. For example, it becomes unreasonable to exact debts or hoard treasure if silver and gold will shortly be of no more value than sawdust. And even non-resistance to evil becomes reasonable if all wicked persons will shortly be liquidated in a divine Judgment. And Mr. Marshall admits that on his view of the Kingdom the interpretation of numerous moral imperatives scattered throughout the teaching of Jesus, and specially frequent in the Sermon on the Mount, 'presents one of the most difficult problems of New Testament exegesis.' His interpretation of 'Resist not him that is evil,' is that Jesus

'insists that men ought not to find revenge sweet and that the disciple of the Kingdom of God who has been wronged will not soil himself with a counter wrong. There is no idea here of absolute non-resistance to evil of any kind. The idea is simply and solely that of the renunciation of the passion for retaliation. "Do not exact vengeance for personal wrongs." Thus the real meaning of the saying is: "I tell you not to retaliate on the man who is ill-disposed to you."'

It must be admitted that Mr. Marshall faces the difficulties, and handled by m the precepts of the Sermon no longer bear the aspect of impossible ideals, ıt give practical guidance in the conduct of life. His chapter on 'The Chief loral Imperatives of Jesus' is stimulating and may prove the basis of many luable sermons on Christian conduct. His view is that Jesus must not be garded as a new Lawgiver, drawing up a code of rules to be rigidly observed. is concern was not to prescribe rules and regulations for every situation in e, for casuistry was foreign to his spirit and genius, but to bring men under ıe rule of God, freely accepted as the rule of their lives. The moral impera- ves of Jesus aim at making explicit the ethical ideals and principles which e implicit in the new relationship to God into which a man enters when the ingdom is established within him.

With regard to the teaching of Jesus on divorce, Mr. Marshall writes as llows:

'On this question Jesus took the highest possible ground, and insisted that a marriage joined by God should never be dissolved. He definitely proscribed divorce for all who ever hope to enter the Kingdom of God. In St. Matthew's two accounts of our Lord's teaching on this point, there occurs, in both cases, the saving clause that a wife may be divorced if she has been guilty of adultery (v, 32; xix, 9). But this exception is certainly not original, for St. Paul, the first to quote the teaching of Jesus on the subject, knows nothing of it.'

The 'saving clause' is 'to be dismissed as a later addition to the text, casioned by the difficulty of carrying out in practice the uncompromising aching of Jesus.' Mr. Marshall admits that not all New Testament scholars ree with him here; and it is surprising, on this theory, that 'the uncompro- ising teaching of Jesus' was not, in more cases, diluted by some 'saving ause.'

Rather more than a third of Mr. Marshall's book is devoted to an examina- on of the ethical teaching of St. Paul. He quotes Holtzmann's remark that he Pauline ethic as a whole is dominated by the metaphysical contrast tween flesh and spirit,' and observes that by 'flesh' Paul does not mean e material of which the body is composed, but the whole lower nature of an. He regards 'flesh' not as the cause of sin, but as its seat, sin being sinister power which takes up its residence in the 'flesh.' The hope for an lies in the Spirit of God acting in man's inner life, enabling him to ntrol his lower impulses and redirect them to high ends. The gift of the oly Spirit has profound ethical as well as religious results. Contrary to me now popular conceptions, Mr. Marshall holds that Paul was no believer the total depravity of man.

This book, thorough, sane, and scholarly, should be in the hands of all io wish to give teaching about the ethics of the New Testament. It is a ok, also, for the layman, for it is devoid of unnecessary technicalities, and als with the subject in a straightforward manner.

J.C.H.

THE NEW TESTAMENT LETTERS *

With the widespread decline in the practice of Bible-reading the general neglect of the New Testament Epistles must be very nearly complete, and the average layman's acquaintance with them is probably confined to such extracts as from time to time he may listen to in church. The Bishop of London has attempted to remedy this by publishing, through the O.U.P., a fresh translation of them. The result is an attractive volume in which the Epistles appear not as formal books of Scripture but as a collection of genuine letters. It is, says the Bishop,

> 'an effort to encourage a . . . kind of Bible-reading, which will lead, not perhaps to close familiarity with favourite passages, but to knowledge of whole books. We need to grasp complete arguments, doctrines, schemes of salvation, not merely choice aphorisms or comforting texts. For this purpose we should read whole books of the Bible at a sitting, as we should read magazine articles or private communications' (p.vii).

The translation of each letter is prefaced by a brief introduction giving the probable circumstances under which it was written, and there is also a brief heading to each chapter. The arrangement of the whole is roughly chronological.

It is natural in estimating the value of a new translation such as this to turn to difficult or doubtful passages, in order to see how the translator has rendered them. Bearing in mind what his object is, it must be deemed sufficient if he gives to them a clear and possible meaning. Dr. Wand succeeds in this respect quite admirably. For example, *Ephesians* i, 22f. is given thus:

> 'He hath put the universe under his feet.' In so exalting Christ He has made Him Head of a Body, the Church. That Body provides universal means of expression for one who is Himself a universal personality' p. 114);

I Corinthians xv, 29—

> 'Otherwise what would happen in the case of people baptized as proxies on behalf of those candidates for baptism who had died before they could receive the sacrament?' (p. 50);

Hebrews xi, 1 (the famous definition of faith)—

> 'Now faith is a conviction of the fulfilment of our hopes, and a continual reliance upon the unseen world' (p. 190);

and finally *I John* iii, 20—

> 'By this means we shall recognize that we are on the side of truth and shall satisfy any scruples of conscience we may feel in His presence. If we feel any such scruples, we shall remember that God is superior even to our conscience and knows all about us' (p. 206).

The two chief dangers against which the translator of the Bible into modern English has to be on his guard are pedantry and vulgarity. Dr. Wand manages to avoid them both and fairly succeeds in his aim, which he describes thus:

> 'To put the Epistles into the kind of language a Bishop might use in writing a monthly letter for his diocesan magazine, which, provided one's style is neither too stiff nor too colloquial, should offer a medium very like that of the original' (p. viii).

* *The New Testament Letters*, prefaced and paraphrased by J. W. C. Wand, D.D. (O.U.P. 1946. 7/6.)

Some of the Bishop's phrases are perhaps not very happy. For example: Luke, the beloved physician' (*Col.* iv. 14) becomes 'Dear Dr. Luke.' But these e offset by others which convey exactly the right impression. *Galatians* vi, 11, r example, is given thus:

'P.S. Here is a postscript in my own handwriting. You can tell it is mine by the big letters I make' (p. 23).

nfortunately there is a misprint in this Epistle. It has become divided into ven chapters instead of only six.

The real success of a translation like this depends, of course, upon the nount of interest which it arouses in its subject matter. This, Dr. Wand's anslation ought to do and therefore it should be recommended to all who e likely to benefit from it.

D. L. Scott.

CHARLES KINGSLEY (1819–1875)

There are signs that the Victorian age is coming into favour. The older ote of criticism, censure, even contempt, is being exchanged for one of sym-ithetic understanding and growing appreciation. There are many indications this, and not least, the present popularity of Trollope's novels. Lytton rachey's *Queen Victoria* perhaps marked the turning point. It is said that ennyson, the most typical of Victorian poets, is being read by the more dventurous of the younger generation. Of course, Wordsworth has never ased to be popular and Matthew Arnold has never been popular. 'The arretts of Wimpole Street' may have given a temporary 'boost' to Brown-g, but Browning's optimism is irritatingly out of place in our present en-ronment.

Curiously enough, the Victorian clergy have suffered less in the eclipse of ctorianism than have the poets and novelists. Thomas Arnold, John Henry ewman, Benjamin Jowett, Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, Frederick Denison aurice, Robertson of Brighton and Charles Kingsley have maintained their tus as outstanding figures in the evolution of English religion. The appear-ce of *Charles Kingsley and his Ideas,** by Guy Kendall, is the latest evidence this. Charles Kingsley was the most many-sided of this group although rhaps not the most distinguished. The influence of Dr. Arnold as an ucationist and Frederick Denison Maurice as a religious prophet and social former, have had deeper and wider influence on our English life than the hievements of Charles Kingsley.

Charles Kingsley, like so many distinguished Englishmen, was the son of parson, a Devonshire country clergyman and later Rector of Chelsea. adition still preserves in Chelsea Rectory to-day the location of Charles ngsley's bedroom and the little office off the hall where he kept his cask of . In the rectory garden a tree is pointed out under which the Duke of ellington often sat in converse with his brother, a former rector of Chelsea. ngsley's father was a gifted man, possessed of every talent, except the ent of knowing how to use them. Charles had several brothers, the most tinguished being Henry, the author of *Ravenshoe*. Charles graduated from gdalene College, Cambridge, in the Classical Tripos. He was ordained in 42, became curate of Eversley and then vicar, and retained the benefice il his death in 1875—an incumbency of thirty-one years. He became Pro-sor of History at Cambridge in 1860, Canon of Chester in 1869 and Canon Westminster in 1873. Although Dean Stanley desired that Kingsley should buried in the Abbey, his body rests, with that of his wife, in Eversley

* *Charles Kingsley and his Ideas,* by Guy Kendall. (Hutchinson. 1947. 21/-.)

churchyard, the cross over their grave bearing the unforgettable inscription *Amavimus, amamus, amabimus.*

Kingsley's wife, Fanny Grenfell, whose life of her husband can compar with Mrs. Creighton's *Life of Mandell Creighton,* was a most remarkabl woman. While keeping herself in the background she exercised a profoun influence over her husband, whose love of her was only 'on this side idolatry.

Mr. Guy Kendall's volume is not so much a biography of Kingsley, bu something more interesting — a presentation of Kingsley's ideas and ideal against the background of his life and times. And what times they were i which Charles Kingsley spent his early years! A new England was comin into existence — the steam engine had arrived, the Reform Bill had bee passed, slavery was abolished in our West Indian plantations, the hungr forties had sown the seeds of Chartism, the great industrial movement wa creating vast urban populations underpaid and overworked, herded togethe in centres where all the amenities of civilized life were lacking. The Evan gelical revival and the Clapham sect were at the height of their influence and Tractarianism, initiated by Keble's Assize Sermon in 1833, was littl more than an infant in its cradle being nursed by the Romantic movement.

Open-mindedness was one of Charles Kingsley's greatest gifts, and wha quality could be more valuable in the dawn of a new age? He was also extraordinarily courageous, and it is this combination of open-mindednes with courage which made him the influence which he became. He was highl sensitive and deeply emotional. Spiritual beauty, moral beauty, the beauty o nature inspired him. It was in poetry that he felt he best expressed himself If prophetic is the right adjective by which to describe Kingsley's adore master, F. D. Maurice, poetic is the right term by which to describe the dis ciple. As a preacher, Kingsley was practical and healthy, revealing at time profound solutions and arresting distinctions, but he was not a great pulpi orator. In cogency his sermons are much below the level of Robertson o Brighton, and in beauty of diction and rhythm they cannot be compared wit those of John Henry Newman. Kingsley wrote exquisite lyrics, unsurpasse by any Victorian. His novels rank high. *Westward Ho!* stands at the head o them. It may not be as popular with schoolboy readers as R. L. Stevenson' *Treasure Island,* but at least it comes a good second. There is no bette picture in our English literature of the men who sailed the Spanish Main i Tudor times and no more arresting account of their religious convictions Roman Catholic controversialists have said that while Littledale's *Plai Reasons against joining the Church of Rome* has secured for that Churc many converts, the reading of *Westward Ho!* by English youth has created prejudice against the Roman Church which has remained with them for th rest of their lives.

Next in attractiveness among his novels come *Hypatia,* and is there an better volume for giving its readers an understanding of the conflict of ideal political disorders, personal rivalries, and religious fanaticism which chara terized the fifth century of the Roman Empire? Kingsley's *Yeast* and *Alto Locke* preserve remarkable pictures of English life in the period whe Chartism and Romanism were becoming growing influences among the mo ardent types of Englishmen. Kingsley's educational lectures on the classic heroes, the Christian monks and hermits, and *The Roman and the Teuton* ca still be read beneficially.

Kingsley's openness of mind was manifest in two important spheres—th relation of the Christian religion to problems of social reform and the allevi tion of the miserable, insanitary, drink-sodden, ignorant condition of o labouring classes. He was inspired to service in this field by F. D. Maurice Tom Hughes of *Tom Brown's Schooldays* was one of the most energetic a

ttractive of Kingsley's colleagues: among many others were Ludlow and ansittart Neale. The best account we have of these English social re-ormers (so different from their continental contemporaries) is to be found in rofessor C. E. Raven's *Christian Socialism 1848-1854*.

Nothing throws more light on the early relations of Christian socialism ith Chartism than Mr. Kendall's account of a Chartist gathering in which harles Kingsley publicly declared: 'I am a Church of England parson and Chartist,' and Tom Hughes jumped on a chair and challenged to fight any an present who protested against singing 'God save the Queen.'

It is suggested by Mr. Kendall that Kingsley changed his political views ter in life, but we doubt it. Kingsley was always loyal to the Crown and to e Church yet maintained to the very end his loyalty to the Christian social ovement, but he came to recognize that the most effective leaders of that ovement ought to be drawn from those classes which supplied leaders in her fields of national endeavour. Such a policy, he was convinced, would nite the nation in the crusade for effective social reform.

The other field in which Kingsley exhibited his openness of mind was in the ger welcome which he gave to the discoveries of modern science, especially geology and biology, as allies, not enemies, of the Christian Faith. What-er the Bible might be interpreted as saying about the age of the world or e method of creation, Kingsley was certain that the Creator had not written one enormous and superfluous lie' on the rocks of His creation.

Equally, Kingsley was from the first on the side of Darwin and Huxley in s acceptance of the truth of biological evolution, but saw no reason to dis-nse with the Creator because we had come to accept a new conception of od's creative methods. Had Kingsley not combined profound religious faith th clear-sighted open-mindedness, he could not have taken the stand he did hen the vast majority of his fellow-churchmen took the opposite side.

If the popular mind associates anything with Kingsley beyond his novels d his delightful lyrics, notably those set to music, it is the ideal of 'muscular ristianity.' Kingsley did not coin the phrase. If anyone in his group did in it, it was probably Tom Hughes. Kingsley was no lover of smugness d the sedentary life. Although hardly an athlete he believed in physical ness. As a Cambridge undergraduate he initiated the one-day walk from mbridge to London. Although not a sporting parson, he kept a hunter nen he could afford to do so, and maintained it, not out of his clerical in-me, but from the fees of his pupils. He was a great fisherman, and in proving his vicarage grounds he worked hard himself and commandeered e services of Benson and Lightfoot. He introduced Sunday cricket for the ls of his parish as it was the only day in the week they had for sport, but discouraged his own sons, who possessed week-day leisure, from cricket-g on Sunday.

We are grateful to Mr. Guy Kendall for his stimulating and timely lume, which contains among much which is admirable some very acute con-butions to literary criticism. H.D.A.M.

C. S. LEWIS AND THE MIRACULOUS*

To many Christians a stumbling-block, to would-be Christians foolishness. ch is the enduring problem of the New Testament miracles. Half a century o Matthew Arnold wrote:

'Christianity is immortal: it has eternal truth, inexhaustible value, a boundless future. But our popular religion at present conceives the birth,

* *Miracles: A Preliminary Study*, by C. S. Lewis. (Geoffrey Bles. 1947. 10/6.)

> ministry and death of Christ as altogether steeped in prodigy, brimful of miracle: and *miracles do not happen* . . . To a great many persons this is tantamount to stopping their use of the Bible and of the Christian religion: for they have made up their minds that what it popularly called *miracle* never does really happen, and that the belief in it arises out of ignorance or mistake . . . The objections to miracles do, and more and more will, without insistence, without attack, without controversy, make their own force felt: and that the sanction of Christianity, if Christianity is not to be lost along with its miracles, must be found elsewhere . . . This being so, there is nothing one would more desire for a person or document one greatly values, than to make them independent of miracles.' (Preface to *Literature and Dogma,* edition 1897.)

Diametrically opposed to and manifestly irreconcilable with this conception is Mr. Lewis's claim that

> 'in Christianity the more we understand what God is who is said to be present and the purpose for which He is said to have appeared, the more credible the miracles become. That is why we seldom find the Christian miracles denied, except by those who have abandoned some part of the Christian doctrine. The mind which asks for a non-miraculous Christianity is a mind in process of relapsing from Christianity into mere "religion."' (pp. 160-1.)

Thus what Matthew Arnold considered a stumbling-block, Mr. Lewis regards as the chief corner-stone of the Christian edifice. We believe that Mr. Lewis is wrong and that Matthew Arnold is right in so far as he saw that there ought not to be any incongruity between Nature and Grace, between the natural and the spiritual.

In dividing the universe into two sharply defined categories — the natural and the supernatural — Mr. Lewis sets up an overt dualism between two contrasted claims, both of which will continue to strive for supremacy. He thus perpetuates the detrimental conflict between science and religion. That he does so with literary artistry and ingenious naïvety in no way conceals the difficulty of the problem. The supernatural is conceived not as the highest development of a total reality, of which the natural or physical is the lowest, but as standing outside nature altogether. Hence for our glimpses of the supernatural, the natural has to be 'done something to,' has to be 'invaded' or 'interfered' with. This piercing of the natural by the supernatural is not done 'arbitrarily in order to get the characters out of difficulty,' but merely to reassure us who are destined to live in an incongruous world: 'a cataract of bears, babies and bananas,' an 'immoderate deluge of atoms, orchids, oranges, cancers, canaries, fleas, gases, tornadoes and toads.' (p. 81.) When such an invasion occurs, the result is a miracle, of which we are able to take cognizance, because we ourselves possess a 'rational and moral element' which is 'a point of force from the supernatural working its way into Nature.' (p. 49.)

It is obvious that Mr. Lewis arrives at this conception by abandoning the evidence and methods of modern scientific enquiry, and by refusing to attach any importance to historical perspective. His confused thinking in regard to Nature may be due to his total disregard of the sobering effect that the development of the historical perspective has had upon all spheres of scientific enquiry, and not least upon biblical research.

He bases his interpretation of miracles on his study of the Gospel narratives alone. We are asked to study the historical evidence for ourselves, and to regard with suspicion books about the New Testament which are written by modern scholars among whom we move as 'sheep among wolves.' If Mr

.ewis means by 'scholars' lay obscurantist theologians, we heartily agree. 3ut even if we accept Mr. Lewis's challenge not to study scholastic interpreta- ions of the Gospels, but to go to the Gospels themselves, it is difficult to see n what grounds he convinces himself of the incongruity between the natural nd the supernatural. From the teaching of Jesus no evidence of such dis- armony can be adduced. For Him the supernatural is spiritual reality which s reflected in the products and processes of the natural world. Jesus teaches s to recognize the hand of God forever working in our environment, and not, s Mr. Lewis would have us believe, in the effects of the occasional probings f a divine finger into an alien world. R. W. Smith.

THE FAMILY *

'The family in the modern world,' observes Mr. Urwin, 'is a shadow of s former self.' The economic basis on which it rested has shifted; while it egan as an economic-producing unit, it has become only an economic-con- uming unit, and may even cease to be that.

> 'The ancient clan family held lands, flocks and herds in common and shared the labour of tending them. Women spun and wove, baked, tended the household, laboured in the fields and gleaned at harvest. Even children began early to earn their keep, tending cows and sheep . . . In towns industry had a domestic character. The craftsman's workshop adjoined his home and was sometimes part of it; his apprentices lived in, and his wife and children often participated.'

The industrial revolution disposed of this kind of thing, for the connection etween home and industry was broken. Home was now a place to eat and leep, but not to work, in; and the father no longer directed his children's abour. Then came compulsory education, withdrawing the child from the abour market. The burden of maintaining the family was the same, but re- ources were less. To have children became more costly; they were no longer n economic asset but a liability.

> 'It is not without significance that the decline of the birthrate in Britain dates from the period of the institution of compulsory education.'

And then, of course, there is the emancipation of women, not only political, ut domestic. A wife and mother need no longer spin and weave, make lothes, or bake bread. The factory does all this for her, and labour-saving evices in the home make things easy. The nursery school, school dinners, hildren's clinics, canteens of various kinds relieve her of domestic responsi- ilities. And as children become less of a responsibility, child-bearing becomes ore of a nuisance and is reduced to a minimum. But as family interest de- reases sex-interest tends to increase.

> 'A curious fact is that the surging of sex seems to intensify with the development of civilization. Anthropologists appear to have destroyed the legend that primitive races are more licentious than civilized ones. Sexual taboos are very strong among primitive peoples, and sexual desires, so far from being strong and active, have to be stimulated by the tribal dance.'

One tends to forget that primitive man is perpetually hungry, and abstinence rom food assists continence. Moreover, the 'savage' has no erotic cinema, o salacious novels, no Freudian psychology: his 'untutored mind' is not aturated with sex.

* *Can the Family Survive?* By E. C. Urwin. (S.C.M. Press. 1946. 5/-.)

The present fashion, whatever be the motive, is for the family to be small; yet the advantages of being one of a large family may be considerable.

> '"Why doesn't someone say what fun it is to belong to a big family?" said someone tired of hearing complaints of the costliness of having children. One of the greatest advantages which can be given to any child, it has been said, is the possession of brothers and sisters. "The natural and wholesome discipline of life in a large family circle provides the surest means of avoiding psychological difficulties, and is a great help in the sound upbringing of any child," says the statement on *Marriage and Parenthood* of the Society of Friends. "Membership in a family of four or five may be of more value than an expensive education — certainly it will be of far greater value than the possession by the family of a car."'

The nexus between the family and property has been much dwelt upon, and both come under a like condemnation at the hands of progressive persons. The link certainly exists, or has existed. In the feudal period family life rested upon an economic basis in real property; the typical unit being the family farm. All members of the family were active partners in its life. To-day only vestiges of this property basis remain. Even among the well-to-do it is disappearing through the incidence of income-tax and death duties. Private property, along with the family, may be doomed. Sentence upon both has already been passed by our doctrinaire secular idealists. And yet it has still to be proved that the successors to these old-time institutions will be any less prolific of evil. Attempts on the part of the community to underpin the family by the provision of housing and 'family allowances' at the public expense are signs of a widespread conviction that we cannot afford to let the family slip. As Mrs. Bosanquet has observed, 'No one has ever yet devised an adequate substitute for a parent' — or, at least, for a good parent.

> 'Conceive the task of the school unless upheld by the home. As many tried and baffled teachers would confess, after bitter experience, if the home unloads on the school the products of its own misgovernment, the task of the school becomes almost insuperable.'

In the good family is learned the spirit of give and take, as well as fidelity, kindness and affection. For it need not be assumed that successful family life is easy, and Mr. Urwin has outlined some of the difficulties in an admirable chapter, 'From one Generation to Another.' And he ends his book with an altogether excellent chapter entitled 'The Unmarried,' in which he deals most sympathetically with those 'to whom, although supremely fitted for the joys of home and desirous of marriage and parenthood, these things are denied by conditions over which they have no control.' He declares it to have been the most difficult chapter in the book to write, and we can well believe it. But it is a good chapter, sympathetic and understanding. Indeed the whole book is an extremely sound piece of work.

J.C.H.

THE GROUNDWORK OF THE GOSPELS*

R. O. P. Taylor holds that the Gospels

> 'are the fruit of a long process, initiated and determined by God. Even by itself the preceding history would lead us to infer that the Gospels were the outcome of a divine intention, the calculated result of God's

* *The Groundwork of the Gospels*, by R. O. P. Tayler, late Provost of Cumbrae. (Blackwell. 1946. 7/6.)

guidance of the human mind — and that, after all, is surely a true definition of inspiration.'

Before stating this conclusion he has touched upon the various influences which had affected the Jewish nation, Chaldaean, Egyptian, Persian, Hellenistic, so he concludes that

'at Rome and abroad, the men of Galilee as of all Jewry, having inherited all that the great civilizations could teach, as well as the knowledge specially given to them of the one God, were in a position to grasp, to teach and to circulate the religion which was the consummation of all religions.'

Probably most will agree that the Provost's conclusion is sound, though one or two of the details of the argument by which he supports it may seem little fanciful. But it is when we come to the discussion of the formation of the Gospels, especially of *Mark*, which occupies the greater part of the book, that doubts as to the Provost's methods and conclusions begin to arise. The thesis he maintains is that not long after the resurrection Peter, who felt strongly his duty to bear witness to Christ, formulated his remembrances of what Jesus had done and taught in such a manner that they could be taught to converts section by section, and it is these 'lessons' as perhaps we might call them which Mark eventually committed to writing. Naturally he rests his contention upon the well-known passage in Papias but he interprets it in a different way from that in which it is usually interpreted. The word *chreia* he was using

'not in the vaguer sense of "necessity" but in its technical sense of a weighty anecdote. Hence we must take him as meaning that Peter drew up his lessons with a view to supplying maxims and anecdotes to be learnt in order to be quoted — a basis for thought and discussion.'

In another place he justifies this meaning of the word *chreia* by a quotation from Theon, a rhetor of the first or second century A.D. Again he says that instead of saying that Mark reproduced things as he remembered them, we should translate Papias's words — '*as he had them in mind*' or '*produced them from memory*.' That is to say that Mark wrote down word for word what he had learnt by heart.

Here the Latinisms in *Mark* seem to present a difficulty; if they are due to Mark he was not reproducing word for word what Peter had taught him, and if they are not due to Mark they must be Peter's own, which does not seem very probable.

The writer explains, no doubt rightly, that the Jewish system of elementary education consisted chiefly in making the scholars learn by heart the words of the teacher, from which he infers that those who learned the gospel story from Christian teachers would be content to commit what they had been taught to memory and would not write it down. This may be true as long as we are thinking only of Jews, but does it follow that it is equally true of Hellenistic Gentiles? These men, as the finds at Oxyrhynchus show, were men much given to writing, so there is no reason why some of them should not have written down the teaching they had received. May some of them not have made little collections of 'Sayings of Jesus' similar to those of a later date found at Oxyrhynchus? Indeed, one such seems to be embedded in *Mark* iv, as is indicated by the recurring use of the words 'and he said.' If the discourse in *Mark* iv is really Peter's record of what he heard, it is passing strange that he should have given the explanation of the parable of the sower made privately to the disciples in the middle of a discourse addressed to the multitude.

I have called attention to this because it is one indication that Mark's gospel, like those of Matthew and Luke, is composite, but it is not the only one; some scholars are of opinion that *Mark* vi, 31 to vii, 37 are a variant traditions of the same events as those described in *Mark* viii, 1 to ix, 1, and there are good reasons for supposing that *Mark* xiv, 1 to xvi, 8 is a fusion of two narratives. These considerations make us hestitate to accept Papias's account of how Mark's gospel was written as correct, and the accuracy of Papias's statement is the very foundation stone of the Provost's theory. That much of Mark's gospel may rest alternately on the testimony of Peter is likely enough, for Peter was an eyewitness of most of the events there recorded; but not of all of them; he cannot have been an eyewitness surely of the incident at Herod's Court which led to the beheading of the Baptist; he was not an eyewitness of what happened at the Tomb when the women went to visit it. We have no evidence that he was an eyewitness of the Crucifixion, but the Provost surmises that Peter may have been watching at a distance and that what Mark records may have been what Peter saw and heard. But does not the fact that Mark mentions that certain women were looking on afar off suggest that they and not Peter were his informants?

He holds that Mark's gospel ended and was intended to end with the words 'for they were afraid.' That it so ended is perhaps as likely as that it had a further section which has been lost. But can we be sure that it was intended to end so? Many a book has been left unfinished by its author and Mark's gospel may be one of them.* Is it not reasonable to suppose that as Peter in *Acts* constantly lays stress on his function as a witness of the resurrection he should in his teaching have given an account of Christ's appearance to him and that Mark would have included this account in his gospel?

We will now give a few examples of what seem to us unsound arguments used by the Provost. He holds that Jesus habitually spoke Greek and one of the reasons he alleges for this opinion is that Jesus 'spent the first years of His life in which he learned to talk in Egypt, that is to say in a Greek-speaking community.' This implies that he regards the flight into Egypt as historical, yet he appears to attribute not the matter only but the actual wording of *Luke* i and ii to the Virgin Mary, for he speaks of it as the story 'which Mary had deliberately memorized,' but he gives no indication of the point in the dream narrative at which the story of the flight into Egypt can be inserted.

His treatment of *Luke* i and ii shows clearly how unreliable a guide the Provost is. He says of them

> 'the style of writing is quite different from Luke's own. It has all the signs of a statement which Luke took over without change.'

Yet when I turn to the table of words and phrases characteristic of St. Luke's Gospel in Sir J. Hawkins's *Horae Synopticae*, I find that 212 such words and phrases occur in chapters I and II, that is practically one-seventh of the whole (1,453), though these chapters are less than one-seventh of the whole book; in other words, characteristically dream-words and phrases are rather more common in i and ii than in the other parts of the Gospel. He apparently regards our *Matthew* as a translation of an Aramaic original but makes no effort to explain how it comes about that there are so many close verbal resemblances between *Matthew* and *Mark*. Could it be mere coincidence or

* Shelley's *Triumph of Life* ends abruptly with the words: 'Then what is life? I cried.' Yet nobody supposes that he intended it to end so. We know that the reason he went no further was that he was drowned. It is therefore possible that Mark, like Shelley, meant to add more, but was prevented we know not how.

ire we to suppose that the translator kept a copy of *Mark* beside him and ised it as a sort of crib? Either hypothesis seems equally preposterous.

But perhaps the most astounding statement of all is that on page 9.

> 'The Gospel of *Mark*, which is basic to the others, was written only a generation after the Crucifixion — say thirty-five years. In so close a society, the leaders of which (apart from Paul) had been in the company of Jesus during the great days, it would not be difficult to compile a reliable account of the events and the person who had determined their career even after that interval. Nor is it possible that Gospel should have been adopted, officially one may say, by the community unless it tallied with the recollections of many who had been with the Lord.'

Mark's Gospel was probably written in Rome, but the Church in Rome can iardly be the community referred to, for we have no reason to suppose that here were 'many who had been with the Lord' in that Church, nor is there ny evidence that Mark's gospel was officially adopted anywhere during the ifetime of the first generation of Christians; indeed, the scanty evidence we ossess suggests that it was not till about the middle of the second century hat the four canonical gospels received a sort of official recognition.

The author is widely read and quotes largely from writers ancient and nodern, but he seems to have rather strange ideas as to what constitutes istorical evidence, to overlook evidence which tells against his theory and o take more or less plausible inferences for established facts. To give but ne instance, he says that the house of Mark's mother 'was certainly the ouse in which the last supper was held.' It may have been, but that it was, s merely a fairly plausible inference from the fact that it was the one to vhich Peter went on his escape from prison.

E. R. Buckley.

WEIGHED IN THE BALANCE*

Bishop Heber drew no distinction between the different forms of eathenism prevailing from Greenland's icy mountains to India's coral trand. Adherents of these cults were all alike 'benighted' and bound in rror's chain. Such uncompromising notions were typical of the bishop's lay, while some early Fathers, though in the presence of a dominant aganism, were able to see the *Logos spermatikos* at work in the world efore the Christian Church had come into visible existence. Though others toutly affirmed that all resemblances to Christian thought and practice mong pagans must be attributed to the demons, who thus sought to lead istray, if it were possible, even the elect. In large measure the cleavage vas between enlightened Greek, and dogmatic Latin.

A not dissimilar division displays itself to-day. The fiery Tertullian might ind his equivalent in Karl Barth, whose verdict on the relationship which Christianity bears to other systems is expressed in the laconic formula, There is no contact. Barth's negation is echoed in less aggressive terms, and supported by wider knowledge, by Dr. Hendrick Kraemer in his *Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (1938). In contrast to this, Dr. J. N. Farquar, a distinguished Scots Missionary in India, in his *Crown of Hinduism* (1915), regards Christianity as the fulfilment of previous revelations nd experiences received by non-Christian peoples. In like manner the Jeru-

* *Many Creeds, One Cross,* by C. E. Storrs. (S.C.M. 6/-.)

salem Conference of 1928 declared that just because in Jesus Christ the Light that lighteth every man shone forth in its full splendour, 'we find rays of that same light where He is unknown and even is rejected.' Again, in 1932 an American Laymen's Foreign Missions Enquiry, published its findings under the title *Rethinking Missions,* defining the missionary motive as 'to seek with people of other lands a true knowledge and love of God, expressing in life and word what we have learned through Jesus Christ.' Mr. Storrs is inclined to feel, however, that this manifesto was 'based on a theory of Christian evangelism, which threatened to remove all sense of urgency from the missionary enterprise and cut the nerve of the movement.' But it has not yet been tested in practice.

The hospitable standpoint of these American laymen is carried even further by Dr. Radhakrishnan, who sees no hope for the religious future of the world if the ideal of a World Commonwealth is not extended to include the religious sphere. He recommends the Hindu solution, 'which sees the unity of religion not in a common creed but in a common quest.' Though Mr. Storrs does not identify himself with these more liberal views, he is far from accepting the Barth-Kraemer platform, as his understanding and sympathetic chapters on the various world-religions show.

That oriental cults such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc., are becoming more or less popular among certain Western intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals, has become obvious through the writings of Mr. Aldous Huxley, and others. Whether one considers this as evidence of Western spiritual bankruptcy or not depends on one's point of view. Hinduism, of course, is a mixed magnitude containing pools where lambs may drink and elephants may swim. From the highest mystical philosophy to the grossest superstitions and most obscene practices every grade of religion can find a place. Mr. Nehru writes of Hinduism that it is a religion 'of the butcher . . . of baths and top-knots, of all manner of marks and fasts and ceremonies which have lost all meaning.' Even their gods are manufactured in Birmingham and Japan. One who has spent many years in India as an official, Mr. John Coatman, writes,

> 'One blazing hot-weather day I drew water in a Central Punjab village for a woman of the untouchables who dared not approach the well. She wanted the water for her sick child, and none of the caste Hindu villagers had attended to her in all her long wait of two hours for fear of pollution.'

A similar tabu prevented the priestly accusers of Jesus from entering Pilate's Judgment Hall, 'lest they should be defiled.' When religion overrules normal feelings of humanity it becomes a curse.

In examining Buddhism Mr. Storrs has a curious passage:

> 'Just as our Lord used His synoptic teaching for the simpler hearers and reserved for deeper and more receptive disciples His mystical teachings of the Logos, recorded in St. John, so, it is claimed, Gautama reserved his deepest and highest thought for those who could receive it.'

Yet the Synoptic Gospels indicate that the teaching they record was given to the disciples, amongst whom were Peter and John—presumably receptive enough. And did Jesus ever mention the Logos? Did it belong to His universe of discourse? This, however, is a detail. The book deals fairly with the world-religions, and may well serve the parochial clergyman as the basis of talks on missionary problems. J. C. H.

THE SOCIAL PARADISE

*The Social Paradise** is an inspiring little volume by an interesting personality. Mr. de Bary was a Franciscan — a Roman Catholic priest — who many years ago entered our English Church, became domestic chaplain to the Earl of Shaftesbury and since those days has been a country vicar. *The Social Paradise* is the exposition not of a materialistic socialism but of a spiritual socialism mediated by Jesus Christ and originating from the Fatherhood of God and the Divine Sonship of men which finds its appropriate and perfect expression in the spirit of human brotherliness. Mr. de Bary's outlook is as optimistic as it is spiritual. He writes:—

> 'To believe in Jesus Christ is to believe in the divine worth of every man, and to believe with Him that this earth shall become the Social Paradise. To believe in Jesus Christ is to feel and know that what He sees we can see, that what He knows we can know, that what he loves we can love, that for what He prays we may pray for, what work He does we may do; what he achieves we may also gain, through the humble and saintly interchange of ourselves with Him' (p. 22).

In two other passages Mr. de Bary finely presents the true character and function of the Bible.

> 'The Bible is the Book which, recording man's discipline of faith in God, unfolds in the memorial of human times and moments that greater policy of God, in which God, working through man's faith in Him, gradually consolidates earth and Heaven in one eternal fellowship' (p. 18).
>
> 'The New Testament is the World's Classic of the Way of the Healing of the World's Schisms, the World's Sins, and the World's Sorrow, and the World's Unfaith' (p. 39).

Truly the writer of these words is a liberated soul of whom it may be said in St. John's words: 'We have passed over from death into life because we love the brethren.' H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

BISHOP COLENSO

SIR,

The article on Bishop Colenso, by the Rev. D. L. Scott, interested me very much, though I feel the title was just a little provocative. The excitement which raged throughout the Church during those seven years was phenomenal — the moves and counter-moves, the meetings of bishops, memorials here, protestations there, inhibitions, the Capetown trial (the speeches of the prosecutors alone went on for five days), the excommunication, and so on, and so on. All this must have surprised Colenso more than anyone else. Then the Privy Council took a hand and reversed a good deal of what had gone before; and the whole question of the position of the Colonial Church was laid bare. Who would ever have thought it in, say, 1853?

* *The Social Paradise*: A résumé of its Message for the Present Time, by Richard de Bary, author of the original issue of *The Social Paradise*. (Bournemouth: For the Author: Wimborne St. Giles. 2/- net.)

I suppose that some will argue, as did Pusey, that had Colenso not been a bishop his writings would have gone unnoticed. And again, perhaps it was his way of doing things, his method of presentation, which so shook the Church. Mr. Scott writes of Colenso as being forthright. I incline rather to the belief that both Gray and Colenso were very obstinate men—but the obstinacy of a Cornishman will go far and last long.

Colenso had a massive intellect, which ranged over many and varied matters. His courage was astounding, and his grim resolve never dimmed. He was in some ways not easy to deal with, and he was difficult to understand. Tait (then Bishop of London), in what I think was an unguarded moment, gave rein to his personal feelings towards Colenso when he wrote in his diary, March 5, 1853:

> 'Yesterday I had a long conference with Bishop Colenso, from which I gained no hope. He seems fanatically convinced that he has a great mission to save the theology and religion of England from a great collision with Science. He seemed to me very wild, and to be very likely to go very far in discarding the old faith.'

Not a great deal is known of Colenso's early and private life. He was born in 1814, but did not receive baptism until 1827. His father, also John William, is described as an officer of the Duchy of Cornwall. The bishop's brother became a Fellow of Exeter College, and his sister married Nicholas Kendall, a clerk in Holy Orders. The father died young, and the future bishop went to Devonport with his mother to live with his grandfather, Thomas Blackmore, a solicitor (I think). Colenso would then be about ten years old, and it is on record that he was even then remarkable for his wonderful attainments, especially in mathematics. His appearance and precocity were noticeable.

There is a strange memorial in St. Austell church to Colenso's memory. It is commented on in a history of that town, published in 1897. In a window is depicted our Lord before Caiaphas, and St. Peter is also seen warming himself before a fire. The artist has contrived to introduce the words, '*He hath spoken blasphemy.*' The brass underneath makes no reference whatsoever to Colenso's episcopate.

J. L. Kempthorne,
St. Enoder Rectory, Cornwall. *Hon. C.F.*

DISTRUST OF THE BRAINS TRUST

Sir,

I was amazed to read in the paragraph by Prof. S. H. Hooke on page 62 of *The Modern Churchman* for April:—

> 'At some point in the history of man a breach has taken place in the right relationship between God and man as a free spirit. All the moral evil in the world results from this'!

I showed this to my sister and she said: 'Write and ask for the date!'

Why is it that theologians cling to the Fall? If they can't have one in 4004 B.C. with Archbishop Ussher they either have a 'premundane fall' (with N. P. Williams) or else some mundane fall of vague date—neither in the Stone Age, nor before, nor after it—and at a time when all mankind were gathered together in one spot.

Surely it is sufficient to say that man has not risen to the heights to which God has called him? He finds it easier to let the animal in him triumph over his true humanity.

I do not like the statement of Mr. Hardwick:

'The existence of such beings cannot be proved or disproved [spirits of evil].'

Surely this argument is the one traditionalists love? As the existence of such beings cannot be proved or disproved we are bound to believe what holy Church or the Bible teach about it.

Why not be bold and say, There is no particle of evidence for the existence of such beings? In science we are forced to assume there is one mind and only one behind the universe. There is no evidence that sometimes an opposing power gets in possession of things and causes a conflict. If an experiment does not turn out as we expected, we do not say: An evil spirit has been at work, nor do we say: A miracle has happened. We first of all make sure that the experiment was properly conducted. If the result is still not what we would expect, we are forced to modify the Laws of Science in order to fit them in with the results of our experiment.

Again, at the bottom of page 62 Mr. Hardwick says: 'A friend who has worked as a missionary in Central Africa has told me that there one can hardly avoid belief in the existence of evil spirits.'

Does this imply that evil spirits exist in Central Africa? — the Clarendon Bible on *St. Luke* says that evil spirits do occur in non-Christian lands, and Dr. Plummer on *St. Matthew* quotes a case where a patient had demon possession. Surely these are cases where 'evil communications' corrupt good manners?

R. R. Lewis.

9 High Street, Hitchin, Herts.

April 22nd, 1947.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY

SIR,

In reading your article on Alfred Adler, in the April *The Modern Churchman*, I find a reference (page 45) to Mrs. Eddy and Christian Science in which it is inferred that psychology is used in Christian Science practice.

This inference is entirely erroneous. Christian Science is the science, or true knowledge, of the divine Mind not of the human mind, and it has therefore no connection whatever with psychology.

I write to inform you of this as I am sure you would not wish to allow a mistaken impression to remain uncorrected.

Freda R. Tompson.

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RELIGIOUS FILMS IN A COUNTRY PARISH

SIR,

Hanley Castle (Worcs) has no cinema, the nearest being several miles away, and so films are popular and in demand. Having it in mind that a film might attract those who usually stay away from church, it was decided to hold film services on five Sunday evenings in Lent. The loan of a 16-mm. G.T.H. talkie-projector was obtained from Worcester, together with a large white matt screen. This was hung from the Rood Screen in one church and from the top of a tall step-ladder in the other (there are two villages with two churches in the parish) and let down after the notices, and before the third

hymn at Evensong, the films (lasting about 30 minutes) taking the place of an address.

Considering the weather and the fact that ice and snow made the roads difficult, the attendance was remarkably good. Normal evening congregations number about 50. The films were shown in the two churches alternately, and in spite of ice and snow attendance on the worst night never fell below 75, and was usually between 120 and 150, and the last film (the 1 hour and 10 minute *Manger to the Cross*) which was shown twice, once in the afternoon in one village school, and later in the church in the other village, was seen by about 250 people. The congregations were most appreciative, and from the schools (two church schools and a grammar school) comes word of the stimulus given to teaching by discussion of the films and of their interpretation of the stories portrayed. The films shown were *The Prodigal Son, A Certain Nobleman* and *Manger to the Cross,* supplied by the Dawn Trust, Aylesbury, and *The School*, a simple but effective documentary of school life in Palestine 2,000 years ago, and *Kamalam*, an Indian missionary tale from Religious Films, Golders Green, London, N.W.11. Naturally there were many points of agreement with the presentation of the gospel stories, and disagreement also, but everyone agreed that they were stimulating to the imagination, and that the films were reverently and sincerely done. Perhaps the congregation enjoyed them more than the vicar ! From a modernist standpoint a good deal of dubious interpretation was allowed to pass unchallenged. On the whole *The Prodigal* and *The Nobleman* were entirely acceptable — the latter had a most moving moment when Jesus confronts a man possesed with an evil spirit and quells his ferocious attack with his gaze.

Manger to the Cross was more open to question. This film was made in 1913, and has attached to it a sound track, consisting of extracts from the Gospels which deal with the episodes in the life of Our Lord thereon depicted. The photography is good for 1913, but not up to modern standards. The treatment of some of the miracles, *e.g.* the turning of the water into wine, the healing of the sick of the palsy, and other healings, which are always followed by a stereotyped gesture on the part of the healed, and the inordinate space devoted to the Massacre of the Innocents (which frightened some of the children) showed a considerable degree of unimaginativeness. On the other hand the Triumphal Entry and most of the Passion scene was fine, but I think the archaic photography produced a sense of ' unreality ' in the minds of some of the younger spectators, and this is the last thing required of a religious film. But it was all most decently and reverently done, and the people liked it in the main.

In spite of inexperience and difficulties, the attempt was well worth while, and would seem to show that a religious approach to the public upon lines familiar to them in secular life can successfully and reverently be made. One of the films was shown at a Padre's hour to troops in the parish, on a poor projector, but was remarkably well received (we believe the Chaplain General has ordered a number of copies of films for Army use, and the Naval authorities also) and there seems to be scope for use in this way, as well as in schools.

JOHN D. PEARCE-HIGGINS.

Hanley Castle, Worcs.